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Abstract
This thesis examines the government-industry relationship in the regulation 
of pharmaceutical prices in the UK, through the pharmaceutical price 
regulation scheme (PPRS). It takes a broadly institutionalist approach to 
explaining and understanding the design and persistence of this idiosyncratic 
form of pharmaceutical cost control. Broad factors such as the global nature 
of the pharmaceutical industry and its industrial importance in the British 
economy, as well as the conception of the British state’s role, the place of 
parliament in framing regulation and the organisation of the executive all play 
a part in underpinning the PPRS as a co-operative policy community 
between government and industry for the control of medicine costs to the 
NHS. Key to the dynamics of this sector of policy is the interplay between the 
industrial policy and health policy concerns of government, in a unique 
relationship in which government is both the primary sponsor and customer 
of the industry.
The thesis develops a theoretical framework and five working hypotheses for 
the study of three cases of policy development in the PPRS during the 
1990s. The empirical research is undertaken through interviews with key 
players across industry, government and parliament, as well as the analysis 
of government and industry documents and legislation.
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Introduction
Introduction
The core of pharmaceutical price regulation in the UK consists of the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), which has existed in one 
form or another since 1957. This is a voluntary scheme that regulates the 
level of profits that pharmaceutical companies may earn on their business 
with the National Health Service (NHS). Its terms are negotiated periodically 
between the Department of Health (DOH) and the Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI).
The PPRS is unique and contrasts sharply with other European systems of 
price regulation, which between them take one of several different ‘off-the- 
shelf approaches to pharmaceutical cost control. In all European countries, 
cost containment in health care has been a major determining factor in the 
design of pharmaceutical price control. Yet public policy in pharmaceuticals is 
also driven by industrial policy concerns. The industry is a major ‘high-tech’ 
employer and a significant contributor to the science base of many countries. 
Its investments are highly sought after.1 The aims of cost containment and 
those of industrial policy (or industry promotion) pull in opposite directions 
and the balance between the two has defined the politics of pharmaceutical 
price regulation in the UK for several decades.
It is the purpose of this thesis to explain the persistence of the PPRS through 
the 1990s. Structural and institutional factors are identified which underpin 
the PPRS ‘policy community’ and which are responsible for its persistence 
and its change.
This thesis asks why a system so idiosyncratic has persisted in the UK, alone 
among European countries, which face similar dual policy pressures in this 
field. It proposes that the structural context of pharmaceutical policy has 
combined with institutional aspects of the British polity and its bureaucratic 
and administrative organisation to entrench the PPRS and underpin its
1 Burstall, M.L. and Dunning, John (1985), p. 189.
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persistence as a system of supply side regulation. An interplay between 
industrial policy and the procurement of medicines has defined policy in a 
way that seeks to balance the two important concerns of the government.
In answering the question as to why a co-operative, non-statutory system of 
regulation has been at the heart of the economic regulation of the 
pharmaceutical industry and has represented and enabled the successful co­
existence of government and industry aims for so long, the thesis takes a 
broadly institutionalist approach to analysing the PPRS. It invokes 
institutionalist and policy-community approaches to the analysis of policy 
making to create an analytical framework for approaching the question. From 
this framework five hypotheses are proposed, which arise from the 
examination of the structural and institutional context of policy making.
A key feature of government-industry relations in the sector, which has been 
both a cause and an outcome of the PPRS, has been the persistence of a 
co-operative relationship between government and industry, expressed 
through a co-operative policy community. As an abiding feature of the 
government-industry relationship in this sector, the five hypotheses between 
them suppose that this co-operative relationship is fundamental to the 
development of policy in the sector and the desire to maintain it a central 
delimitation of the choices both sides make in their strategies for the 
development of policy and their negotiations over it with each other.
Three policy developments in the 1990s are examined in order to test the 
hypotheses: the negotiation of the scheme in 1999; the passage of the 
Health Bill in 1999, which contained specific clauses related to the PPRS; 
and the negotiation of the scheme in 1993. The studies are undertaken 
through interviews with the key individuals in government, industry and 
parliament who have been responsible for policy development, as well as 
through the analysis of relevant government, industry and parliamentary 
documents.
15
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Interviewees were contacted on the basis of their role in the 1999 PPRS 
negotiations and the passage of the Health Bill. The large majority of those 
contacted agreed to interview. Some notable exceptions proved not to be 
critical to the research outcomes and alternative means of on-the-record 
evidence of their views were sourced. These consisted of one industry 
participant in particular and two government ministers, Baroness Jay and 
Baroness Hayman, none of whose roles and positions could not be deduced 
from the interviews that were undertaken or from on-the-record sources.
Interviews were semi-structured: structured around the five working 
hypotheses, as well as enabling broader and less structured input from all 
interviewees on the nature and determinants of policy development.
Chapter 1 analyses the structural context of pharmaceutical policy making: 
the place of the pharmaceutical Industry in the British economy, the UK as a 
location for global pharmaceutical investment, the changing shape of 
corporate structure in the sector, the supply and demand sides of the 
pharmaceutical market and the implications of all these factors for politics 
and policy.
Chapter 2 analyses the functioning of the PPRS in detail, as well as the 
administrative architecture of regulation and other mechanisms of cost 
containment in the health care sector which complement the scheme.
Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical framework and develops an institutionalist 
and policy community approach with which to examine the PPRS and related 
policy. The five working hypotheses are developed from both the structural 
context set out in Chapter 1 and the theoretical analysis undertaken here.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 analyse in detail the three instances of policy 
development in the 1990s, against which the hypotheses are judged.
Chapter 7 is the conclusions to the thesis.
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pharmaceutical price regulation
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1.2 The UK as a pharmaceutical industry location
1.3 Corporate structure and consolidation
1.4 Pharmaceutical supply and demand
1.5 Political implications and policy
1.6 Overview of the UK pharmaceuticals market
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This chapter analyses the structural context of pharmaceutical industry 
regulation: the importance of the industry in the UK economy and the 
importance of the UK for the global industry, as a research base; how the 
shifting global corporate structure of the sector interplays with and affects 
these concerns; and the nature of the supply and demand sides of the sector 
in the purchase of medicines for the NHS. These factors underpin both the 
aims and resources of government and industry in arriving at agreement on 
the PPRS.
The relationship between the UK economy and the pharmaceutical industry 
is distinctive. For the UK economy the industry is of particular importance and 
the industry regards the UK as an important location for its operations. These 
two points are interrelated but the former is also related strongly to the 
relative position of the pharmaceutical industry among other industries in the 
British economy.
1.1 The pharmaceutical industry in the UK economy
There is a vast array of literature exploring the causes of Britain’s economic 
decline, ostensibly in the post-war era but in reality stretching as far back as 
the turn of the twentieth century.2 The 1980s and 1990s have seen a 
significant turn-around and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the 
UK was, by 2003, higher than in Italy, France or Germany,3 making the UK 
the richest large economy in Europe. Nevertheless, industrial decline remains 
a salient issue for politicians and governments, ingrained in their psyche, and 
Britain can claim to be a world leader in only a few industrial sectors. Among 
these industrial sectors is pharmaceuticals. It is a high value, research 
intensive sector of the UK economy.
The pharmaceutical industry is the leading investor in research and 
development (R&D) in the UK economy, responsible for 37% of total R&D
2 See, for example: Hall, Peter (1986); Coates D. and Hillard J. (eds.) (1986); Wilks, S. (1984), 
chapter 1.
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investment by the manufacturing sector and around a quarter of all industry 
R&D in the economy, far ahead of any other sector. This has risen 
consistently from just 5% in the early 1970s 4 It now invests over £2.8 billion 
in R&D per annum, representing 34% of its sales. Other high-tech industries 
invest less -  aerospace, another industry in which the UK is a world leader 
(the UK has the second largest aerospace industry in the world and is the 
world’s second largest exporter of defence equipment, after the United 
States), is responsible for £1.5 billion of R&D investment per year; the 
chemical sector as a whole invests £3.5 billion (although this is a conflation of 
several sectors within the chemical industry. Most commentators, including 
HM Customs and Excise, separate the industry into several sub-sectors, 
parts of which comprise relatively low-tech consumer products). This 
represents around 2-3% of its sales.5 Chart 1.1 shows a comparison of R&D 
investment in pharmaceuticals, aerospace, electrical machinery/electronics, 
motor vehicles, mechanical engineering and other manufacturing.
Chart 1.1: R&D as per cent of sales for major industry sectors
Other manuf
Mechanical engin
Chemicals
Motor vahicles
Electrical/electronics
Aerospace
Pharmaceticals
Source: ABPI6
3 See, for example: The Economist. The World in 2003. December 2002.
4 Greener, M. (2001), p.22.
department of Trade and Industry (2003b), chapter 2.
6 Association of the British Pharmaceutical (ABPI) (2003).
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As a trading sector, the British pharmaceutical industry also makes its mark. 
It is one of the major exporters among British industries. Its £9.25 billion of 
exports in 2001 compares with aerospace at £15 billion and chemicals at £29 
billion. This puts it among the UK’s largest trading sectors. Yet it is the 
contribution to the balance of trade where the industry really stands out. It 
contributed £2.9 billion in 2001. Few sectors contribute so much and only two 
sectors are listed by HM Customs and Excise as contributing more: 
petroleum and power generating machinery. The chemical industry, where 
the various sectors are conflated, contributed £4.6 billion in 2001 and the 
aerospace industry followed pharmaceuticals at £2.8 billion. The 
pharmaceutical industry is therefore third or fourth (depending on the 
category split of ‘chemicals’) in the league table of contributors to the balance 
of trade.7
The pharmaceutical sector is a significant employer. It employs over 65,000 
people across the UK. Although this is a large number in itself, the key point 
is the value of these jobs: other sectors employ far more people -  145,000 in 
aerospace; 235,000 in chemicals; 715,000 in the automotive industry,
404,000 in banking and 360,000 in insurance.8 Yet there is no other 
manufacturing sector that creates more value-added than pharmaceuticals. 
Each pharmaceutical employee is responsible for over £76,000 of value- 
added, compared with £56,000 in the aircraft industry and £37,000 in 
manufacturing industry as a whole. Pharmaceutical jobs are some of the 
most productive in the UK economy. Chart 1.2 shows value-added per 
employee for pharmaceuticals, aircraft, business services, all manufacturing 
and motor vehicles.
7 ABPI (2003); Chemical Industries Association (CIA) (2001); Society o f British Aerospace 
Companies (2001).
8 Association o f  the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), 2003; Chemical Industries Association 
(CIA), 2001; Society o f  British Aerospace Companies (SBAC), 2001; Department of Trade and 
Industry (2003a); Association o f British Insurers (ABI), 2003; British Bankers’ Association (BBI), 
2003.
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Chart 1.2: Value-added per employee by sector, £, 000
Motor vehicles 
All manufacturing 
Business Services 
Aircraft 
Pharmaceticals
Source: ABPI
A further aspect to the value of the industry within the UK economy is the 
very real success of British-based firms. While the industry includes global 
firms, the majority of whom are based or have their origins elsewhere, the 
British firms are themselves important global companies and yet have a 
tendency still to invest in the UK for their research. Unlike the motor industry, 
for example, which is dominated by overseas companies, the pharmaceutical 
industry maintains a strong ‘home-grown’ element. As the UK is the leading 
biotechnology centre in Europe9 and the two sectors are linked scientifically 
and financially, ensuring strong British-based firms may also have positive 
spin-offs in that ‘sunrise’ sector.
The ‘sunrise’ nature of the pharmaceutical-biotech sector is a critical issue 
because of the extent of reliance on emerging scientific discoveries for future 
wealth creation, as well as the interconnectedness of all forms of 
‘technological revolution’, not least in light of the struggle of successive 
British governments to encourage the restructuring of traditional British 
manufacturing sectors.10 Scientific advances in materials, information
9 Ernst & Young’s Annual European Life Sciences Reports 1998-2003.
10 Toterdill, Peter et al. (1990).
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technology and biotechnology are highly interrelated and the basis of the 
knowledge economy of the future. Attention to the science base is an 
increasingly important part of any government’s economic policy in a 
globalising knowledge economy.11 Just as pharmaceutical R&D investment is 
in part due to the strength of the UK’s science base,12 so the pharmaceutical- 
bioscience industries are seen in particular as central to driving these various 
areas of technological discovery.13
The government have seen the pharmaceutical industry as an important 
base for the development of biotechnology.14 R&D investments are targeted 
at countries with a high innovation capacity and strong science base, thereby 
reinforcing the status quo.15 Indeed, the countries identified as particularly 
strong in pharmaceutical innovation two decades ago (US, UK, Switzerland 
and Germany) have arguably strengthened their position over that period 
(with the possible exception of Germany).
The UK’s traditional strength in pharmaceuticals is an important factor in its 
more recent success in the biotech area,16 another reason for government to 
be wary of its regulation of the pharmaceutical sector.17 The 
interconnectedness between the pharmaceutical and biotech sectors gives 
the industry an important part to play in the mind of government, not least as 
a ‘cash cow’ for the more cutting edge research organisations, in providing 
the non-innovative business support functions that would emulate the 
positive relationship that has emerged in the sectors in the US,18 often 
through European companies exploiting the American academic and 
research base.19 For both sectors, the regulatory environment has 
implications for their operations and, important for governments, for their
11 See, for example: Kaounides, Lakis C. (1999), pp.53-79.
12 See, for example: Burstall, M.L. and Dunning, John (1985), p.190.
13 See, for example: Office o f Science and Technology, (1995).
14 National Economic Development Office (1987), p .l.
15 Burstall, M.L., Dunning, J.H., and Lake, A. (1981).
16 Kettler, Hannah E. and Casper, Steven (2000); Ernst & Young’s Annual European Life Sciences 
Reports 1998-2003.
17 Bartholomew, S. (1997).
18 Shan, W., Walker, G., Kogut, B. 1994, pp.387-94.
19 Sharp, Margaret (1995).
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innovativeness. Strict controls on pharmaceutical prices have, specifically, 
been found to affect pharmaceutical company innovation.20
The nature of global capital is also important for government’s attitude to the 
industry. The development of knowledge-based economies is linked to 
‘clusters’ of knowledge, capital, expertise etc., and the generation of 
innovation which they underpin. The place of any national economy in the 
global distribution of such clusters is reliant on successful ‘national innovation 
systems’ (NIS).21 Knowledge-intensive industries are particularly conducive 
to cluster development and the attention of policy makers has been drawn to 
how encouraging clusters may improve national innovation.22 Firms’ 
investment decisions are significantly affected by macro conditions in any 
national economy.23 There are therefore specific features of the global 
organisation of firms, of which the pharmaceutical industry is a clear 
example, for government’s industrial policy. It is more important than ever to 
attract and to keep high value, knowledge-intensive activities for general 
future economic prosperity.
The pharmaceutical industry occupies a special place in the British economy, 
to the extent, it is proposed here, that the industrial policy concerns of the 
British government have been amplified in arriving at a balance of health and 
industrial policy aims in the economic regulation of the pharmaceutical 
industry.
1.2 The UK as a pharmaceutical industry location
Not only is the pharmaceutical industry of importance to the UK economy as 
a highly research intensive, knowledge-based industry, but the industry has 
found the UK a good place to do business. Although per capita
20 OECD (1997), p. 12.
21 On national systems o f innovation see: Bartholomew, S. (1997), pp. 241-266; Kaounides, Lakis C. 
(1999), pp. 53-79.
22 OECD, (2001).
23 OECD, (1995), pp.22-26.
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pharmaceutical spending has been low by the standards of most major 
pharmaceutical producing countries, R&D in the sector has been high and 
the British-based industry has been remarkably commercially successful.24 It 
has an unusually international orientation in terms of attracting R&D capital25 
Although only around 3% of the global market, the UK is home to around 9% 
of global R&D expenditure in the sector.26 It has also spawned some of the 
most successful pharmaceutical companies: GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and 
AstraZeneca are currently the world’s second and third largest respectively. 
British companies are considered to have been competitively very strong 
relative to European counterparts for at least the past two decades 27
1.2.1 Research and development (R&D)
As a contributor to the science base, the industry provides specialised, high 
value-added jobs and maintains scientific knowledge and skill within the 
national economy. It is not only the size of the industry or the cash value of 
its production that is significant to government, but how much of its 
investment is in the science base, i.e. in R&D. As Chart 1.3 shows, this is 
high for the UK.
Key to the UK’s position, and successive governments’ attitudes to the 
industry, is this favouring of the UK as an R&D location. The success of the 
large British firms is an important aspect of this but it is not the sole or even 
the primary factor in accounting for the scale of UK R&D in the sector. The 
large American firms have substantial R&D operations in the UK. R&D 
expenditure by the industry in 2000 was $23 billion in the US, $17 billion in 
Europe and $7 billion in Japan.28 The UK’s share of all European29 R&D in 
the sector was over one-quarter. The UK’s heritage in attracting international 
R&D investment is deep. In the early 1980s, the UK was clearly second only
24 Taylor, David and Maynard, Alan. 1990, p. 15.
25 Burstall, M.L. (1990), p.21.
26 ABPI (2000a).
27 Burstall M. (1985).
28 Scrip’s Pharmaceutical R&D Databook: Benchmarks Trends and Analysis. Vol. 1. (2002). p.24.
29 Where EFPIA statistics are used, ‘Europe’ refers to the EFPIA European region o f the following 17 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK
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to the US in the number of the top firms with R&D facilities located in the 
country.30
Chart 1.3: Pharmaceutical R&D investment in national economies (2001 €m)
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Source: EFPIA31
The UK’s position in this regard does not appear to be eroding, certainly 
within a European context. Following the acquisition of Pharmacia by Pfizer 
in the spring of 2003, the company announced a rationalisation of its global 
R&D organisation. For early research it announced that all its efforts would 
now be focused on six sites globally -  four in the US, one in Japan and at its 
large facility in Sandwich, SE England. Its clinical testing would be 
rationalised, focusing on six sites, five in the US and its Sandwich facility, 
while sites in France and Italy would be closed.32 As there may be significant 
gains and losses from the rationalisations that follow further consolidation in 
the sector, it is a positive sign for the British government that the first of these 
has continued the recent pattern of favouring the UK among European 
locations for the major global corporations.
30 Burstall, M.L. and Dunning, John. (1985), p. 186.
31 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Associations, (2003).
32 Wall Street Journal Europe, 30 April 2003.
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The R&D investment in the UK has succeeded in producing a consistent line 
of new drugs. Of the major centres for R&D around the world, the principal 
innovators are the US, UK and Switzerland, with over two-thirds of ‘Category 
A’ (i.e. the most innovative) drugs from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s 
between them.33 Of 152 major global drugs developed between 1975 and 
1994, 45% were of US origin, 14% originated in the UK, and 9% were of 
Swiss origin (see Chart 1.4).34
Chart 1.4: Origin of major global drugs developed 1975-1994 (%)
a US 45%
■ UK 14%
□ Switzerland 9%
□ Germany 9%
■ Japan 7%
a Belgium 5%
■ Sweden 4%
□ France 3%
■ Other 6%
Source: PhRMA
The British-based industry is seen as highly successful in producing 
medicines that penetrate world markets. This is in significant contrast to 
France, where politicians have worried about the weak research base of the 
French industry for many years.35
33 OECD, (1997), p. 12.
34 See website: http://www.pharma.org/publications
35 Bosanquet, Nick (1990), pp.9-11.
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1.2.2 The market
The major markets of the pharmaceutical industry are in North America, 
Europe and Japan. In 2001, North America (largely the US) accounted for 
50% of the world pharmaceutical market, at $182 billion. This compares with 
24% for Europe ($87 billion) and 13% for Japan ($47 billion). Asia, Africa and 
Australia accounted for 8% and Latin America for 5%.36 There is not 
necessarily a direct correlation between the size of the domestic market and 
the intensity of R&D or the volume of production. Ireland and Switzerland are 
both large producers but small markets. Yet, again, the two countries are 
very different: Ireland has become a favoured location for manufacturing 
owing to its low corporation tax rate; Switzerland is an established giant, with 
a highly research intensive industry. Both Germany and France continue to 
be large scale producers and have significant positive balances of trade as 
well, yet R&D investment and innovation have waned.
Chart 1.5: Size of national pharmaceutical markets (1999, €m)
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Source: EFPIA37
36 Scrip’s Phannaceutical R&D Databook: Benchmarks Trends and Analysis. Vol. 1. (2002), pp.54-5.
37 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Associations (2003), p.7.
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1.2.3 Relative balance of trade
As stated above, the pharmaceutical balance of trade is high in the UK 
relative to other sectors of industry. It is also high by comparison with the 
pharmaceutical balance of trade for other countries. In Europe, only 
Switzerland and Germany have consistently had greater positive trade 
balances from the sector, although Ireland has also had large trade surpluses 
in recent years (see Chart 1.6).
Chart 1.6: Pharmaceutical balance of trade (1999, €m)
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1.3 Corporate structure and consolidation
By its very nature an industry at the cutting edge of science, the 
pharmaceutical sector is one that has been, and continues to be, profoundly 
shaped by the dynamics of modern scientific research. The pharmaceutical 
industry is the most research intensive of all industries.39
38 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Associations (2003), p. 10.
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Modern medicine discovery began in the 1930s when there was a shift in the 
basis of pharmaceutical products from natural to synthetic substances. It is 
therefore a twentieth century industry, albeit with long commercial roots in 
pharmacy.40 The scientific focus of research has changed radically during the 
past few decades and the research intensity of pharmaceutical discovery as 
it is understood today is a yet more recent phenomenon41 The overt 
commercialisation of the drug discovery process is something that has 
happened in the post-war years, giving rise to a new scientific-commercial 
organisation of industry’s research, in industrial style laboratories 42
It is this process that has underpinned the place of the pharmaceutical 
process at the heart of both health and industrial policy. The trends in the 
industry towards bigger, globally mobile firms, with gigantic R&D budgets, 
producing ever more sophisticated and expensive products will intensify the 
aims and incentives for government in both industrial and health policy in 
coming years.
It is, therefore, the industrialisation of the processes of research and 
development that has transformed the drug discovery process and the place 
and scope of medicines in health care and, crucially for this study, of the 
medicine industry in the economy. This process of scientific industrialisation 
has changed radically the nature of the relationship between government and 
industry.
It is also a central driver of change for the corporate structure of the 
research-based industry. The growth in the cost of drug research, discovery 
and development has driven consolidation among firms as companies seek 
to share costs and risks 43 Various estimates of the total cost of bringing an 
NME (new medical entity) to market show a large and sustained increase 
over the past four decades. Estimates from different sources ranged from 54
39 Danzon, P. (1997), p.5.
40 Howells, J and Neary, I. (1995), pp.65-6.
41 Breckon, W. (1972), pp.43ff.
42 Sykes, Sir Richard (2000), p. 18.
43 Sharp, Margaret and Patel, Pari (2002).
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to 125 million dollars in the 1970s to 450 to 802 million dollars in the 2000’s 
and average development time has lengthened from around 8 years in the 
1960s to over 14 years during the 1990s.44 This has been a major driving 
force behind merger activity in the sector. This process of consolidation has 
become greater in recent years as some of the industry’s best known names 
have merged to become yet bigger companies. The top league of companies 
dominates the global market. A Financial Times survey in 1996 showed that 
the top ten companies alone accounted for 34% of the global market in 
pharmaceuticals.45
Global R&D in the pharmaceutical sector reached $45 billion in 2000.46 The 
large global companies now have vast R&D budgets. Latest available 
comparative statistics show that Pfizer’s R&D budget for 2001 was almost $5 
billion, followed by GSK’s at around $3.7 billion (see Chart 1.7). The recent 
acquisition by Pfizer of Pharmacia is likely to give the new company an R&D 
budget of around $7 billion, dwarfing most of the other major corporations, 
who may now seek further consolidation of their own research and 
development in order to compete.
A more traditional and generic form of ‘synergy’ in corporate consolidation 
has been the creation of giant sales forces among the top companies. This is 
one area where traditional economies of scale can be achieved through 
mergers, as networks of sales personnel can be used to promote additional 
products at relatively little marginal cost (see Chart 1.8).
44 Scrip’s Pharmaceutical R&D Databook: Benchmarks Trends and Analysis. Vol. 1. (2002), pp. 16- 
18; Association o f the British Pharmaceutical Industry. 1999.
45 The Financial Times. 24 April 1997.
46 Scrip’s Pharmaceutical R&D Databook: Benchmarks Trends and Analysis. Vol. 1. (2002), p.20.
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Chart 1.7: R&D budgets of major companies (2002, $bn)
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Chart 1.8: Sales force personnel of major companies
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47 Scrip’s Pharmaceutical R&D Databook: Benchmarks Trends and Analysis. Vol. 1. (2002), 
p.68/p.74.
48 Scrip’s Pharmaceutical R&D Databook: Benchmarks Trends and Analysis. Vol. 1. (2002), 
p.68/p.74.
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1.3.1 Shifting geography
In the UK, the commercial structure of the sector has changed greatly and 
rapidly since the 1950s, when there was a large influx of American and 
European companies. Their operations tested the ability of smaller British 
operations to compete, and many failed to do so. The size of British firms 
increased as companies merged in response to the international 
competition.49 This is not something that has happened to the same extent 
elsewhere. While American and British firms have consolidated relentlessly, 
for example, French and German firms have been far slower to do so. In 
those countries, there persist large numbers of small and family owned firms 
beneath the few large global corporate players.50
Notable from the shape and outcomes of recent merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity in the sector is a general shift in the centre of gravity of the 
industry, in terms of both corporate origin and location of facilities of all 
companies, from Europe to the US. By 1999 (the year of the most recent 
negotiation of the PPRS), companies of European origin had begun to 
constitute a second tier or ‘division’, with the exception of those originating in 
the UK and Switzerland, as the analysis from The Financial Times in Table
1.1 shows.
49 Howells, J and Neary, I. (1995), p.61.
50 The Economist. 10 April 1999.
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Table 1.1: Pharmaceutical companies by market capitalisation (1999, $bn)
American dominated first division European dominated second division
Merck & Co US 198.0 Zeneca*1 UK 38.6
Pfizer US 179.9 Astra*1 Sweden 32.3
Bristol-Myers Squibb US 126.7 Monsanto US 27.8
Novartis Switz 122.9 Pharmacia & UDiohn US 27.5
Roche Switz 116.6 Bayer Germany 24.7
Glaxo Wellcome UK 114.6 Hoechst*2 Germany 24.6
Eli Lilley US 105.0 Sanofi*3 France 20.8
Schering-Plough us 82.9 BASF Germany 19.9
American Home Products us 82.0 Rhone-Poulenc*2 France 16.8
SmithKline Beecham UK 80.7 Synthelabo*3 France 10.8
Abbott US 75.4 Akzo Nobel Netherlands 9.3
Du Pont us 60.3 Schering Germany 8.3
Warner-Lambert us 59.3 Novo Nordisk Denmark 7.8
*n merging (at time of publication)
Bold = European companies
Source: The Financial Times, 13 April 1999.
Since that survey, the top end of the global pharmaceutical industry has 
metamorphosed, spawning new ‘mega-companies’ such as Novartis, 
Aventis, AstraZeneca, GlaxoSmithKline and PfizerWamerLambert. Many of 
these have been European, but the American firms have come out more 
strongly from the process, with the exception of the British firms GSK and 
AstraZeneca, which have organised themselves globally more than have 
their continental rivals, and succeeded in gaining substantial global market 
share.51 To some extent Glaxo’s history and culture of aggressive acquisition 
has been well suited to this era of consolidation.52 Furthermore, the position 
of the seemingly indomitable Swiss firms appears to have waned to some 
degree. Arguably, the European corporate situation overall continues to 
worsen and for the UK the corporate league table does no tell the whole 
story. The globalising GSK has transferred its research headquarters to the 
US (though by no means the majority of its research, which remains in the 
UK) following the completion of its merger.
51 Hancher, Leigh (1989a). pp. 165-66.
52 See: Lynn, Matthew. 1992. In particular, part 3.
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The following ABPI figures show the league table by sales in 2001, following 
the most recent round of mergers. The top 11 companies represent over half 
the world market by sales.
Table 1.2: Leading pharmaceutical corporations, 2001
Company Country Sales £ Growth % Share of 
world market
%
PfizerWamerLam bert USA 18,275 13 7.5
GlaxoSmithKline UK 17,066 12 7.0
Merck & Co USA 12,916 12 5.3
AstraZeneca UK 11,147 12 4.6
Johnson & Johnson USA 10,828 21 4.4
Bristol-Myers Squibb USA 10,422 7 4.3
Novartis SWI 9,767 9 4.0
Aventis FRA 8,501 11 3.5
Pharmacia Corp USA 8,265 15 3.4
Abbott USA 7,507 10 3.1
American Home 
Products
USA 7,450 12 3.1
Leading 11 114,694 12 51.1
----------------Source: ABPI
Statistics also show that the American-based firms are currently more 
successful at growing their markets than are their European rivals, and in this 
instance the British firms tend more towards the European camp. As Chart 
1.9 shows, the American companies have greater organic growth as well as 
having merged more rapidly into large corporations.
53 ABPI 2003. Section 1.
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Chart 1.9: Sales of leading companies 1999/2000
Sales of leading corporations in the PPI region (from 
September 1999to September 2000)
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Source: Pharma Prognosis International, 2001-200554
Following a lull of activity during 2001-2002, the merger in March 2003 of 
Pfizer and Pharmacia in a £57 billion deal, which takes the combined 
company’s global market share to 10%, could herald a new wave of 
corporate consolidation in the sector.
The picture for the pharmaceutical industry is now being mirrored in the 
biotechnology sector, though in an exaggerated form. The US is clearly 
dominant in this new sector, but within a European context the UK’s position 
is strong. Indeed, it is the leading biotechnology economy in Europe, a 
position of several years standing which it appears to be holding as 
companies in the sector mature.55
R&D investment in biotechnology rose from about $8 billion dollars in 1997 to 
about $14 billion in 2000 in the US; the comparable figures for Europe were 
about $2 billion and just under $5 billion respectively.56 This represents a 
sharp growth rate for the sector in Europe but a continued large gap with its
54 The PPI (Pharma Prognosis International) region consists of the top ten markets: US, Japan, 
Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Canada, Australia and Belgium.
55 Ernst & Young’s. 1998-2003.
56 Ernst & Young’s. 1998-2003
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American counterpart. American companies are bigger but the growth in the 
number of companies is now faster in Europe than the U S .57
1.3.2 Conclusions
The corporate structure of the industry, based in its increasingly industrial- 
scientific research, is a principal determining factor of the nature of 
government-industry relations in the sector because it creates large global 
firms with large R&D budgets. The location strategies of a relatively few firms 
are responsible for vast amounts of global pharmaceutical R&D. 
Furthermore, two of the very top few are British-based firms. Yet the sector 
has undoubtedly begun to shift in its latest phase of consolidation, orientated 
around the dominant American market. There are mixed signals for the UK: it 
seems to be maintaining, even strengthening, its attractiveness relative to 
other European countries; but there are signs that Europe as a whole may be 
losing out to the US. The industrial policy aspect of the PPRS is arguably 
more important than ever.
The global corporate dimension of the industry is a key contextual feature of 
government-industry relations in the PPRS and underpins Hypothesis 2, in 
Chapter 3 below.
1.4 Pharmaceutical supply and demand
The supply side of the pharmaceutical sector is shaped by several factors. 
The intensity of R&D in the sector is clearly special, as illustrated from the 
figures above; the intellectual property generated by this R&D underpins a 
second distinctive feature: the important effect of patents in the sector; this in 
turn is reflected in the nature of the brand.
57 Scrip’s Pharmaceutical R&D Databook: Benchmarks Trends and Analysis. Vol. 1. (2002), p.46.
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The intensity of R&D creates economies of scale that amount to a significant 
barrier to entry to the market. The largest firms have a distinct advantage in 
having vast R&D budgets and broad R&D capabilities, which they can target 
at the most lucrative areas of the market. Smaller companies focus on 
particular areas in which they are expert. One result of this is that the 
therapeutic sub-markets of the sector (in which there is limited therapeutic 
cross-over)58 have less competition than the market as a whole would 
suggest. Only the largest firms have a presence in all sub-markets and some 
highly specialised areas may have only a few other, niche, companies.
The concentration of suppliers is further consolidated on the supply side by 
the presence of patented products that dominate the market, giving a 
monopoly to a company producing a drug for any particular indication, and 
creating additional promotional costs to a potential entrant after the patent 
has expired in order to break brand loyalty built up during the life of the 
patent.59 The patented part of the market is, by value, by far the majority part. 
Patents reduce competition but this is their intention. Patents are granted by 
governments to orchestrate a monopoly for the purpose of encouraging 
innovation. The monopoly status they give to an invention is the mechanism 
by which R&D funds are drawn into the sector.60
Patents allow companies initially to sell their product under exclusive license 
but this also affords them the opportunity to build brand loyalty among 
doctors (and patients) which can award them an advantage following patent 
expiry and the ensuing competition with generic copies. Some cost control 
initiatives have focused on encouraging doctors to work with the generic 
(chemical) name of products rather than the brand name to overcome brand 
loyalty (see below). Nevertheless many doctors and increasingly patients 
prefer brands they have become accustomed to and brand loyalty built up 
during the life of the patent therefore acts as a further barrier to entry to other
58 Reekie. W Duncan. (1975), p.21
59 Reekie, W Duncan (1969), p.5.
60 For discussions o f the economic purposes o f patents, and the relationship between intellectual 
property protection and R&D investment, see: Danzon, P. (1997); Reekie, W Duncan (1975), pp.84-6.
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manufacturers within a particular sub-market and so represents a further 
limitation on competitive supply.
As a consequence of the barriers to entry -  economies of scale, patent 
protection and brand loyalty -  price competition within the research-based 
industry is low. In markets with competing products, competition centres 
around the product not the price: if a product is not as good as a rival, lower 
prices or good advertising are unlikely to have much effect on its market 
position.61
Limited price competition is, however, due not only to the nature of the supply 
side, which would suggest prices are likely to be inflexible, but also to the 
nature of demand. Demand for pharmaceuticals is inelastic because of the 
nature of the product. Medicines are not optional purchases (or only at the 
margins) but essentials for those who use them. The structure of demand in 
national health services is orientated, in Europe, around large public 
purchasers.62 The nature of demand in health care is therefore different from 
many other sectors, being similar to other insurance-based markets. 
Furthermore, health care in most western countries is largely publicly funded.
Health care demand is characterised by third party purchasing, according to 
principles of insurance markets. In insurance-based markets, the final 
consumer of a product is not the payer (not directly, at time of use). Hence 
the marginal cost of the product is zero, a situation which can give rise to 
‘moral hazard’, where there is over consumption because of zero marginal 
costs.63 Insurance coverage may not be comprehensive and may involve an 
‘excess’ payment, but in the case of the British NHS, this is not so. There is, 
according to traditional theories of insurance markets such as these, an 
inherent inducement to consume more health care than if the consumer were 
paying for it directly.64
61 Reekie. W Duncan (1975), p.34.
62 Reekie. W Duncan (1975), p.35.
63 Danzon, P. (1997), pp. 9-11.
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In health care, there is a further actor in each act of consumption, 
complicating the relationship between supply and demand and the dynamics 
of moral hazard, as monitoring of consumption by insurers is more difficult. 
Unlike other insurance markets, purchasing decisions are not made by a 
combination of the consumer and the insurer but by a third party -  the 
medical professional. Hence there are three actors -  the payer (government 
or insurer), the decision maker (doctor), and the consumer (patient).
In the health care market in the UK, the ‘insurer’ is the government, through 
the monopsonisitc, tax-funded NHS. The government therefore has an 
opportunity as an economic actor, as well as a legal actor, to regulate the 
industry. The UK is at the far end of the spectrum among European countries 
in funding health care through general taxation; only Denmark has a funding 
formula as concentrated on this single source as the UK (see Table 1.3). 
Furthermore, the user charges in the British NHS are the lowest of their kind 
in the EU, making the British government’s responsibility for funding 
pharmaceutical prescriptions the highest as a proportion of the total among 
EU countries.
Taxation and compulsory social insurance constitute the two principal means 
of public funding for health care in the EU. Eight EU countries use general 
national or local taxation as the primary means for funding public health care 
services (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, UK), in 
some cases along with small amounts of hypothecated taxation such as 
National Insurance in the UK. Insurance-based models of funding are used in 
Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Compulsory 
social insurance contributions overseen by the government but operated by 
separate social insurance funds is the model used in these countries. 
Belgium and Greece use a mix of insurance and taxation.65
In most countries there is some element of voluntary insurance, such as 
private insurance, and some element of co-payment by patients within the
64 McGuire, Alisatir; Hendersen, John and Mooney, Gavin (1998), pp.169-173.
65 Mossialos, E and Le Grand, J. (1999), pp.5-9.
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publicly funded services. The table below shows the varying proportions of 
these sources of funds within EU health care services.
Table 1.3: Sources of health care finance in the EU, 1990s (%)
Member
state
Taxation Social
insurance
Voluntary
health
insurance
User
charges
(including
direct
payments)
Other
Denmark
(1996)
80.7 - 1.9 17.4 -
UK (1993/4) 78.8 12.3
(NICs)
5.6
(private
health
insurance)
3.2
(prescription
charges) '
Sweden
(1993)
69.7 13.4 - 16.9 -
Ireland
(1993)
68.1 7.3 8.6 13.9 2.1
Italy (1995) 64.6 - 2.6 31.2 2.4
Finland
(1994)
62.2 13.0 2.2 20.8 1.8
Spain
(1995)
59.3 15.3 7.0 16.3 1.7
Portugal
(1995)
55.2 6.0 1.4 37.4 —
Belgium
(1994)
38.0 36.0 - 17.0 9.0
Greece
(1992)
33.3 24.1 2.1 40.4
:
Luxembourg
(1992)
Austria
(1992)
Germany
(1995)
Netherlands
(1996), ........
France
(1994)
3.6
49.8
54.0
64.8
68.0 
71.6
7.1
15.0
7.9
14.0
7.3
7.1
9.8
.
—
1.3
Source: Mossialos and Le Grand
66 Mossialos, E and Le Grand, J. (1999), p.6.
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Outside of Europe, the United States has a predominantly private insurance 
model, though with two major schemes of public provision for the poor 
(Medicaid) and the elderly (Medicare). Fifteen per cent of the population is 
not covered by any sort of health insurance in the US. Canada has a 
universal tax funded system and Japan a social insurance system similar to 
the German model of compulsory employer contributions.67
It is not only in the financing of services that governments are involved in 
health care but also in many cases in their direct provision, through the 
ownership and administration of hospitals and so on. Of hospital beds, over 
90% are publicly owned in the UK and Scandinavian countries, while in 
Germany about half are owned by non-profit hospitals and in the Netherlands 
and Belgium most acute hospitals are private. Doctors are also paid 
differently in different systems, including fee-for-service payments to salaried 
employees of the public system. Hence across Europe, while funding of 
health care is largely public, both the particular type of public funding and the 
involvement of government in actual health care delivery vary widely between 
countries.68
All these systems have in common, through the 1990s to the present, the 
new pressures of rising costs. The interest of governments in the cost of 
pharmaceuticals has in the past decade become more acute owing to the 
exploding costs of health care services and the arrival of the politics of ‘cost 
containment’.69 Public expenditure on health care has risen dramatically in 
the past three decades across European countries, from 3.5% of GDP in 
1971 to 6.1% of GDP in 1996. For the UK, over the same period, the rise has 
been less marked but significant still, from 4% to 5.8%.70 By 2003 the EU 
average was over 8% and the UK around 7.2%. In North America, health 
care consumes an even larger spending commitment, whether from public or
67 Nedde, Ellen (1995), Section II.
68 Nedde, Ellen (1995), Section II.
69 Abel-Smith B. (1984); Mossialos E, Ranos C, Abel-Smith B (eds) (1994); Le Grand J, Mossialos E 
(eds) (1999).
70 Mossialos, E and Le Grand, J. (1999), p.48.
41
Chapter 1: Structural context
private sources, reaching 14% of GDP in the US and 10% in Canada by the 
1990s.71
Two key factors impinge on health care costs and underpin this explosion: 
first, demographic change and an ageing society; and second, advancing 
medical technology, including pharmaceuticals. First, longer life expectancy 
and a diminishing birth rate are changing the age structure of western 
countries. There is a rising number of elderly people and a smaller workforce 
to provide tax income with which health care services can be funded. 
Estimates suggest that by 2011 there will be an additional half million people 
over 80 years of age in the UK.72 The precise resource implications of an 
older population in itself are not clear. It may be that the onset of 
degenerative diseases will be delayed and the period of dependent old age 
no greater than at present, even where people are living longer. The effects 
on costs of longer term degenerative diseases and the ability to treat them 
are unclear and research evidence is mixed. It is unclear to what extent 
longer life spans affect health care costs, as most health care expenditure 
(for those without chronic diseases) occurs in the final year of life, at 
whatever age that is.73
Second, technology is both a separate and a related factor. Technological 
advances are the key element in the increasing costs of health care over a 
long period of time -  in the UK, almost from the outset of the NHS. New 
treatments have meant that ‘health’ is a moving target. There are now 
treatments available where previously there were none and there is an 
increasing technological component of previously existing treatments. 
Technology, not least in the pharmaceutical context, can also be cost 
reducing, as new treatments prevent or reduce hospital stays, for example.74 
Many of the most ‘cutting edge’ technologies on the horizon can be expected 
to reduce health care costs, as Diagram 1 below illustrates. High-tech (and 
relatively high cost) drugs are likely to have some of the greatest cost saving
71 Nedde, Ellen (1995), p.4
72 Ham, Christopher (1992), p.245.
73 Mossialos E, and Le Grand J. (1999), pp.55-6.
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potential of any technologies. During the post-war period evidence has 
suggested that new medicines have significant economic benefits to the NHS 
in reducing other forms of treatment.75
Chart 1.10: Summary of resource implications of medical technology76
Increased costs 
to NHS
Cost
neutral
Reduced cost 
to NHS
CURRENTLY
AVAILABLE ON STREAM
POSSIBLILITIES FOR 
THE FUTURE
Coronary artery 
bypass grafts
Hip replacement
Treatment of end- 
stage renal failure
Cataract surgery
Cimetidine 
(gastric ulcer 
drug)
Improved
anaesthesia
Computerised
diagnosis
Heart/Heart and 
lung transplant
Liver transplant
Knee replacement
Magnetic 
resonance 
imaging (MRI)
Positron emission 
tomograpgy
Diagnostic kits 
for GPs
Subtraction
angiography
t
Laser surgery
Lithotripter
Coronary artery 
angioplasty
Neuronal transplant
Developments in 
laser surgery
Biotechnology- 
biosensors 
monoclonal 
antibodies as 
treatment for cancer
Cytotoxic 
Drugs -  Stone dissolving 
Mental illness 
* Dementia
74 Mossialos, E and Le Grand, J. (1999), p.58.
75 National Economic Development Office (1987), p.5.
76 Ham, Christopher (1992), p.250.
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Crucially, it is the interaction of demographic change and new technologies 
that will have the greatest resource implications. Some new treatments are 
specifically aimed at older people, such as hip replacements and coronary 
bypass surgery. The key question for health care resources is therefore how 
many more treatable people there will be than there are today, a calculation 
that combines both demographic and technology elements.
There is also a political dimension: the increasing wealth of western societies 
is likely to render health care an increasingly important political priority, along 
the dynamics of “hierarchy of needs”.77 Whatever the effects of individual 
technologies at the micro (patient) level, at the macro (system) level, new 
technologies increase costs because there are more treatments than there 
once were; again, whatever the effect at the patient level of longer life, a 
higher proportion of aged to young people in itself will serve, in the medium 
term at least, to increase the relative costs of health care in the economy as 
a whole. This is notwithstanding the lack of evidence for the constantly rising 
cost of health care in line with national wealth and the possibility that at some 
point a limit will be reached.78
Cost containment in health care has included a variety of measures. This has 
led to the introduction of many mechanisms of ‘rationing’ health care across 
western countries.79 In the area of pharmaceuticals, both the supply and 
demand sides have been targeted. The extension of co-payment has been 
widely used, where patients pay a larger proportion of their health care costs 
or pay a fee for some services; the restriction of services provided publicly 
may also be used, pushing costs into the private sector; and health care 
budgets -  either actual or indicative -  have been used to limit the activities of 
health care practitioners. Other measures can be used to affect costs, such
77 Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy o f Needs was a theory that supposed that for human beings lower 
order needs (physiological) had to be satisfied before higher order needs (self-actualisation) could be 
satisfied. In this case the point is that as societies develop, health care becomes a higher priority -  it is 
higher up the pyramid o f needs than food, housing and so on.
78 See, for example: Kanavos P. and Mossialos E. (1999).
79 See, for example: Coulter A. and Ham C. (eds). (2000).
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as restricting the supply of medical personnel or controlling the costs of 
drugs.80
Through the PPRS, the British government, among the most directly involved 
in the provision of health services of any developed country, has chosen a 
very particular means of achieving the latter.
1.5 Political implications and policy
As the pharmaceutical market is dominated on the demand side by public 
purchasing, the pharmaceutical market is highly political. The economic 
context of the industry extends into the heart of politics.81
In the health policy arena, the government as the primary purchaser of 
medicines, regulates the pharmaceutical industry for several reasons:82
■ There is a perceived flaw in the operation of the market on the supply side 
-  a lack of competition which gives producers undue power in the 
marketplace.
■ There is nevertheless the intention to produce a lack of competition 
through the patent system in order to bring research and development 
funds into the sector.
■ The demand side operates under conditions of moral hazard, where 
excessive demand can be expected.
■ There is also an idiosyncrasy in the market based on lack of expertise by 
the final consumer (the patient), which means that purchasing decisions 
are made by a third party professional (the doctor).
■ Government, as a funder of health care, has obligations to the tax payer 
to seek cost controls. This role also gives it the ability to exercise its
80 Mossialos, E and Le Grand, J. (1999); pp.62-71.
81 Macmillan, K. and Turner, I. (1987), p. 124.
82 For discussion o f why governments regulate see the following: Peacock, A. (1984); Baldwin, R. and 
Cave, M. (1999), chapter 2; Breyer, S. (1998); Breyer, S. (1982), chapter 1.
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power in the marketplace as a monopsony buyer, adding economic power 
to its legal authority in relation to the industry.
The government therefore exercises a ‘double power’ in relation to the 
industry, as both a regulator and a purchaser.83 Not only is the market one 
which government may in any case seek to regulate but it is one in which the 
government has decisive market power. These two facts would lend 
themselves to a strict form of regulation against which industry would have 
few ‘bargaining resources’. The PPRS on the other hand has been described 
as ‘light-touch.’84 The difference, it is proposed here, lies in the industrial 
policy concerns of the government, which lend to the industry significant 
bargaining power and also unify the aims of industry and government to 
some degree. Both wish to see a favourable environment for pharmaceutical 
business in the UK, in international terms. The PPRS is therefore the 
outcome of a clash between two policy aims that are, at face value, in 
conflict.
1.6 Overview of the UK pharmaceuticals market
An important feature of the PPRS is its claimed ability to balance cost 
containment with support for the research-based British pharmaceutical 
industry and one of the claims of this thesis is that the nature of the UK 
pharmaceuticals market is a central factor in its ability to do so. The UK 
market itself has several characteristics that distinguish it, arising from the 
structure of supply and demand and, more idiosyncratically, policy responses 
to them.
1.6.1 Features of the British pharmaceuticals market
1. It is relatively small in terms of total value.
2. There is a significant degree of therapeutic conservatism among doctors.
83 Teeling-Smith, G. (1969), pp.86-87.
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3. There is a large generics market.
4. There is a relatively large over-the-counter (OTC) market.
5. Higher prices are concentrated at the ‘top end’ of the product range.
6. New medicines are launched quickly following licensing.
Market size
Overall expenditure on medicines is among the lowest of any major western 
country and around half as much per capita as in France, Japan or the US.85 
Within Europe, the larger markets are historically those of France, Italy and 
Spain.86 The overall health budget is also lower as a proportion of GDP than 
in most developed countries,87 but it remains that the actual cost of drugs to 
the public purse is less than in similar countries because consumption is less, 
and higher prices in some drugs are therefore more easily tolerated (see 
Table 1.5).
Therapeutic conservatism
The UK is known as a conservative market. New products may reach the 
market quickly but their uptake is generally quite slow. British doctors, for a 
variety of institutional and cultural reasons, do not take up new products 
quickly or use them widely. Their attitude tends to be one of waiting to see 
how the use of a product by others turns out in practice. The Second Report 
of the House of Commons Health Select Committee, Session 1993-4, says, 
“The impact of medical culture should not be underestimated in international 
comparisons of medicine consumption.”88 It has also been noted that 
“cultural differences between European countries’ prescribing patterns are
84 Interviews, DOH civil servant 5; industry executives 11 & 13.
85 Tucker, A. and Taylor, D. (2000), p.21.
86 Burstall, M.L. (1990), p.21.
87 UK Health spending as a proportion o f GDP in 1995 was 6.9%. This compares with 10.4% in 
Germany, 9.9% in France, 7.7% in Italy and 14.2% in the US. Source: Department o f Health & 
Human Services (2000), Appendix 4.
88 See, for example: House o f Commons Health Committee, Session 1993-4. HC Papers 80-1, 7 July 
1994, paragraph 30 and paragraphs 28-29.
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based on deep rooted variations in medical culture and training rather than 
just the effects of contrasting price and profit controls for medicines.”89
It is a fact recognised by the Department of Health. A senior civil servant 
there commented, “This country has got a history of relatively slow 
introduction of new medicines into the NHS because our GPs are 
conservative in terms of prescribing new medicines.”90 Therapeutic 
conservatism was also recognised as a feature of the UK market in the final 
report of the PICTF: “Existing UK market conditions, including the traditional 
conservatism of many UK prescribers, mean that sales of new products are 
limited in the years immediately following launch...”91
While this is not a fact that the research-based industry would or does like in 
itself, it is something that acts as an informal brake on the potential shock to 
the health budget of the introduction of new products, potentially reducing the 
perceived need by government officials to devise some sort of formal 
mechanism for achieving this.
Large generics market
The UK generics market has been promoted vigorously so that today it 
represents over 50% of total prescription volumes. As a senior politician 
involved in the 1999 PPRS negotiations noted, “a huge proportion of the 
drugs that people get are now generic and we have one of the highest 
proportions in the world.”92 Generics need to overcome the goodwill built up 
by branded products during their patent life, and hence tend to be priced 
significantly lower than the original product. Generics volumes tend to be 
higher where prices are higher, such as the UK, and this can be seen in 
comparing European markets.93 The largest generics markets in Europe are 
the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, which also have the higher
89 David Taylor (1992).
90 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
91 Department o f Health (2001), paragraph 2.14
92 Government minister 7
93 Burstall, M.L. (1997), p.78.
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prices.94 Hence the UK market is characterised by relatively low prices for a 
large proportion of its volume (the generics) alongside the higher prices 
commanded by branded products.
Large over-the-counter (OTC) market
In addition, although the NHS accounts for the vast majority of medicine 
purchases, relative to other European markets the British OTC market is 
large. This factor further relieves pressure on the public purse (see Table 1.5, 
Column 4). Only Italy has a comparable (and slightly larger) proportion of 
OTC sales. OTC medicines transfer the budgetary burden for most sales 
from the NHS to the patient.95 As well as the actual cost of the medicines, 
OTCs also avoid the considerable cost of a medical consultation. An eight 
minute meeting with a General Practitioner (GP) is estimated to cost the NHS 
about £18;96 and GP consultations that could be dealt with by pharmacists 
are estimated to cost the NHS £380 million per year.97
Higher price ‘top-end’ products
Although representing less than 50% of the total prescription market by 
numbers of prescriptions, in-patent brand name products account for 78% of 
prescription costs.98 The highest selling drugs by value contain very few 
generics, with only three generic products in the top thirty drugs in the UK 
market (see Table 1.4). Prices are heavily weighted to the brand name, in­
patent end of the market. It is possible to have higher prices at this end of the 
market yet pursue cost containment objectives only because of the volume of 
generics. Furthermore, the restriction on price increases in the PPRS means 
that launch prices are higher than they would otherwise be, because prices 
tend to be fixed for the longer term (see 3.4).
94 Lewis, Graham (2001).
95 OTC medicines can be obtained on prescription for financial reasons if  a patient chooses, but the 
vast majority are paid for directly by the consumer.
96 BBC News, 22 August 2000.
97 BBC News, 29 August 2000.
98 European Commission (2001).
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Table 1.4: Top UK pharmaceutical products, 2000
Product Manufacturer
Date of marketing 
authorisation
Total sales 
£m
1 Losec AstraZeneca Jun 89 247.17
2 Zocor MSD May 89 172.58
3 Zoton Wyeth Apr 94 146.81
4 Istin Pfizer Jan 90 139.85
5 Lipitor Pfizer Jan 97 123.48
6 Seroxat GlaxoSmithKline Feb 91 104.80
7 Serevent GlaxoSmithKline Dec 90 95.62
8 Flixotide GlaxoSmithKline Mar 93 83.74
9 Zestril AstraZeneca Jun 88 77.01
10 Card ora Pfizer Jan 89 74.64
11 Pulmicort AstraZeneca Jan 83 68.24
12 Zyprexa Lilly Oct 96 66.79
13 Becotide GlaxoSmithKline Oct 72 66.71
14 Ventolin GlaxoSmithKline Jan 69 63.05
15 Zoladex AstraZeneca Mar 87 57.71
16 Lipostat BMS Sep 90 56.25
17 Fluxotine Generic n/a 54.50
18 Efexor Wyeth Jan 95 54.33
19 Adalat Bayer Oct 77 53.40
20 Cipramil Lundbeck Jun 95 50.42
21 Enalapril Generic n/a 49.51
22 Neoral Novartis Apr 95 47.18
23 Ranitidine Generic n/a 46.25
24 Imigran GlaxoSmithKline Sep 91 42.00
25 Lamictal GlaxoSmithKline Nov 91 41.92
26 Tenormin AstraZeneca Jun 76 41.58
27 Mixtard Human Novo Nordisk Mar 85 41.14
28 T ritace Aventis Mar 90 40.75
29 Cozaar MSD Feb 95 40.42
30 Becloforte GlaxoSmithKline Oct 82 39.23
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Comparing pharmaceutical product prices across markets is notoriously 
difficult because bases of comparison can limit the studies undertaken, such 
as availability from the same manufacturer and difference in dosage forms, 
strengths and pack sizes of drugs in different countries. Studies can yield 
remarkably distinct results according to the criteria used for measurement." 
As with any international price comparisons, exchange rate fluctuations also 
cause difficulties of measurement. Nevertheless, assembled data show the 
UK to be in the middle- to higher-end range of prices across-the-board in the 
EU, a position that has changed slightly over recent years, with relative 
aggregate prices for the UK coming down somewhat. A decade ago, they 
were towards, or at, the very top of the European league table.100
Quick launch
Products are launched early in the UK relative to other European countries. 
The PPRS allows companies to price newly launched products as they wish. 
Because, in addition, it also effectively prevents actual price increases from 
that point on, prices are likely to be set higher at launch than they would be in 
a free market. Freedom of pricing at launch is therefore the means by which 
branded products are priced higher than in other European markets.
Freedom of pricing at launch it is a key feature of the market insofar as it 
allows products to be launched immediately following the issue of a license. 
This is because the price regulation system does not require any process of 
assessment for reimbursement purposes, as is the case in many other 
regimes. The PPRS enables this one, important, aspect of a free market to 
remain. It is one that is regarded by industry as vitally important in enabling 
them to recoup their large R&D investments -  something that is generally 
recognised in government: “For industry, it’s about getting things onto the 
market in the UK,” commented a DTI civil servant.101 The attractiveness to
99 Danzon, Patricia M. and Kim, Jeong D. (1998).
100 Burstall, M.L. (1990), pp.31-32.
101 Interview, DTI civil servant 1
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industry of the UK market relative to other European markets is based in 
large part on this one feature of it (see Chapters 4 and 5).
The importance of the quick launch following licensing approval has been 
recognised by the government during the deliberations of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry Competitiveness Task Force (PICTF), set up between government 
and industry as part of the 1999 PPRS negotiations, to study the 
competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry and market.102
Table 1.5: Non-hospital pharmaceutical consumption in European countries
Pharmaceutical consumption per person in various countries, 1997 (Column 1) and 
expenditure on prescription medicines per person in various European countries, 1995/96 
(Column 2). Column 3 shows the pounds per person spent on OTC medicines and Column 
4, what this represents as a percentage of the total market, per person.
Column 1 
Total £
Column 2 
POM £ (%total)
Column 3 
difference £
Column 4 
% OTC
France 239 170 (71%) 69 29%
Germ any 205 169 (82%) 36 18%
Italy 179 79 (44%) 100 56%
Sweden 172 145 (84%) 27 16%
UK
Notes. Column 1:
154 87 (56%) 67 44%
£ per person; Pharmaceutical consumption includes prescription medicines, OTCs, sales tax/VAT and pharmacists' 
remuneration; Hospital medicines are excluded.
Source; Health Data 1998 (OECD)
Notes. Column 2:
£ per person .
Sources: The Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe -  Key Data (EFPIA); Tal Og (MEFA); Compendium of Health 
Statistics 1999 (OHE); SCRIP Magazine; Statistics '99 (VFA); Health Data (OECD)
1.6.2 Conclusions
The British pharmaceutical market displays a particular configuration of 
features that separates it in many ways from other European markets. There 
are greater similarities with some markets and price analyses show a basic 
correlation between broadly ‘northern’ European markets, on the one hand, 
and ‘southern’ European ones, including France, on the other. Relative
102 Department of Health (2001), paragraphs 2.8, 9.2 and 9.3.
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average prices across Europe show the higher price countries being 
Germany, Belgium, UK, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, while lower 
price countries are Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and (cheapest of all) 
France.103 However, as Table 1.5 shows, there are cross cutting features 
which create a more complicated picture, and which mark out the British 
market as distinct.
There is also a complex interaction between the market and regulation, and 
identifying those aspects that are independent from regulation and those 
caused by it is an inexact science. The modern pharmaceutical industry has 
grown up within the PPRS framework for over four decades. Some features 
of the market can be seen as independent from, and prior to, the regulatory 
regime and therefore as ones which form the context within which the 
regulatory regime has been devised. Others can be seen more as having 
been created by regulation, in particular higher ‘top-end’ prices and a quick 
launch that characterise the PPRS.
In relation to government-industry relations in the PPRS, the market first 
provides opportunities for the government to achieve its key aims: its 
relatively small size and other features enable the government’s procurement 
aims to be achieved without stringent regulation. Meanwhile, the PPRS yields 
key benefits (or ‘regulatory goods' -  see Chapter 3) for industry. These 
features of the market, as a contextual feature of government-industry 
relations, underpin Hypothesis 1 in Chapter 3 below.
103 Burstall, M.L. (1997), p.91; Garattini, L. and Tediosi, F. (2000); Mrazek, M. (200), p.459.
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This Chapter sets out the administrative architecture of regulation: the 
organisation of government and industry for negotiating and administering 
the PPRS. Through this architecture, both sides are concentrated into a small 
group of individuals charged with the responsibility to negotiate the PPRS on 
behalf of the government and the industry as a whole. The structure of supply 
and demand in the sector has therefore yielded small competent groups with 
decisive political resources and as a result a small and focused policy 
community to devise and administer the PPRS.
The market is dominated by a single buyer, the Department of Health (DOH), 
with overwhelming market power. The low elasticity of demand for medicines 
and the corporate structure of the industry also mean that there is significant 
concentration and market power on the supply side. Consolidation has 
created a small number of very large global firms, creating another important 
feature of the landscape in which government-industry relations are formed.
The dual aims of the government in both health (cost containment) and 
industrial policy mean that the market for medicines is shaped by politics.
In 1998, the NHS accounted for £6,056m of the total UK pharmaceutical 
market of £7,481 m.104 The vast majority of medicines in the UK market are 
prescription medicines funded by the NHS. The dynamics of the market are 
shaped by two basic facts:
■ That the customer of products (i.e. the doctor) does not purchase (pay 
for) the product, as would a service provider in a normal market structure. 
This is the role of the government or taxpayer.
■ Nor is the doctor the consumer of the product, which is the role of the 
patient.
104 ABPI (2000a) p.20.
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So the patient neither chooses the product s/he is to consume, and neither 
s/he nor the doctor pays for it: the purchasing transaction is a “dinner for 
three”.105 There are additional factors including the role of the pharmacist and 
the various codes of conduct of professional organisations to which doctors 
and pharmacists are subject, as well as the complicating factor of the status 
of consumers: ill people in a position of particular need.106 This has 
implications for some types of drugs in particular, such as psychotropic 
drugs. The nature of the demand side is peculiar and this is one of the 
reasons for the economic regulation of pharmaceuticals, on both the supply 
and demand sides.
As Chapter 1 explains, the demand side of the market is not the only basis of 
the perceived need for regulation. The supply of pharmaceuticals is seen as 
non-competitive because of the patent system, which institutionalises 
(purposely) product monopolies for a set period of time in order to encourage 
expensive research and development into new products.
The government therefore believe there is a need for price (or purchasing) 
regulation to ensure that the purchaser (i.e. government, or taxpayer) is not 
unfairly treated under the conditions of monopoly that are created by patent 
protection, exacerbated by the lack of normal purchasing sensitivities on the 
demand side.107
This chapter sets out the various regulatory measures that have been 
developed to control pharmaceutical prices, on both the supply and demand 
sides, including a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the PPRS. First, it 
analyses the organisation of government and industry for the purpose of 
regulating pharmaceutical costs.
105 Management Forum (2001); Jim Fumiss.
106 Taylor, David (1983), pp. 15-18.
107 Interviews, DOH civil servants 5 and 10.
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2.1 The administrative architecture of regulation
The Department of Health is responsible for medicines and the 
pharmaceutical industry. There are three branches that deal with the industry 
and with procurement, all of which are part of the Medicines, Pharmacy and 
Industry Division (MPI).108 The Branches are:
1. The Sponsorship Branch -  aims to ensure that the views of industry are 
expressed within the Department and that its interests are promoted.
2. The Pharmacy and Prescribing Branch -  deals with the consumption side 
of pharmaceuticals and demand side issues.
3. The Pricing and Supply Branch (formerly the PPRS Branch) -  negotiates 
and operates the PPRS.
The structure of the Department vis-a-vis pharmaceuticals changed in 2000, 
when the sponsorship and PPRS functions were split into two branches, 
where previously the sponsorship function had been the responsibility of the 
PPRS Branch. This was contained within the International and Industry 
Division (the IID), along with an international function that is now no longer 
part of the pharmaceuticals-focused MPI Division.109 It is this structure that 
was in place during the negotiation of the 1999 scheme. There has been a 
minor change in 2002, amounting to little more than a change in the name of 
the PPRS Branch to the Pricing and Supply Branch.110
2.1.1 Varying perspectives within the DOH
The change was in response to the 1994 Health Select Committee Report, 
which had criticised the presence of the sponsorship function within the 
PPRS Branch. It had said, “... it is essential that the individual Department of
108 For the 1993 and 1999 negotiations, the Division o f the DOH was the International and Industry 
Division (IID). It became the MPI, following the loss o f the International section, in 2000. It will 
therefore generally be referred to as the IID throughout, unless the MPI is being referred to 
specifically.
109 Interviews, DOH civil servants 4 and 5.
110 Civil Service Year Book 2002.
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Health officials who negotiate with the ABPI over the PPRS ... should have 
no responsibility for promoting the industry ...”111
Within the Department there are now three perspectives on medicines and 
the pharmaceutical industry:
■ A specifically industry-focused perspective which provides a direct line of 
communication into the Department from, and for, industry; it also has 
good working contacts with the relevant part of the DTI.
■ A specifically demand side perspective which focuses on issues of 
prescribing.
■ A procurement perspective in the Pricing and Supply (PPRS) Branch.
The splitting of the sponsorship and PPRS functions has not rigidly split 
policy into two branches because the PPRS itself specifically aims to 
represent the dual role of government, as a purchaser and a sponsor, but the 
overt sponsorship function has been removed from those officials responsible 
for the PPRS. Prior to this, the official responsible for the PPRS also had the 
formal responsibility for sponsoring the industry, as was the case during the 
1999 PPRS negotiations.
Broader pharmaceutical interests within the Department are also taken into 
account through ‘MPOG’, the Medicines Policy Oversight Group. This 
committee is serviced by the Sponsorship Branch and chaired by the 
Permanent Secretary. It includes representatives from most of the Divisions 
or Directorates within the Department who have an interest in medicines, 
including the Medicines Control Agency (MCA)112, responsible for the 
licensing of medicines, on both the supply and demand sides. Its purpose is 
to ensure that there is a proper overview of policies that affect medicines.113
111 House o f Commons Health Committee. HC Papers 80-1, 7 July 1994, paragraph 93.
112 Since 2003, called the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA).
113 Interview, DOH civil servants 4 and 15.
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2.1.2 The three departments
Beyond the Department of Health, formal regulatory architecture gives the 
DTI an important but limited role. There is a line of communication between 
industry and government, through the Bioscience Directorate (formerly the 
Biotechnology Directorate, during the 1999 negotiations). The DTI offers an 
alternative perspective (to the procurement perspective) that enables industry 
to communicate its concerns and to have its commercial interests 
represented. This perspective links in with the sponsorship function of the 
DOH. A DTI official explained: “The Department of Health Sponsorship 
Branch and the DTI Biotechnology Directorate look at the health service as a 
market -  how it’s pulling through new technology, and how it operates to 
encourage, or not, the pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology 
companies that have got at least some base in the UK. W e have the same 
kind of concerns.”114
The PPRS Branch of the DOH is concerned with procurement, but the 
context that shapes the articulation and expression of this concern is the 
PPRS itself -  a scheme that has a broader purpose in defining the 
relationship between the industry and the NHS.
There are therefore three parts of the bureaucracy with some overt concern 
for the commercial and industrial interests of the pharmaceutical companies.
In addition, the Treasury has a significant impact on the PPRS. Its interest in 
the scheme is very significant and considerable time and resources are 
devoted to it prior to its renegotiation in order to arrive at the government’s 
negotiating position. In the end, the Treasury must also agree to any ‘deal’ 
that is agreed by the Department of Health, by formally ‘signing-off the 
agreement, along with the DTI. The Treasury therefore examines the PPRS 
as a separate framework within which a significant amount of public spending 
is arranged (over 10% of the total health budget), and does not simply 
confine its interest to the overall budget, leaving its disposal to the NHS. The
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Treasury has a Health Team of several people specifically charged with 
health department issues and in the run up to a PPRS renegotiation its main 
task is to examine the scheme.115
2.1.3 The Pricing and Supply (PPRS) Branch
The Pricing and Supply Branch (PPRS Branch) of the MPI (formerly IID) is 
responsible for conducting the annual round of negotiations and discussions 
with each supplier to the NHS that the PPRS entails. It is also responsible, 
along with the division head, for negotiating the PPRS every five years or so 
and developing and executing the government’s negotiating position (for 
details of the annual and five yearly processes, see 2.3.5). The role of the 
division head in the five yearly process is to ensure that the balance that the 
division represents, and whose task it is to achieve, is reflected in the PPRS 
agreement.
The Branch contains only 15 people including clerical and administrative 
staff. The Branch consists of two teams, each of three people including an 
accountant. Each team deals with its own portfolio of companies.116
In addition to the teams dealing with the annual cycle, there is another team 
including a pharmacist that is responsible for policy issues. Hence a 
separation has been made within the branch between the annual round of 
discussions and decisions based on the Annual Financial Returns (AFRs) of 
companies,117 on the one hand, and the development of policy, on the 
other.118 There is also a branch head, a supporting pharmaceutical officer 
and a small general office. At the five-yearly negotiation, the Head of Division 
is also centrally involved, and took a leading role along with the Branch Head 
in the 1999 negotiations.
114 Interview, DTI civil servant 1.
115 Interview, Treasury civil servants 24 and 25.
116 Interview, DOH civil servant 5.
1,7 Annual Financial Returns are submitted by companies to the Department to assess their NHS 
business (see 2.3.6).
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The Department of Health and the Association of the British Pharmaceutical 
Industry (ABPI), the trade association for the industry, sign the PPRS. The 
DOH does so on behalf of the government and the ABPI on behalf of the 
industry. This entails that industry too has a formalised organisation and 
procedure for representing its diverse interests at these key negotiations.
2.2 Institutional organisation of industry
The ABPI’s signature has always been taken as being on behalf of the whole 
industry. Although not all companies are members of the Association, all 
companies are expected to comply with the scheme. In fact, less than half of 
the companies selling to the NHS are members, although 80% of 
pharmaceutical sales by value to the NHS are from ABPI members.119
This gives the ABPI a highly political role. Indeed, during the negotiation of 
the 1999 agreement compliance by companies with the scheme was a major 
issue for the government and the ability of the ABPI to represent all of the 
industry was therefore an open question -  more so because some firms not 
complying with the scheme were members of the Association.
2.2.1 Negotiating the PPRS
For negotiations of the scheme, the ABPI has set up negotiating teams of 
about seven people, including an ABPI secretariat and a spectrum of 
representatives of the industry. A balance has been struck along the two 
main axes or fault lines of ABPI membership -  firm nationality (British, 
American, European) and firm size (large and small). The negotiating teams 
on the PPRS are organised to reflect both these size and nationality 
dimensions.120 Throughout the history of the PPRS, the ABPI has modified its 
internal procedures in order to suit the demand made upon it by the
118 Department o f Health (1999b).
1,9 Earl-Slater, A. (1997), p.39.
120 Interview, industry executive 6.
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scheme.121 The PPRS is a significant part of the Association’s work and a 
central focus of its activity on an on-going basis. Even the preparation for the 
five-yearly negotiations can occupy it two-years in advance, as it did for the 
1999 negotiations (see Chapter 4).
Typically, each company will begin a process of defining its position 
regarding the PPRS at least several months prior to the beginning of the 
ABPI process. The task of the ABPI is then to agree enough of a blueprint for 
negotiations to enable the relatively small team of industry negotiators to act 
with authority when they meet the departmental officials.122 In 1999, for 
example, a flexible negotiating remit was defined in advance for the 
negotiating group, within which they were not required to refer back to the full 
membership of the ABPI for approval. This is more effective in allowing the 
industry negotiators to face the government on reasonably equal terms, but it 
also requires a great degree of acceptance by the membership as a whole 
that the team of negotiators is representative and that their brief carries their 
authority.
2.3 Supply side regulation: The PPRS
The PPRS is the key mechanism of supply side regulation of the 
pharmaceutical industry in the UK, for the purpose of controlling costs in the 
purchase of medicines for the NHS.
The PPRS is the descendant of the Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme 
(VPRS), which dates from 1957. From this early time the government was 
worried about the rising costs of medicines within the NHS budget and in 
1949 and 1956 standing committees had suggested the introduction of some 
sort of price control of medicines, based on the principle that tax payers had 
some right to have their interests represented in the public purchase of 
medicines.
121 Sargent, J.A. (1985), p.123.
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The PPRS regulates the costs of medicines to the NHS by capping the profits 
on the NHS business of companies selling products to it. The scheme is 
intended to strike a balance between the health policy aims of cost 
containment and the broader industrial policy aims of maintaining and 
encouraging a world class pharmaceutical industry in the UK, contributing 
positively to the balance of trade.123 Through this, it represents a compromise 
between the interests of the consumers and producers of pharmaceuticals. 
This creates a government-industry arrangement very different from other 
European systems in overtly attempting both cost containment objectives and 
the promotion of the UK pharmaceutical industry.124
The purposes of the scheme have evolved slightly over the years but remain 
similar -  focused on achieving a balance between these two policy aims. The 
stated purposes of the PPRS, as written in the 1999 scheme but scarcely 
altered in any scheme since 1978, are to:
■ Secure the provision of safe and effective medicines for the NHS at 
reasonable prices.
■ Promote a strong and profitable pharmaceutical industry capable of such 
sustained research and development expenditure as should lead to the 
future availability of new and improved medicines.
■ Encourage the efficient and competitive supply of medicines to 
pharmaceutical markets in this and other countries.125
2.3.1 The early history of the PPRS
The ABPI was formed from the Wholesale Drug Trades Association (WDTA) 
in 1948 -  the change of name reflecting the new role given to it as 
representing more than the trade in drugs.126 The objectives of the WDTA
122 Interview, industry executive 2.
123 Earl-Slater, A. and Bradley, C. (1996), p.399.
124 Borrell, Joan-Ramon (1999), p.292.
125 Department o f Health (1999a), paragraph 1.1.
126 Lang, Ronald W. (1974), p.64.
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were, from its outset in 1930, political. One of its four objectives was to: 
“promote or oppose or assist in promoting or opposing departmental or 
parliamentary legislation affecting the trade.” Involvement in policy was a 
principal aim and the relationship with government during the war years put 
the industry in good stead to command some influence over policy after the 
war.127
During the war the WDTA had ensured the compliance of its members with 
the wartime emergency measures of the Central Pharmaceutical War 
Committee, part of the Ministry of Supply. The purpose of the measures was 
to ensure the integrity of supply to the public, but the framework of co­
operation provided a basis for later strategies of regulation.128
It also provided a possible blueprint for detailed administrative control of the 
industry, within the NHS framework, which industry wished to avoid.129 In 
1941 a National War Formulary was set up, listing useful and essential drugs 
dispensed under the National Health Insurance System. In 1945 the Ministry 
of Health (MOH) published a comparative list of products for inclusion in the 
formulary. Such powers were not subsequently included in the National 
Health Services Act. Immediately following the war the government was 
concerned to restore the balance of trade, and it recognised the place of the 
pharmaceutical industry in contributing to this.130
Rising costs of health care
Following the war years, the British system of regulation developed in the 
decade after the setting up of the NHS, and was a response on the part of 
government to the unexpectedly high, and rising, costs of a health care
127 Lang, Ronald W. (1974), p.60.
128 In fact, as will be seen later on, the emergency wartime measures exist in the background o f later 
regulation as emergency powers held by the Secretary of State for Health to set prices o f medicines 
directly. These powers, though never used, remained in existence until the Health Act 1999. Their 
legislative incarnation was during the first world war, through the wide ranging Defence o f the Realm 
Act ( ‘DORA’), which aimed to secure the supplies o f all types of goods in the wartime economy.
Parts o f  the act exist today.
129 Hancher, Leigh (1990), p.74.
130 Hancher, Leigh (1990), p.75.
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system which was designed with the expectation of an eventual levelling off 
of overall costs.131 In 1949 the government passed legislation allowing it to 
introduce a prescription charge, with the aim of not only raising revenue but, 
as Aneurin Bevan put it, to reduce the “cascades of medicine pouring down 
British throats”.132 As such, concerns about costs were the central motivation 
on the part of government in seeking some sort of regulatory framework for 
the purchase of medicines for the NHS. Several parliamentary committees 
examined medicine costs.
In 1949 the Standing Joint Committee on the Classification of Proprietary 
Medicines, the Cohen Committee, recommended to the Committee of Public 
Accounts (CPA) that price regulation of some sort be introduced. It 
recommended that doctors be discouraged from prescribing expensive 
branded products which were not sufficiently advantageous over generic 
equivalents (some sort of demand side control), and that prices for branded 
equivalents of standard products should have prices agreed in advance by 
the MOH and the manufacturer (some sort of supply side control). The idea 
of a negotiated agreement between the MOH and the industry already had 
the precedent of war time co-operation. The MOH had some experience of 
such a system while this presented the industry with an opportunity to 
negotiate to protect its interests.133
A paper submitted to the CPA in 1952 reiterated the concern over the costs 
of pharmaceuticals, and stated that the rising drugs bill was attributable to the 
increase in branded prescriptions, which had grown from 7% of total 
prescriptions in 1947 to 23% in 1951, while overall per capita consumption 
had not grown so quickly.134
Following this, the Guillebaud Committee was established in 1953 to 
examine the increasing expenditure on the NHS and, within it, on medicines. 
The Guillebaud Report recommended that the tax payer should have some
131 Macmillan K and Turner I. (1987), p.l 19.
132 Klein, R. (1995), p.31.
133 Hancher, Leigh (1990), pp.77-8.
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say in the prices of medicines bought by the NHS, and that at the same time 
the pharmaceutical industry should be able to develop properly.135 Also in 
1955-6 discussions with the industry as a whole were undertaken, leading to 
the establishment of the first VPRS.
An interim report of the Hinchcliffe Committee on Effective Prescribing 
revealed in 1957 that the MOH lacked basic statistical information on levels 
of drug consumption and use of branded products. This was a conclusion of 
the Guillebaud Committee as well, which had said that the lack of statistical 
information made it difficult to make recommendations concerning what to do 
about the drift towards more expensive branded products.136
Government-industry co-operation
The wartime relationship and the setting up of the NHS had left the roles of 
the ABPI and the government intertwined. As Lang says, “From 1950 on, the 
fortunes of the ABPI were tied in very closely with the activities of the Ministry 
of Health, the Treasury and the Committee of Public Accounts.”137 It was 
through this relationship and this ‘institutional dependency’ that the ABPI was 
so heavily involved in the design of the VPRS when it was first introduced in 
1957. Its organisational development was also defined by the relationship 
with government through the VPRS. But the co-operative relationship 
between government and industry is something that formed the context of the 
first scheme, rather than something created by it.
The reports of the successive committees suggest that the prior relationship 
of the industry with government as well as the inability of government to 
obtain independently the information it would need for strict regulation have 
underpinned the particular form of regulation in the VPRS and later PPRS. 
Indeed, in the years leading up to the first VPRS, the ABPI set up a 
negotiating committee in order to conduct business with government more
134 Hancher, Leigh (1990), p.77.
135 Hancher, Leigh (1990), chapter 3.
136 Hancher, Leigh (1990), p.78.
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efficiently and respond to the increasing pressure for some sort of regulation 
of pharmaceutical costs. The association therefore became integral to policy 
making and its role here became a significant part of its purpose and 
objectives.138 It was helped in this aim by the economic situation in the UK at 
the time: persistent balance of payments problems made the industrial policy 
side of the case far stronger, and this was something the ABPI was able to 
argue for successfully.139
In determining the relationship between government and industry, the limits 
to the ability of government to implement a regulatory regime was judged by 
successive studies to constitute a significant limitation on policy choices. 
Furthermore, the government was politically weak owing to various battles 
with the medical profession over the setting up of the NHS and this fostered a 
desire to avoid confrontation.140
2.3.2 The 1957 VPRS
The first Scheme of 1957 was based on two assumptions about the 
pharmaceuticals market: that prices in export markets were competitive and 
could therefore be used as benchmarks for UK price levels; and that most 
medicines in the UK were reasonably priced, but that some form of regulation 
was needed for those that were not. The first assumption was later criticised 
by the Sainsbury Report of 1967, which drew attention to the effects of 
patents on the world market. The report judged that the nature of the 
pharmaceuticals market is one operating on the basis of product, rather than 
price, competition. Hence, where competition between products is reduced, 
which is the intended effect of the patent system, there ceases to be a 
market mechanism for a check on prices. It recommended that some types of 
branded medicine be placed in special categories and doctors prescribing 
them obliged to justify their decisions. Generally, it suggested far more 
scrutiny of costs, profits and prices in the sector. Particular attention was paid
137 Lang, Ronald W. (1974), p.65.
138 Lang, Ronald W. (1974), p.66.
139 Hancher, Leigh (1989), p.87.
140 Wright, Maurice (1991), pp.505-7.
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to the extent of promotional expenditure by companies, and this became a 
key aim for the Ministry of Health in the VPRS.141
The first VPRS used three formulae for arriving at prices, and an option for 
direct negotiation if these were not applicable or if the manufacturer desired.
■ The first formula was the ‘export criterion’ which was applied where more 
than 20% of a medicine was exported. In this case the maximum UK price 
would be the weighted average export price -  the international market’s 
competitiveness was assumed here.
■ The second formula was the ‘standard equivalent criterion’, which applied 
to a narrow range of drugs. The branded product was to be priced no 
higher than the retail price of the unbranded equivalent.
■ The third formula was the ‘trade price formula criterion’, which consisted 
of an addition of accepted costs such as the ingredients, an ‘Oncost’ of 
121/4%, allowances for processing, packaging and a wholesale 
discount.142
The early development of the VPRS implied recognition that the first scheme 
needed to be strengthened if prices were to be affected greatly. The ABPI 
recognised that prices reached under the scheme’s formulae would often be 
higher than those already charged.143
2.3.3 Subsequent schemes
In 1961 the principle of negotiations with reference to costs and profits was 
introduced into the scheme, with the Ministry taking into account the 
profitability of a company’s overall business with the NHS. In 1964, a new 
scheme tightened regulation further. First, the scope of medicines subject to 
regulation was extended beyond the branded equivalent of standard 
products, as defined by the Cohen Committee,144 to include all medical
141 Taylor, David and Maynard, Alan (1990), p. 10.
142 Ministry o f Health (1957).
143 Martin, S. (1996), p.5.
144 Hancher, Leigh (1990), chapter 3.
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specialities prescribed by GPs. Unbranded medicines remained excluded.145 
Second, the level of sales of a medicine to the NHS required for it to be 
subject to direct negotiation was reduced. Hence the thrust of the early 
schemes was to control prices.
It was in the fourth VPRS, in 1969, that direct reference to the sponsorship 
role of government was first made. The scheme referred to the importance of 
a “strong, efficient and profitable” industry, and continued: “As sponsor for the 
industry the Department of Health and Social Security recognises the 
industry’s contribution to the economy of the United Kingdom as a whole and 
wishes further to encourage its competitive efficiency both at home and 
abroad.”146
In this scheme, a company’s sales of products to the NHS, rather than the 
export criterion or costs, formed the basis of negotiations. Companies were 
for the first time required to submit AFRs to the Department (then, the 
DHSS),147 and factors taken into account included the company’s advertising 
expenditure, transfer costs between affiliated concerns, and research and 
other such expenditures.148 It also took into account the ‘reasonableness’ of 
companies’ profits, as well as drug prices, and in this sense was an important 
shift towards the later PPRS.
However, this VPRS, in going further down the road of regulation, and in 
attempting to control both prices and profits, suffered from “the immensity of 
the administrative task to be undertaken and from its sheer complexity.”149 
Following this, the fifth VPRS, of 1972, incorporated a vaguer notion of 
‘reasonable’ profit, and restricted comprehensive regulation to firms with 
large sales to the NHS, over £750,000, and those with sales of less than 
£150,000 no longer had to justify any price rises at all.150 The 1972 VPRS is 
therefore one that modified the regulatory system in favour of the industry,
145 Department o f Health (1961), paragraph 3.
146 Department o f Health (1969).
147 Taylor, David and Maynard, Alan (1990), p. 11.
148 Martin, S. (1996), p.6.
149 Martin, S. (1996), pp.6-7.
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which it did in recognition of the complexity of the previous regulatory regime, 
and the government’s inability to implement it properly.
2.3.4 The first PPRS
The first PPRS came into operation in 1978, at a time when the government 
was concerned about the industry and that earnings and profits had fallen to 
an unduly low point.151 The scheme represented a further simplification of the 
regulatory system. It focused on the control of profits on aggregate business, 
moving away from the more direct control of prices under the preceding 
VPRSs.152 Since the NHS was effectively the sole buyer of prescription 
drugs, it incorporated the principle that overall costs and profits was the 
important factor, and that prices of individual medicines was not relevant.153 
Hence, uniquely in pharmaceutical price regulation in Europe, the regulation 
of company profits is the basis of the scheme. A target figure for profits 
earned from NHS business was set. The target for 1978/9 was 25%. The 
figure was based on a recommendation of the Review Board for Non- 
Competitive Government Contracts, and was similar to that for defence 
contracts, but with a slight addition for risk, to reflect the government’s role as 
a sponsor of the industry.154
The principles of the present PPRS therefore date from the 1978 scheme. 
The structure of that scheme was far simpler than its predecessors and 
allowed the DHSS to administer it with very few personnel and remarkably 
little administration.
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in 1983 was not satisfied that this 
PPRS was achieving reasonable prices for drugs. This criticism of 
successive schemes has continued, though changes in the schemes since
150 Martin, S. (1996), p.7.
151 Taylor, David and Maynard, Alan (1990), p. 12.
152 Sargent, J.A. (1985), pp. 105-27; Hancher, Leigh (1990), pp.67-106; Earl-Slater, A. and Bradley, C. 
(1996), p.398.
153 HMSO (July 1980), paragraphs 14-15.
154 Martin, S. (1996), p.7.
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then are considered to have made it more severe.155 This was during a time 
of particularly strained relations between government and industry, as 
pharmaceutical costs rose while company incomes fell, partly owing to the 
strength of sterling and an increase in imports.156 In the run up to the next 
PPRS, government-industry relations reached crisis point, with bitter public 
arguments over the introduction of the limited list in 1984-5.157
The return on capital for pharmaceutical companies was considerably higher 
than for UK industry in general, by 5% or more. From 1984, the target rate 
was reduced from 25% to 21%, and the ‘grey area’, in which companies’ 
profits were allowed to rise above this, was reduced from 10% to one third of 
the company’s target profit. The target rate was again reduced in 1985. The 
figure was not made public but it was “consistent with the risk rate 
recommended by the Review Board in its report of 1984.”158 As the PPRS 
had given the pharmaceutical industry a 2% increment over these 
recommendations on non-competitive contracts in the past, 19% has been 
suggested as a likely figure.159
The 1986 PPRS used a range for the target rate of return, within which 
companies negotiated with government. From 1987 this was 17-21%. It also 
increased the grey area from 33% to 50% above a company’s target. The 
range, rather than a specific target, was to remain in the scheme until its 
renegotiation in 1999.
2.3.5 The five-yearly and annual processes
The PPRS operates at two distinct levels. First there is the periodic 
renegotiation of the scheme. This takes place roughly every five years. Each 
scheme has stated that the terms can be renegotiated (and a new scheme 
signed) after five years if either party wishes. This has to some degree been
155 Burstall, M.L. (1997), p.S35.
156 Taylor, David and Maynard, Alan (1990), p .13.
157 Letter from Kenneth Clarke QC MP, Minister o f Health 1984-5, 23 May 2000.
158 House o f Commons Papers . HC 280 (1985), p.7.
159 Martin, S. (1996), p.9.
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influenced by the electoral cycle. The longest running scheme was the 1978 
PPRS, which ran for eight years. There have been eight schemes since 
1957:
■ VPRS 1957
■ VPRS 1961
■ VPRS 1969
■ VPRS 1972
■ PPRS 1978
■ PPRS 1986
■ PPRS 1993
■ PPRS 1999
The five-yearly process sets the terms of the scheme. The various provisions 
themselves are agreed, as are the various thresholds within each part of the 
scheme. The scheme then forms the structure and framework for the annual 
cycle of negotiations between the DOH and each individual company that 
does business with the NHS. This second part of the scheme -  the annual 
cycle -  is where each company discusses its AFR with the DOH.
The negotiation and agreement of the PPRS and its implementation are thus 
the outcome of two separate negotiating processes, one of which is collective 
and the other individual, on the industry side.160
2.3.6 Operation of the scheme: The annual cycle
The annual cycle takes place between the PPRS Branch and each individual 
company.161 There is no role here for the ABPI. Each company negotiates 
with the PPRS Branch a global return on capital based on their sales to the 
NHS in the previous year.162 Costs are examined following the submission of 
AFRs by the major companies (with over £25m of sales to the NHS) to the 
Department. The PPRS Branch only requires copies of audited accounts 
from companies selling between £1m and £25m to the NHS, and nothing
160 Sargent, J.A. (1985), p.106.
161 Although the relevant branch is now called Pricing and Supply, it was for many years known 
simply as the PPRS Branch, including at the times o f the 1993 and 1999 negotiations, which are the 
subject o f subsequent chapters here. It will therefore generally be referred to as the PPRS Branch 
throughout, unless the point being made is specifically related to 2002 and later, and notwithstanding 
the fact that the annual cycle is described here in general rather than ‘time-specific’ terms.
162 Department o f Health (1993 & 1999a); Burstall, M.L. (1990). p.30.
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from companies selling less than £1m, unless specifically requested.163 The 
distribution of these types of companies, following 1999, within the scheme is 
as follows:164
Table 2.1: Categories of PPRS companies by sales
Total number PPRS companies 156
NHS sales in excess of £25m 35
NHS sales between £1m and £25m 71
NHS sales below £1m 50
The PPRS Branch uses the AFRs to ensure that the products listed are 
correct -  that is, that they do in fact come under the auspices of the scheme 
-  and that there is consistency between companies in their representations; 
they are also used to calculate allowable expenditure under the R&D formula 
and under the sales promotion formula.165
There are three stages to the annual cycle. First, the companies submit their 
Annual Financial Returns, several months after the completion of the 
company financial year,166 with provisions for agreed delays in certain 
circumstances. So the system works retrospectively.
The second stage consists of the DOH examining the returns and possibly 
seeking additional information, if it sees this as necessary (paragraph 8.5). 
Here the DOH examines the AFRs to ensure that they yield a permitted level 
of profit for the company on its NHS business. The accounting process for 
each company is therefore a key part of the operation of the scheme.
The third stage (paragraph 8.6) is the process of negotiation to reach 
agreement on the level of profitability achieved by the company, after which 
the Department issues an assessment, which may indicate a payment due
163 Interview, DOH Civil Servant 5; Earl-Slater, A. (1997), p.45; Department o f Health (1999a).
164 Interview, DOH Civil Servant 5.
165 Department o f Health (1999a), paragraph 8.9.
166 There are three groups, according to alphabetical listing, who submit AFRs 6, 9 and 11 months 
after the financial year, respectively. See Department o f Health (1999a), paragraph 8.2.
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from the company. Discussions with each company about its AFR are 
confidential.
Historically, the timetable is has not always been kept. The 1996 Report to 
Parliament167 said that action on 19 of the 50 AFRs for 1993 had not been 
completed by 1996, though some progress was reported in the 1997 Report 
to Parliament. Still, the latter Report states that by September 1997 only 23 
of the 45 AFRs relating to 1995 had been cleared by the DOH.168 The 2000 
Report to Parliament reported a significant improvement in the clearance of 
case work by the Department -  up to 98% of those AFRs received within the 
past two years. There was also an improvement in the submission rate, with 
only a quarter of AFRs not received one year after the end of the financial 
year by 1998, compared with almost half in 1997.169 There has been, then, a 
considerable delay in the application of the scheme to many companies in 
each year.
While the rate of allowable profit is set at 21%, factors entered on each 
company’s AFR are discussed in the annual round of negotiations to ensure 
that they are allowable and to calculate what aspects of capital can be 
attributed to NHS business.
Much criticism of the PPRS stems from the behind-closed-doors 
negotiations, where each company sits down with government to discuss its 
capital employed and how much of it can be offset against NHS business. 
The scheme itself has improved in transparency in recent years -  not least in 
the 1999 scheme -  but the annual cycle of discussions is by its very nature 
not transparent, as it consists of discussions about commercially confidential 
data.
167 These are intermittent reports produced by the PPRS Branch, at the request o f Parliament in its 
1994 Select Committee Report. They give details o f the functioning o f  the PPRS and o f the progress 
in the assessment o f company accounts by the Branch.
168 Department o f Health (1996 & 1997).
169 Department o f Health (2000a), Table 1, p.8.
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2.3.7 Details of the scheme
In assessing the amount of profit that companies can earn on their NHS 
sales, there are restrictions on the amount that can be attributed to various 
activities in calculating capital employed. The basic principle of the scheme is 
that companies should earn profits roughly in line with those of British 
industry in general. ‘Reasonable’ is not defined in the introduction of the 
scheme,170 but so far as any explanation of the term is given, it is in this 
linking of profits to other sectors of industry.
The scheme does two key things. As well as limiting the profits that can be 
earned on NHS business for branded products, the scheme also obliges 
companies to apply for any price increase on any branded medicine sold to 
the NHS. So although companies must regulate the prices of their portfolio as 
a whole, they cannot do this by increasing individual product prices. They can 
only increase their overall profitability by either volume increases (where 
declining marginal costs of production would increase profitability171) or by 
new product launches, where the company is free to set any price it wishes. 
Indeed the scheme is designed to push companies to launch new products in 
order to regain their rate of profit on NHS sales -  it is by this mechanism that 
the scheme encourages R&D investment.
a) Calculating allowable profits
Since the 1999 scheme, a rate of return on capital employed (ROC) has 
been set for the industry as a whole at 21%. The first step in the annual cycle 
of the AFR assessments is to calculate capital employed by the company -  
which includes fixed assets, such as buildings and equipment, and working 
capital, such as debtors and stocks less creditors and tax. Profits are then
170 Sargent, J.A. (1985), p.105.
171 It seems unlikely that the rate o f profit could be increased easily through increases in sales volume 
within the UK market at a constant price, given that production is in any case organised on a global 
basis and any available economies o f scale are likely already to have been achieved for most products. 
Increases in volume would therefore be to increase overall profit rather than the rate o f profit.
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calculated by deducting allowable costs from total sales. Costs that are 
included in this calculation are as follows:172
■ Costs of goods (direct costs of producing medicines or the cost of
importing them or purchasing them from another company).
■ Distribution costs.
■ R&D costs.
■ General administrative costs, which are usually about 12% of sales.
■ Costs related to the provision of information on products (i.e. data sheets) 
and non-promotional expenditure.
■ Promotion, which includes the cost of marketing to the NHS.
There is also a fixed costs allocation, through which 7.5% of total net UK-
based NHS medicines fixed assets can be allocated to the NHS, before the 
PPRS allocations take place. This is because, to quote the PPRS itself, “the 
Department acknowledges that a straight apportionment on the basis of the 
value of NHS and export would not take full account of the cost and asset 
base required in the UK to supply branded medicines to the NHS.”173 This 
marks a significant increase in the basic fixed cost allocation, which was 
2.4% in the 1993 Scheme.174
Hence, 7.5% of all fixed assets employed to produce branded, prescription 
medicines is ‘allocated’ to UK production. The remaining 92.5% is then 
divided between exports and NHS business proportionately, with some minor 
differences in the criteria used for apportionment in the two cases.175 There is 
therefore a slight weighting of fixed assets in favour of UK production over 
export production.
The purpose of this mechanism is to offset the widely reported ‘export 
disincentive’ attributed to the PPRS.176 The export disincentive arises
172 Mossialos, E. (1997), p.54.
173 Department o f Health (1999a), paragraph 15.1.
174 Department o f Health (1999b), paragraph 2.14
175 Interview, DOH Civil Servant 5.
176 See, for example: Mossialos, E. (1997), p.68.
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because increases in capital do not need to be as proportionately large as 
increases in export sales, so the capital base of NHS business appears to 
reduce as exports increase. The figures below serve as a hypothetical 
example of how profitability on NHS business can be reduced as exports 
rise. They also show how the 7.5% basic allocation to UK costs might offset 
this to some degree:177
Table 2.2: Effects of the PPRS ‘fixed costs allocation’
Home Export Total
Yr.1
Sales 2 0 0 0 2 0 0
Capital 1 0 0 1 0 0
7T 2 1 % 2 1 %
Yr2. with no initial UK allocation
Sales 2 0 0 1 0 0 300
Capital 80 40 1 2 0
71 21% 16.8%*
Yr.2 with 7.5% allocation
Sales 2 0 0 1 0 0 300
Capital 8 3 | 37* 1 2 0
7C 2 1 % 17.4%**
* 80% of yr.1
** 83% of yr.1
t  7.5%x120=9; 120-9=111; 2/3x111=74; 74+9=83
$ 1/3x111=37
n = target profit
In addition to specifying a rate of profit allowable, the PPRS also sets limits, 
or allowances, to some aspects of capital employed. Principal among these 
are limits on R&D and on promotional expenditure, which includes marketing 
to the NHS.
177 Interview, industry executive 13.
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The R&D ‘allowance’ is up to 20% of the value of NHS sales. This is taken to 
ensure that sufficient research and development investment is undertaken (or 
available to be undertaken) by companies to support an innovative industry. 
There is also a variable rate of R&D allowance, which is further intended to 
encourage innovation: “an additional 0.25% of NHS home sales for each in­
patent molecule above a threshold of £0.5 million of NHS home sales per 
annum up to a limit of 12 molecules. This is available on top of the ... 
allowances ... The amount allowed reflects both a contribution to the 
worldwide cost of R&D undertaken by companies developing human 
medicines and a desire to reward and provide an incentive for success in 
R&D.”178 The purpose of this is to recognise rather than reward innovation, 
as it allows extra money for a diverse product portfolio.179
Allowable sales promotion expenditure consists of three components. There 
is a ‘standard’ element of 6% of home sales of NHS medicines, plus a ‘fixed’ 
element of £464,000 per company.180 In addition, there is a ‘product servicing 
allowance’ for each active substance with NHS sales of £100,000 or above in 
the year to which the AFR refers. These are higher for the limited number of 
eligible products, reducing gradually. The 1999 scheme allows £58,000 for 
each of the first three eligible products, £46,000 for each of the next three, 
£35,000 for each of the next three, and £23,000 for each of the rest. The 
scheme also sets out what particular activities are regarded as qualifying as 
‘sales promotion’.181
Sales promotion allowances do not restrict sales promotion expenditure over 
all. They limit the amount that may be offset for PPRS purposes. In reality, 
companies may spend more than this (as they may with R&D allowances). 
This means that ‘PPRS profit’ may be lower than ‘real’ profit, as money spent 
for sales or R&D registers as profit for PPRS purposes.182 This may be seen
178 Department o f Health (1999a), paragraph 14.1.
179 Interview, DOH Civil Servant 5.
180 Interview, industry executive 13.
181 Department o f Health (1999a), paragraph 16.1.
182 Interview, industry executive 13.
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to disadvantage small companies, for whom a new drug may form a very 
large part of their hopes for success. Their ability to ‘add’ promotional 
expenditure above that which can be counted in PPRS calculations maybe 
more limited than for very large companies. The allowance per company is 
intended to offset this to some degree.
If a company is calculated to earn more than 21% profit on capital employed, 
using the specified allowances for some types of expenditure, then it must 
pay back the excess profit to the Department of Health, subject to the 
operation of the ‘margin of tolerance’ (see below).
b) Levels of allowances and price increases
Key to the dynamics of the PPRS is that prices of individual products 
continually fall in real terms. Rises in price of individual products have to be 
applied for to the Department and in practice they are rare.183 As this decline 
in prices happens, company profits are recovered by the launch of new 
products, over which they have complete freedom of pricing. The PPRS 
therefore also specifies rules for price increase applications.
For the rate of allowable profit, allowable R&D costs and allowable 
promotional expenditure, the PPRS specifies two ‘levels’. Level 1 allowances 
apply for price increase applications. Level 2 allowances -  i.e. the figures 
described above -  apply for AFR analysis in the annual cycle.
Level 1 allowances are 17% for the ROC, 17% for R&D and 3% for 
promotional expenditure. In other words, the AFR is effectively recalculated 
using the less generous figures to see if the allowable ROC (now 17%) has 
been reached. Only if a company’s profits fall below 17%, subject to the 
application of the other level 1 allowances and to the operation of the margin 
of tolerance, will a price increase be granted.
183 Interviews, industry executives 9 and 13.
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There are further restrictions on price increases. No increase will be granted 
within 12 months of a preceding authorised price increase (paragraph 19.6); 
and a price increase will not be granted where a company’s ‘AFR business’ is 
not up to date (paragraph 19.1).
c) The margin of tolerance
The PPRS is in practice both far more generous in its analysis of AFRs and 
far more stringent in its consideration of price increase applications than 
these two levels of allowances suggest. This is because of the operation of a 
mechanism known as the ‘margin of tolerance’ (MOT).
The MOT operates in order to allow for rises and falls in profits either side of 
the target rate, before any price increases need be considered or any profits 
repaid or price reductions implemented by companies. The MOT is set at 
140% above level 2 profit and 50% below level 1 profit. Profits can therefore 
be kept up to 29.4% of capital employed ( 21 x1 .4 )  before the Department will 
require money to be paid back. Furthermore, companies can fall significantly 
below the 17% target profit, that is, 8.5% profit (17 x 0.5), before a price 
increase is considered.
This therefore operates as another restriction on price increases. Where a 
price increase is allowed for a particular company, profits above the level 1 
allowance (17%) in that year must be repaid to the Department. A ‘return’ to 
level 2 profit (21%) can therefore only be achieved by means other than price 
increases -  effectively through new product launches. The scheme states: 
“The MOT will not be available to a scheme member for any year in which it 
has had a price increase agreed by the Department.” Furthermore: ‘W here a 
scheme member exceeds its level 1 target profit for a year in which it has 
received a price increase, all profits above the level 1 target will be 
repayable.”184
184 Department o f Health (1999a), paragraph 12.2.
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In summary, profits must fall below the bottom of the target range, plus the 
MOT, for price increases to be considered. Price increases are then 
considered, but on the basis that they will be granted in order to return profits 
to level 1 target only. No action is taken to reduce profits until they exceed 
the upper limit of the range, plus the MOT.
d) Return on sales companies
Companies with little capital investment in the UK have their profits based on 
sales. These are known within the PPRS as ‘ROS’ (Return on Sales) 
companies. If a company’s sales exceed its capital employed, sales are 
taken as the basis of calculating allowable profits. The allowable profit target 
is divided by a factor of 3.5 for this purpose -  i.e. 6% profit is allowable on 
sales to the NHS. This happens if a company’s annual sales are more than 
3.75 times its capital invested. There were 7 such companies in 1993, out of 
a total of 43 selling to the NHS,185 and in 1999 there were 9 such 
companies.186
e) Free pricing
A central feature of the PPRS is that it allows companies to set prices for new 
products. This is a key dynamic of the PPRS ‘system’, as it is intended to 
encourage innovation because product launches are the only means of re- 
attaining allowable profits. Such product launches also enable companies to 
offset the effects of the overall price reduction that has been part of each five- 
yearly agreement (see below).
There are qualifications about free pricing related to the launch of potential 
‘blockbuster’ drugs. There is a clause that requires companies to inform the 
government of the launch on the UK market of any such drug -  defined as 
those that might exceed £20m of sales in any one year of the first five years 
of sales. This, Earl-Slater suggests (of the 1993 scheme) stems in part “from
185 Mossialos, E. (1997), p.55.
186 Department o f Health (1999b), paragraph 2.8.
81
Chapter 2: Regulation
a political fear of ‘blockbuster’ products rupturing control and growth of the 
NHS drugs bill.”187 The PPRS does not contain any provision to include such 
products, which, as new products, would be exempt from individual inclusion 
in the scheme for the first five years of sales, providing that overall profits do 
not exceed the MOT.188 This mechanism shows the government’s need to be 
able to plan adequately for ‘blockbuster’ products. The term ‘blockbuster’ for 
the Department refers to levels of sales, rather than to any therapeutic 
advance or the extent of medical need, emphasising the nature of their 
importance from the Department’s perspective.189
f) Price reductions
PPRS agreements have historically been an opportunity for the government 
to achieve an across-the-board price reduction in the total NHS 
pharmaceutical bill. The 1993 scheme imposed a reduction of 2.5% on all 
products covered by it, from companies with NHS sales over £1m, for the 
period 1st October 1993 to 30 September 1996. The 1999 scheme imposed 
a reduction of 4.5% from 1 October 1999, to remain unchanged until 1 
January 2001, after which companies will be able to apply for price 
increases. The 1999 scheme includes a mechanism of ‘modulation’, in which 
the DOH will accept reductions that in sum (across a company’s portfolio of 
NHS products) amounts to the same as a 4.5% reduction for each product. 
This is a significant ‘one-off cut and it is possible in theory that some 
companies would have fallen below maximum allowed profits for some time.
2.3.8 Dynamics of the scheme: What it does and doesn’t do
The PPRS has several functions. As is described above in detail, the 
principal mechanism of cost control within it is the regulation of the profits 
earned by companies on their business with the NHS. There are, though, 
numerous other features of the scheme that also control costs. These include
187 Earl-Slater, A. (1997), p.45.
188 Department of Health (1999a), paragraph 20.1.
189 Earl-Slater, A. (1997), p.46.
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the prevention of price increases, which have to be approved by the 
Department in accordance with rules laid out in the scheme; and the one-off 
price reduction across all NHS medicines, which can reduce the drugs bill 
significantly over the short-term and therefore stem the rate of its longer term 
rise.
In summary, the main components of the PPRS are as follows:190
■ The statement of objectives
■ Control on profits
■ Control on price rises
■ Control on research and development expenditure
■ Control on advertising expenditure
■ Advance warning to government of ‘blockbuster’ products
The scheme aims to fulfil simultaneously health and industrial policy goals. It 
aims to achieve the health policy goal of cost containment and the industrial 
policy goal of a successful and internationally competitive pharmaceutical 
industry.191 As has been noted by several commentators, “These dual 
objectives of cost containment and industrial innovation, are not necessarily 
wholly compatible.”192
The scheme aims to achieve ‘reasonable prices’ for NHS medicines. As 
prices are not themselves regulated, what it in fact does is effect to some 
degree the amount, in aggregate, that government pays for NHS medicines. 
High prices in one part of a company’s portfolio must be offset by lower 
prices elsewhere. It regulates prices but does not set them directly, in so far 
as they cannot easily be raised once they have been set by companies. In 
real terms prices of individual medicines continually fall.
Only if company profits fall significantly below the allowable ROC is a rise in 
price of an individual medicine considered by the Department of Health. The
190 Earl-Slater, A. (1997).
191 Sedgley, M. (2001).
192 Martin, S. (1996), p.3.
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basic ‘dynamic’ of the PPRS is therefore that as real prices of products are 
eroded by inflation, pharmaceutical firms must release new medicines into 
the marketplace in order to maintain their allowable profit level. Free pricing 
at launch is a key feature of the system and such releases enable companies 
to move back up to their allowable rate of return if they have fallen back from 
it. Through this, the scheme aims to encourage innovation.
The value of free pricing for industry extends beyond its function in assisting 
in a rise in the rate of profit. Crucially, it enables a quick launch. 
Reimbursement systems, where a price has to be fixed in advance of sales, 
can delay launch by many months. The UK has one of the quickest launch 
times following market approval of any major market. Germany, Switzerland 
and Sweden are similar and only the US is quicker.193
The launch price is also important in relation to other markets -  the UK is 
referred to overtly by other European countries to fix their (reimbursement) 
prices. Countries that include the UK as one of the countries for fixing prices 
include Italy, the Netherlands and Ireland; several other countries use an 
average of all EU country prices. However, the extent of cross referencing 
(where countries base their prices on countries that have already based them 
on prices elsewhere) mean that only three EU countries actually price their 
pharmaceuticals completely independently: Germany, France and the UK. All 
other 12 member states of the EU have prices based in some way or other 
on the UK.194
The scheme exercises no control over volumes of consumption and therefore 
cannot determine the overall NHS drugs bill. The release of new medicines 
into the marketplace could, in theory, have a significant effect on NHS costs if 
demand for them proved to be very high. The effect of the scheme is 
therefore quite limited: it helps, where a company is already at its profit 
ceiling, to ensure that the effect on the NHS’s costs of the release of new
193 See, for example: Department o f Health (2002c), p.41.
194 Management Forum (2001); Jim Fumiss.
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drugs under patent protection are to some degree compensated for by price 
reductions on other, older products.
Through the across-the-board price reduction on all business with the NHS, 
the scheme provides an occasional opportunity for government to keep in 
check the growth in the NHS drugs bill. Given the near impossibility of then 
achieving a price increase on a particular product, only products that are 
released following such a reduction remain unaffected by it -  a further 
incentive for the development of new medicines.
In summary, the PPRS interacts with and affects the market for medicines in 
several ways:
■ It allows free pricing at launch.
■ It encourages new product launches.
■ It prevents product price increases.
■ By capping company profits it can potentially reduce the effect of new 
product launches on the NHS budget.
■ By capping various aspects of company expenditure as legitimate 
components of capital employed it can affect company behaviour.
■ It provides a five-yearly opportunity for renegotiation of details and a one- 
off price reduction.
■ It provides a context and an arena for a close working relationship 
between government and industry.
■ It provides some insurance against a ‘budgetary shock’ from a 
‘blockbuster’ product.
2.3.9 Significant developments in the 1999 scheme
The first significant change in the 1999 scheme was the introduction of the 
two ‘levels’ of allowances -  i.e. the introduction of a separate set of 
allowances for price increases. Previously, there had been stated ‘ranges’ of 
allowances, and the way in which these were implemented vis-a-vis each 
company were not transparent. The ROC was a range of 17-21%. Where
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each company fell within this range was a confidential matter between the 
Department of Health and each company.195
The R&D allowance was stated in very vague terms in the 1993 scheme, and 
subject to discussion between the DOH and each company. The type and 
level of investment in the UK was one factor used to decide upon a “level of 
support” for R&D.196 In the 1999 scheme, the range was replaced by two 
fixed amounts of 17% and 21% for the two levels. The 1993 scheme stated 
that research allowances will be maintained “in total for the industry at the 
existing level”, without saying what that was.197 The previous scheme of 1986 
does not state a level either but rather says, “The level of support will be 
negotiated individually with each company.”198 This was an area of flexibility, 
where the annual cycle determined the figures on a company by company 
basis.
The sales promotion allowance remained unchanged except for the 
introduction of the level 1 allowance of 3%.
The other significant change between the 1993 and 1999 schemes was the 
extension of the MOT. In the 1993 scheme the MOT was 25% either side of 
the target profit range. Price increases would therefore be looked at if profits 
fell more than 25% below the lower end of the target profit range, and excess 
profits would have been made when they rose 25% above the target profit 
range. The 1999 scheme saw these increased to 50% below the fixed 17% 
for price increases and to 140% above the 21% for normal AFR business. 
The additional restriction on profits for a year in which a price increase had 
been granted was also introduced in the 1999 scheme.
195 Trumbull, J. Gunnar (2000), p.30.
196 Department o f Health (1993), paragraphs 12.1-12.4.
197 Department o f Health (1993), paragraph 12.1.
198 Department o f Health (1993), paragraph 12.1
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Both industry and government commentators see this extension of the MOT 
in the 1999 scheme as essential to a system that they regard as having (to a 
greater or lesser degree) penalised success and rewarded inefficiency.199
Other changes include:
■ The 1993 scheme had a restriction on price increases in any one year to 
a maximum of 10%, but this has been dropped from the 1999 agreement.
■ ROS allowances were increased from 4.5% return on sales in 1993 to 6% 
in 1999.
■ In order to improve compliance (and get AFR business up to date), which 
was a key aim of the new scheme,200 the 1999 scheme was accompanied 
by a provision in the 1999 Health Act for a ‘statutory scheme’ to be 
applied to any company that did not sign up to the voluntary scheme (see 
Chapters 5 & 6).201
In addition, there was the setting up of a Pharmaceutical Industry 
Competitiveness Task Force (PICTF) to examine all aspects of the industry’s 
regulation and other factors affecting its competitiveness, including 
contextual features that affect pharmaceutical investment, such as the 
science base (see above and Chapter 4).
2.4 Other supply side controls
2.4.1 Statutes
a) The Health Act 1999
The 1999 Health Act introduced provisions for the Secretary of State for 
Health to impose a ‘statutory scheme’, which ‘shadowed the PPRS in its 
structure, on any company that did not sign up to the ‘voluntary scheme’. As
199 Interviews, DOH civil servant 5; industry executive 13.
200 Department o f Health (1999b), paragraph 4.1.
201 HMSO (1999), paragraphs 33-38.
87
Chapter 2: Regulation
is explained in Chapters 5 and 6, this was a highly significant development in 
the politics of government-industry relations in the pharmaceutical sector. 
The government now has statutory powers to control the prices of medicines 
directly if it so wishes. Furthermore, there now exists a legislative framework 
that effectively gives added force to the negotiating competence of the ABPI 
over all the industry, because if companies do not sign the scheme 
negotiated by it, they may be subject to statutory control.
The scheme can be applied immediately to any company that does not sign 
up to the voluntary PPRS. Nevertheless, to prevent the flouting of the PPRS 
by companies that have signed up to it, there is also provision within the 
Health Act for direct powers to control the prices of medicines. The Secretary 
of State can “prohibit any manufacturer or supplier to whom a voluntary 
scheme applies from increasing any price charged by him for the supply of 
any health service medicine covered by the scheme without the approval of 
the Secretary of State.”202 The Secretary of State can also, after consultation 
with the ABPI, “limit any price which may be charged by any manufacturer or 
supplier for the supply of any health service medicine.”203
b) The National Health Service Act 1977
The government has had direct power to control prices since the First World 
War. More specifically, the National Health Service Act 1977 gave the 
Secretary of State the right to impose prices on individual medical products. 
Section 57 of the Act states: “The Secretary of State may by order provide for 
controlling maximum prices to be charged for any medical supplies required 
for the purposes of this act.”204
The 1977 Act was passed in an atmosphere of suspicion between the 
industry and the Labour government, which had mooted the idea of 
nationalising the industry (as was to happen to parts of the French
202 HMSO (1999), paragraph 33 (8)(a).
203 HMSO (1999), paragraph 34 (l)(a).
204 HMSO (1977), Section 57.
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pharmaceutical industry in the early years of the Mitterrand presidency, when 
one quarter of the industry was transferred to the legal ownership of the 
state205). The Act was a decisive shift in the government’s approach to the 
industry because it effectively put the force of law underneath the negotiating 
table. Trumbull notes that it “changed the nature of government-industry 
relations.”206 He also notes that agreements subsequent to the 1977 Act 
were renamed PPRS in place of the Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme 
(VPRS) that it had previously been.
Although the power to control prices directly is restated in the 1999 Act, the 
1977 provisions have been regarded as not providing for a ‘variable 
response’ and rather being a ‘nuclear option’ that could never in practice be 
used without scarring relations between government and the industry, 
possible irreparably.207 The 1999 Act, while allowing for direct price controls, 
also enables a scheme shadowing the PPRS to be imposed -  i.e. it allows for 
the statutory control of profits as a more measured, and therefore realistic, 
response to non-compliance by companies.
2.4.2 The General Medical Services (GMS) Regulations
Supply of some medicines to the NHS has been restricted through provisions 
set out in the National Health Service Act 1977. As part of the National 
Health Service (General Medical Services) Regulations, which are the terms 
of service for GPs in the NHS, two schedules restrict the right of GPs to 
prescribe some drugs on the NHS. Schedule 10 is a ‘blacklist’, which 
completely bans the prescription of those medicines that appear on it. 
Schedule 11 is a ‘greylist’ that restricts the use of a named drug to particular 
groups of patients or specified indications or severity of indication.
205 Hancher Leigh. (1990), p.238.
206 Trumbull, J. Gunnar (2000), p. 30.
207 Interviews, DOH civil servants 5 and 10; industry executives 3 and 13.
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a) Schedule 10, the Selected or Limited List
Schedule 10 is otherwise known as the Selected List or Limited List, first 
introduced in 1984, and extended in 1993. It is titled “Drugs and other 
substances not to be prescribed for supply under pharmaceutical sales.”208 
Its introduction was controversial and soured relations between the 
government and industry.
The 1984 list was one of the most politically controversial acts taken by the 
Department of Health (then DHSS) and marked a low point in the 
government’s relationship with industry. It forbids the prescribing of brand 
name products in certain therapeutic categories, which must be replaced by 
generic prescribing. Overall, in 1984/5, 600 products in seven therapeutic 
classes were banned from prescription under the NHS 209 The list was 
extended significantly in 1993. Now there are about 3000 products listed on 
it.
The drugs that are listed in Schedule 10 can be prescribed to patients 
privately but may not be prescribed at the cost of the NHS. The medical law 
firm Lockharts, in its brief on the subject,210 notes that the Limited List is 
recognised to have both an impact on the pharmaceutical companies’ targets 
and on the direction in which they use their resources to develop new 
pharmaceutical products.
b) Schedule 11
Schedule 11 contains a small range of specialised drugs which may only be 
used on certain occasions. The schedule is titled “Drugs to be prescribed 
under pharmaceutical services only in certain circumstances.”211 In its 
original form the schedule was not controversial and specified uses of certain 
drugs for certain purposes, with medical justifications at the basis of such
208 Statutory Instruments, 1992 No.635, National Health Service, England and Wales; p.222.
209 Earl-Slater, A. & Bradley, C. (1996), p.400.
210 See information from Medical Law Firm, Lockharts: www.lockharts.co.uk
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decisions. Schedule 11 has, however, become more noteworthy and 
certainly controversial in recent years as it appears to have been used for 
‘cost-effectiveness’ type decisions by the Department of Health, in cases 
where the nature of medical need is not clear. The most notable example 
recently is that of the sexual dysfunction drug Viagra, produced by Pfizer; 
another significant one is Propecia, a drug to alleviate baldness produced by 
Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD), which again falls outside what the NHS 
considers to be appropriate for public funding.
The inclusion of Viagra in Schedule 11 has caused very considerable 
concern and the British Medical Association continues to press the 
government to remove the prescribing restrictions on the grounds that the 
conditions for which the drug may be prescribed are not the only conditions 
for which the drug has a proper clinical purpose.
2.4.3 The risk-sharing scheme
In May 2002, a novel attempt to overcome one of the principal fears of 
government -  that of a shock to the medicines budget from so-called 
‘blockbuster’ drugs -  was introduced. It was an experiment in risk-sharing 
between the NHS and the pharmaceutical industry and was introduced for 
multiple sclerosis (MS) drugs in May 2002 (announced in February), following 
controversy about cost-effectiveness appraisals for MS drugs by the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). The risk-sharing scheme is in its early 
stages, in part because of delayed NICE assessments of the drugs 
concerned -  beta interferon and glatiramer -  and also because of a lack of 
available specialist staff.212
The scheme is based on the principle of ‘payment by results’. Costs to the 
NHS of the drugs will be gradually reduced unless evidence of their 
effectiveness is shown. Performance of the drugs will be assessed according 
to target outcomes set between the government and the manufacturers of
211 Statutory Instruments, 1992 No.635, National Health Service, England and Wales; p.2239.
212 Scrip No. 2763, 12 July 2002, p.6
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each of the four drugs involved. If performance targets are met in full, the 
drugs will be considered to be cost-effective for the NHS. The department 
estimates that adjustments in costs according to the performance criteria, are 
likely to continue for about 10 years.213
Strategic health authorities (SHAs) and primary care trusts (PCTs) are 
obliged to fund MS drugs under the scheme. Patients are put on the scheme 
following assessment of their suitability for it by consultant neurologists at 
special MS centres.
The scheme may form a model for the funding of expensive innovative drugs 
in the future. Though initially billed as a scheme confined to MS drugs, an 
extension to other areas has not been ruled out by the Department of Health. 
It has said that it would depend on such a suggestion being made by NICE. 
However, there is the potential for the risk-sharing approach to be seen as an 
alternative to the NICE appraisal process, even though NICE itself is the 
means by which any future schemes would be introduced.214
2.5 Demand side controls
Until the NHS reforms of the Thatcher governments, and the subsequent 
reforms introduced by the Major and Blair governments, pharmaceutical 
expenditure was controlled chiefly by supply side measures -  mainly the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), as well as Schedules 10 
and 11 of the GMS regulations.
From 1948 onwards, pharmaceutical expenditure in the NHS had been 
‘demand-led’ -  that is determined by the activities of GPs (who have 
accounted for about 75% of all NHS pharmaceutical expenditure) and their 
assessment of need. There had been attempts to control indirectly the 
activities of GPs, but these, in the 1950s, centred on getting good prices from
213 Polak, M. (2002); pp. 153-54.
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the industry for ‘expensive’ products -  in other words, formed the basis of 
supply side controls later instituted in the V P R S 215
There are now various demand side controls in the area pharmaceutical 
purchasers and the extent of this has been recognised in the PICTF report. 
The report states that the extent of these marks out the British market as 
distinct from all other European markets.216
2.5.1 Co-payment and cost-sharing
The longest running demand side control on pharmaceutical consumption 
has been the prescription charge. This is one of the few co-payment systems 
in operation in the NHS, where patients contribute to the cost of treatments. 
Most other European health care systems make far greater use of co­
payment as a demand side control. Nevertheless, the prescription charge, 
although quite high (in some cases exceeding the total cost of the drug) is 
charged to only a minority of the population, and those exempt are the 
heaviest users -  only 14% of NHS prescriptions incur the prescription 
charge.217 Today however, there are significant other demand side controls 
on pharmaceutical consumption.
2.5.2 Prescribing controls and advice
Through the 1980s a Prescribing Analysis and Costs system, known as 
PACT, was developed. This was given to doctors to show them how much 
they were spending on pharmaceutical prescribing, and enabling comparison 
across practices. This was as an informal means of encouraging prescribing 
efficiency, and the system remains in place today. Each GP practice receives 
a quarterly Standard PACT Report from the prescription pricing authority
214 Polak, M. (2002).
215 Glennester M., Matsaganis M., Owens P., Hancock, S. (1994), p.89.
216 Department o f Health (2001), paragraph 6.3.
217 European Observatory on Health Care Systems (1999), p.82.
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(PPA) setting out its prescribing data and costs, in a comparative context 
across its Health Authority and nationally.218
The Community Care Act 1990, which introduced the NHS internal market, 
established GP fundholding 219 Prescribing budgets were included within GP 
fundholding budgets, giving GPs incentives to prescribe efficiently. Indicative 
prescribing budgets (IPBs) for non-fundholding GPs were also introduced. 
Independent medical advisers at the local level used these to try to put 
pressure on high-prescribing GPs, and those practices spending more than 
the indicative budget were expected to explain why. Non-fundholding GPs 
could keep some of any savings made from their indicative budget and 
fundholders, operating within an overall budget, could use all money saved 
on the drugs bill in other areas of service.220
The IPB system developed in the mid-90s to include, apart from the freedom 
to transfer funds across services, the empowerment of health authorities to 
pay a fee of up to £3000 per GP for meeting agreed prescribing targets. An 
additional cash incentive was therefore instituted for keeping prescribing 
costs under control 221
From 1999, GPs had their prescribing budgets merged with hospital and 
community health service budgets, on a cash limited basis, and organised 
through new Primary Care Groups (PCGs).222 The NHS Plan of the Labour 
Government has removed this form of fundholding and developed PCGs into 
new PCTs of larger numbers of GPs, covering population ranges of between 
50,000 to 250,000 people -  far larger than the traditional model of primary 
care practice with a few general practitioners. Larger population coverage will 
‘average out’ to some degree differences across sub-populations, providing
218 See website: www.ppa.org.uk/
219 Tucker, A. and Taylor, D. (2000), p.46; Reekie, W.D. (1996), pp.16-18.
220 Glennester M., Matsaganis M., Owens P., Hancock, S, (1994), p.89.
221 Tucker, A. and Taylor, D. (2000), p.47
222 European Observatory on Health Care Systems (1999), p.82-3.
94
Chapter 2: Regulation
an operating environment in which budgeting will be easier and more 
effective than the GP fundholding model.223
A further innovation has been the development of the computer advice 
system PRODIGY that is linked into GP surgeries and gives advice to GPs 
on lowest cost prescribing for particular indications. It is a computerised 
decision and learning support tool for GPs offering a series of 
recommendations for the treatment of diagnosed conditions in terms of 
therapy options, non-specific drug advice or referral on.224 The system 
disseminates information to encourage cost-effective prescribing by providing 
clinical guidance adapted to the patient, including information on diseases, 
and their management.225
2.5.3 Pharmacists
There is pressure on pharmacists too. The Drug Tariff limits the amount that 
pharmacists can be reimbursed by the NHS for generic drugs. Generics are 
an important exception from the PPRS, not being covered by it on the basis 
that there is genuine price competition within the generics medicines market. 
Despite this, the Drug Tariff forms a formal barrier to any escalation of costs 
to the NHS from this sector.226
There is currently debate about extending the role of pharmacists to enable 
them to play a more proactive part in controlling medicines for chronically ill 
patients. The chronic market represents the lion’s share of the prescribing 
budget. Government policy through the NHS Plan, published in 2000, aims to 
enhance significantly the role of community pharmacy, including the aim that 
by 2004 repeat dispensing will be the function of pharmacists and will mean 
that patients can get repeat prescriptions from a pharmacy, without having to
223 European Observatory on Health Care Systems (1999), p. 19.
224 See www.prodigy.nhs.uk/
225 See www.doh.gov.uk/ipu/whatnew/itevent/tables/eprescribinginprimarycare.htm
226 Redwood, H. (1997), p.95.
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contact their surgery each time.227 These plans were finalised in November 
2002, to take effect in early 2003.
2.5.4 Generic prescribing
Several measures have been introduced to encourage generic prescribing -  
and many of those above have a bearing on it. PRODIGY can recommend 
generics as part of its advice; Schedule 10 of the GMS Regulations prohibits 
certain brand name drugs from NHS prescription; and the Drug Tariff then 
limits prices paid for generics to pharmacists. In addition, the PPA provides 
Health Authorities with information, as part of PACT, on how each practice 
may make more use of generics in order to cut prescribing costs.
Large increases in the costs of some generics through 1998/9 resulted in the 
government setting up a statutory maximum price scheme for generic drugs. 
“The scheme will set statutory maximum prices for the main generics 
supplied for NHS use in primary care.”228 The Scheme took effect from 3 
August 2000.
2.5.5 OTCs
Another demand side feature of the UK market is the relatively large amount 
of drugs sold over-the-counter (OTC) without a prescription. The removal of 
the need for a prescription immediately moves a drug, in large part, from the 
NHS to the private market. Although OTC medicines can still be gained 
through a prescription by a patient for financial reasons, most OTC medicines 
are sold by direct consumer purchase. Re-categorising borderline drugs in 
this way is therefore a significant cost containment measure. The 
government’s 2000 NHS Plan includes the aim of enabling patients to obtain 
a “growing range of medicines over-the-counter”.229
Department o f Health (2002a).
228 Department o f Health (2000c).
229 Department o f Health (2000b).
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Nevertheless, the UK OTC market remains a minority of the total market, and 
is limited by the nature of medicines available -  ‘borderline’ drugs are a very 
small group of products, with most medicines, and particularly the most 
expensive, innovative medicines being prescription only. There are likely to 
be only a few candidates from this ‘borderline’ group that could be given OTC 
status in order to reduce the total public medicines bill.
2.5.6 Quality control and cost-effectiveness
Apart from direct budgetary constraints that aim to emulate a more ‘normal’ 
market by limiting demand, there are several more indirect mechanisms on 
the demand side to control the market. Most notable, and politically sensitive, 
is the creation of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in 1999. 
The institute’s purpose is to assess individual health technologies, which 
include pharmaceutical products, medical devices, diagnostic techniques, 
and procedures, as well as the clinical management of specific conditions, 
and to issue advice to health care managers. The advice is intended “to 
provide patients, health professionals and the public with authoritative, robust 
and reliable guidance on current best practice.”230 Assessments are based 
on, among other criteria, judgements of ‘cost-effectiveness’, which inevitably 
implies some element of economic evaluation of products and procedures, 
which entails their comparison within the overall context of NHS health care 
provision, therefore “implicitly, if not explicitly, setting rationing criteria”.231
Other quality focused arrangements have also been established to raise 
standards and attempt to meet the challenge of ‘postcode prescribing’. A 
Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) has been established under the 
Health Act 1999 to monitor service standards including prescribing and 
dispensing standards.232
230 See website: www.nice.org.uk/
231 Tucker, A. and Taylor, D. (2000), p.49
232 Tucker, A. and Taylor, D. (2000), p.48
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As with NICE, its focus is on giving national leadership to quality standards 
and disseminate best practice. It will develop and disseminate clinical 
governance principles through the scrutiny of local clinical governance in 
NHS Trusts, Primary Care Trusts and' Health Authorities. Clinical 
governance covers areas of professional training and professional-patient 
interaction, and CHI therefore aims to ensure the high quality treatment of 
and communication with patients as well as ensuring professionals have up 
to date knowledge of best practice. It is also linked to NICE in that it is 
responsible for monitoring local implementation of NICE guidelines.233
233 www.doh.gov.uk/chi
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This chapter builds a theoretical framework for the analysis of policy making 
in the PPRS. It reviews the theoretical literature and deduces five hypotheses 
for the analysis of the PPRS and the government-industry relationship which 
underpins it. It draws on a variety of approaches from “the tool box of policy 
analysis”234 in order to identify and analyse those factors that explain the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) as a form of industrial and 
market regulation, which has persisted in one form or another for almost half 
a century.
The theoretical framework here first examines the policy community that the 
PPRS constitutes and then analyses the structural and institutional context 
within which it is set, in order to explain the PPRS as a regulatory framework 
for the control of pharmaceutical prices. It draws on the policy community 
approach to policy analysis in order to understand the nature, structure and 
operation of the PPRS policy community; and on institutional approaches in 
order to analyse the causes of its existence and persistence.
3.1 The state-level
A generic ‘state-level’ approach to explaining the policy process in the PPRS 
is not appropriate. Policy areas can be quite isolated from each other: “If 
each policy area develops into a semi-watertight compartment, ruled by its 
own ‘policy elite’, then quite different policy styles may develop within the 
same political system.”235 For this reason, pluralist and corporatist 
approaches are of limited usefulness for the study of the policy process in an 
area of industrial regulation and procurement. Different sectors and 
subsectors are likely to be operating simultaneously according to different 
principles and procedures. State-level theories are abstracts and imperfect 
as complete explanations of policy.236
234 Parsons, W. (1995), p. 188.
235 Richardson and Jordan (1983) p.249
236 See Ham, C and Hill, M. (1993), pp.45-47.
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At first examination, features of the PPRS may lend themselves to ‘state- 
level’ pluralist and corporatist description but this does not identify, a priori, 
features specific to a policy ‘subsystem’ such as the PPRS. The policy 
community may exhibit -  as do so many policy arenas -  corporatist features 
but the approach is specific and cannot be extrapolated easily to complex 
relationships between actors.237
Similarly, a pluralist type theory used for analysis of government-industry 
relations, capture theory, is a state-level one, which posits at the generic 
level a view of regulation as being ‘captured’ by the regulated 238 In capture 
theory, the organisation of producer groups means that their lobbying is far 
stronger than that of dissipated and disorganised consumers and regulation 
is likely to get made in the producers’ favour.239 Regulation is acquired by the 
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit. In this 
rendering of power distribution, the government stands as a more or less 
neutral agency, lobbied by competing industrial and consumer interests -  
clearly not the position in the PPRS, where the government is the consumer, 
and where the government seeks the promotion of the industry through its 
industrial policy.
That ‘generic’ state-level theories are not appropriate tools for this case is not 
to say that the ‘state’ is irrelevant -  some features of the state will likely be 
significant in determining the form of the policy community and how it 
operates, and these are identified below in the hypotheses. In this vein, 
Atkinson and Coleman note that the state-level will ordinarily influence the 
structure of the sub- state-level, but that in some cases particular factors may 
prevent this from happening: “... it is also reasonable to expect that the 
relative frequency of different types of policy communities will vary 
systematically across democratic polities depending on the state-level
237 Rhodes notes how the term ‘corporatism’ has been used in many ways, appearing to be altered to 
make it fit the empirical situation. See Rhodes, R.A.W. (1985), p.4.
238 Peacock, A. (1984), pp.13-18.
239 On capture theory see also: Makkai, T. and Braithwaite, J. (1998), pp. 173-191; Hood, C. (1994), 
p.21; Grant, W. (1990).
101
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework
political institutions.”240 Which institutional factors are significant for policy in 
one subsystem may be different from those that are significant in others: the 
interplay of institutional factors is what is important.
3.2 The policy community
Analysing particular areas of policy making -  ‘sub- state-level’ analysis -  is in 
general a response to the perceived failure of traditional state-level theories 
to get to the ‘nitty-gritty’ of policy making -  the need, in the words of Wilks 
and Wright, to “break away from system-level macro-generalisations and 
move towards empirically-based analysis.”241
Policy community analysis can focus on the sectoral level.242 It allows that 
different policy subsystems may be present within a state. Different areas of 
policy making can display markedly different features.243 Freeman in 1955 
was an early advocate of this approach244 but it was Rhodes who developed 
the idea most fully as a way of examining the relationship between political 
institutions,245 while Wilks and Wright applied the terminology to government- 
industry relations and took a more individual-centred view.246 Wright defines 
the members of a policy community as actors who “share a common identity 
or interest,” and who will ‘transact’ with each other, exchanging resources in 
order to balance and ‘optimise’ their mutual relationships.247
This approach highlights another feature of policy making that has been 
widely identified: its pragmatic and ‘political’ nature. For actors at all levels of 
the policy process, Wright notes, policy is not about optimising so much as it 
is about balancing the various aims and interests of the different parties
240 Atkinson and Coleman (1989), pp.66-7.
241 Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987), p.275.
242 For further description o f policy communities see: Marsh and Rhodes (1992) chapter 1; Atkinson 
and Coleman (1989); Parsons, W. (1995), pp. 184-92.
243 See: Allison, G. and Zelikov, P. (1971), chapter 5; Marsh & Rhodes (1992), chapter 1.
244 Freeman (1955).
245 Marsh and Rhodes (1992) p.9.
246 Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987), pp.294-305.
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involved.248 Optimising is probably over optimistic, according to Simon: the 
limited scope of analysis as well as the circumstances of the political process 
lead to ‘satis fic in g where courses of action are taken because they are 
‘good enough’ 249
The mergers and takeovers policy community in the City is, according to 
Wright,250 comparable in many respects to that operating in the 
pharmaceutical sector. In particular, he states of the parties to the 
community: “Collectively, they prefer the ‘satisficing’ outcomes of their 
network interdependence, to win/lose outcomes. Above all, they prefer 
voluntary self-regulation through predictable and stable network relationships 
to statutory control.”251
Policy in this sense is the outcome of an overtly political process rather than 
of objective, ‘rational’ analysis. A system of bargaining between the major 
interested groups has the advantage that the rationality of any policy is 
defined by those most interested in it. For example, Schilling argued this 
point of view, suggesting that there was no ‘right answer’ to many policy 
questions, such as what is the right budget for a government department.252
Bargaining over policy is the means by which policy changes are made. A 
‘bargaining model’ of policy making in general had been developed by 
Neustadt in 1960, to apply to the American system of “separated institutions 
sharing powers.” His model of the US presidency, though not directly 
applicable to the UK, was an important step in developing notions of 
bargaining that would inform the policy community discussion.253
As described in Chapter 2, the PPRS is a regulatory regime that is devised 
and run by a small group of civil servants in the Department of Health (DOH)
247 Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987), pp.298-9.
248 Wright, M. (1991), p.513.
249 Simon (1957) pp.204ff; March and Simon (1958), pp.48fF.
250 Wright (1988b).
251 Wright (1988b), p.402.
252 Schilling (1962), pp.295-337.
253 Neustadt (1960).
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in co-operation with the representative body of the industry, the Association 
of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), as well as, in its 
implementation, the individual firms. Other actors have a role to play and can 
be seen as part of the extended community -  influential if not present: 
principally the Treasury but also the DTI and other parts of the DOH, along 
with the wider industry to which the ABPI negotiators are accountable. During 
the operation of the scheme, the community consists only of the PPRS 
branch of the DOH and the individual company negotiator. The policy 
community is therefore small and discrete.
While the policy community approach here provides a language and a means 
of describing the actors involved in making policy, and identifies features of 
policy making appropriate to the PPRS as an instance of government- 
industry bargaining, it is not in itself an adequate basis of analysis and 
explanation of why decisions are made in the way they are in the PPRS 
arena, and of what has caused this co-operative form of bargaining to come 
into being and to persist. Indeed, the behaviour of policy communities is 
dependent on the structural and institutional position in which they are 
located. This is clearly the case with the highly structured and formalised 
PPRS.
3.3 Negotiating resources
Central to the make up of the PPRS policy network is the nature of the 
‘resources’ held by each side. The dynamics of the PPRS are in part defined 
by the high (though not absolute) level of competence each side possesses 
to negotiate. This is intensified for the DOH by its dual role, something 
hypothesised here to have been very influential in maintaining the scheme; 
and for the ABPI in its representation of the whole industry.
The initial phase of negotiations in the 1950s between government and 
industry and its outcome in the VPRS (the forerunner of the PPRS -  see
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Chapter 2) can be seen as one in which the role of the ABPI and the extent 
of its ‘authority’ to act are established.254 The organisation of the industry and 
the overall competence of the Department of Health were, according to 
Wright, both important factors in shaping the policy community that emerged 
for the regulation of drug prices.255 The state here has a strong ‘mission’ and 
clearly defined objectives, and the ‘agency’ involved appears to have a high 
degree of autonomy from other parts of government. Crucial to the evolution 
of a policy community was the dual role of the DOH with respect to the 
industry.256 The authority of relevant units of each of the government and 
industry sides are important for their ability to bargain successfully 257 The 
DOH is not completely autonomous in its policy making in the PPRS but it is 
far more so than in countries where the equivalent department deals only 
with procurement policy with regard to pharmaceuticals.
Resources that arise from the basic nature of government and industry are 
also central to the PPRS and to the dynamics of its periodic renegotiation. 
Each side has the ability to threaten the other with something it specifically 
aims to avoid in the regulatory arena. For industry, the government can 
threaten legislation in place of the voluntary agreement; while industry can 
threaten disinvestment, undermining the key purposes of the government’s 
industrial policy. These ‘bargaining resources’ constitute the ‘ultimate 
sanctions’ of each side, which can be seen to keep the equilibrium of the 
government-industry relationship intact.
Information is another important resource. This too can be seen to shape the 
PPRS in that the DOH appears, a priori, to be reliant on the information 
supplied by the industry through the PPRS; information is also important in 
inter-departmental discussions, through which the DOH can be expected to 
value its relationship with industry.258 The ‘liberal’ nature of the British state 
as one in which commercial freedom is sought-after, may also in part be a
254 Sargent, J.A. (1985), p.l09ff.
255 Wright M. (1991), p.513
256 Wright M. (1991), p.513
257 Scharpf, Fritz W. (1993).
258 Grant, Wyn (1993a), p.47.
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weakness in the state’s armoury owing to a lack of independent information 
resources. Alternative forms of regulation would require a greater level of 
independent information gathering by the DOH than does the PPRS.
Structural and institutional factors therefore define the nature and dynamics 
of the PPRS policy community: they define the ‘resources’ of each party to 
the community, their competence to act in their field, the terms of co­
operation, their policy aims and, in consequence, the range of policy 
possibilities that will satisfy both sides and enable optimal and balanced 
policy outcomes.
3.4 Institutions and policy continuity
Institutions are the context within which actors in the policy making process 
make decisions: “The institutionalist focus means that the analysis of policy 
making involves taking account of the way in which the configuration of 
interests and ideas within an institutional context shapes and determines the 
conduct of policy.”259 This is partly because policy makers make decisions 
according to their institutional role. Their institutional position will define the 
scope of their powers and their judgement of success 260 As Olsen notes, “An 
institutional perspective assumes that political life is patterned.”261
Institutions structure the relationships between policy actors and they 
determine who the actors are: “Because policy making in the modern state is 
always a collective process, the configuration of the institutions that 
aggregate the opinions of individual contributors into a set of policies can 
have its own effect on policy outputs.”262 Individuals and groups in a policy 
subsystem don’t simply interact but are structured by procedure and 
practice 263 This does not deny the central role of individuals: “institutions
259 Parsons, W. (1995), p.334.
260 Vickers, G. (1965), p.l35ff.
261 Olsen, J. P. (1996), p.250.
262 Hall, Peter A. (1986), p. 19.
263 Hall, Peter A. (1986), p.19; Vickers, G. (1965), p.l35ff.
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constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole ‘cause’ of 
outcomes.”264
History itself can be a factor in the choices that policy makers make, as well 
(again) as their expectations of policy outcomes: the PPRS has continued 
with modifications and reforms, for almost half a century. Political 
relationships can become ‘frozen’ and continue long after the set of purposes 
for which they were initially designed.265
An existing policy path in can determine future policy. This ‘path dependency’ 
hems in policy makers and channels their decisions along well trodden 
routes.266 In the absence of some sort of crisis or external shock, to shift 
decisively the path of policy, policy change is likely to maintain its existing 
dynamics and basic principles.267 ‘Path-dependency’, as Wilsford describes, 
is where political changes are “tied to previous decisions and existing 
institutions.”268 In path dependency, structural forces dominate, therefore 
policy movement is most likely to be incremental.
Policy communities that bind actors into formalised relationships can emerge, 
acting as a conservative force on policy. This is Katzenstein’s contention 
regarding foreign policy in Western countries, where he claims ‘policy 
communities’ have underpinned the persistence of some policy positions.269
The conservative institutional straightjacket identified as a form of path 
dependency can in some cases restrict the scope of policy analysis and 
narrow the choices seen as available to policy actors. Policy change can 
become a step-by-step, trial-and-error process: a characterisation of policy 
making described (and advocated) by Lindblom in the 1960s. He contended 
that only a change in the basic purpose or the context of policy is likely to
264 Thelen K. and Steinmo S. (1992), p.3.
265 Olsen, J. P. (1996), p.249.
266 Wilsford, David (1994), pp.256-258.
267 Knill, Christoph. (2001), p.22.
268 Wilsford, David (1994).
269 Katzenstein, Peter (1978).
107
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework
lead to radical policy change.270 Lindblom developed this idea not simply as 
a description of policy making but as a formula for actively assessing policy 
change that recognises the limitations on people, in both time and ability, to 
understand complex problems. The choice of policies is deliberately limited to 
those that can be understood and achieved and, if necessary, reversed.271 
The group element to this idea is developed in ‘partisan mutual adjustment’, 
in which the different group interests in a policy arena affect the decisions of 
each other: a structured, ‘bargaining’ model of the policy making process.272
These approaches reiterate the importance of a stable institutional 
environment for the nature of policy. They posit the idea that a ‘shock’ to the 
structural context of policy making as the principal (perhaps only) way in 
which any substantial policy change will take place. They therefore attempt to 
describe the nature of policy but not to analyse its structure, the latter being 
the particular configuration of structural factors that underlies a particular 
policy arena. The idea of a policy ‘path’ is not explanatory and may indeed be 
tautologous: if structural factors shape policy, then their change will be 
necessary for its reform.
3.5 Structural and institutional context of the PPRS
The focus of the approach taken here is to examine and analyse the 
structural context of the PPRS. Because the policy making process is in part 
‘determined’ by its structural context, policy is not simply a process in which 
individuals make rational decisions. Rather, while actors in any bargaining 
process may indeed act rationally, what is rational and what is not is strongly 
determined by structural factors.
The development of particular national institutions (at the state-level) is 
important for understanding how types of policy and policy making structures
270 On incrementalism as a form a method o f policy making, see: Lindblom, Charles E. (1959); 
Lindblom, Charles E. (1979); Braybrooke, David and Lindblom, Charles E. (1963); Gregory (1989).
271 Weiss, Andrew and Woodhouse, Edward. Policy Sciences 25(3): 255-73.
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come about. Electoral and legislative systems affect the nature of policy as 
they determine the organisation and power of the executive and the breadth 
and makeup of the interests that have influence over the policy process.273
What actors in the policy community represent, what they seek from policy 
outcomes and from the regulatory framework or regime -  i.e. th e ir 'regulatory 
goods’ 274 -  where external pressures on them arise from and where there 
are ‘veto points’ on their decisions are all structural features that affect the 
decisions they make. Immergut, in her analysis of health insurance policy in 
Switzerland, France and Sweden, argues that the number of veto points is 
essential in understanding policy outcomes 275 showing that the strength of 
parliament in the French Fourth Republic enabled interest groups to veto 
policy easily, owing to the fragmented nature of party alliances -  something 
not open to interest groups in Sweden, where executive dominance in this 
policy area reduced the veto points available.
Government-industry relations in the PPRS are underpinned by structural 
and institutional factors that sustain this community in a way that has caused 
it to follow a consistent path for over four decades. For government to 
overturn the PPRS policy community and legislate in this area would entail a 
loss of co-operation, and would likely be precipitated by some sort of crisis in 
the relationship between government and industry.
3.6 The PPRS: Five structural and institutional variables
It is hypothesised here that the co-operative framework for policy making is 
determined by various factors that underpin the ‘goods’ that each side aims 
to achieve from policy (i.e. their policy aims) and the various ‘resources’ they 
each have to enable them to do this: neither side has sufficient ‘resources’ to
272 Lindblom, Charles E. (1979), pp.522-3; Lindblom, Charles E. (1965).
273 Steinmo, S. (1993), chapter 3.
274 Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987), p.298.
275 Immergut, Ellen M. (1992).
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achieve its ‘goods’ without co-operation. Co-operation is a ‘core-value’276 of 
the policy community and policy outcomes will find a balance sufficient to 
maintain it. Changes in the structural and institutional factors identified here 
will be the basis of any ‘crisis’ in the policy community. These structural and 
institutional factors form the independent variables that shape bargaining 
resources, the extent of the policy community and the policy and regulatory 
aims within it.
The structure of the market defines the opportunities available to both sides 
in the PPRS. It affects the kinds of compromises that are possible: the lower 
volumes of the UK market mean that some pricing freedom has less of an 
impact than it would in a market of very high volumes; and this in turn has 
created regulatory goods for industry in the PPRS that they are keen to 
maintain, such as freedom of pricing of new products.
The global structure of the industry means that it is mobile and can tailor its 
investment decisions according to the regulatory and economic 
circumstances of any particular country. This draws the attention of 
government to its industrial policy and broadens out their policy aims from 
narrow procurement concerns.
The ‘liberal’ nature of the British state is an important institutional feature that 
appears, a priori, to underpin the PPRS. The limited conception of the state’s 
role by its own executive actors and its historically liberal approach to the 
economy have limited the range of policy possibilities. This structures the 
‘balance of forces’ between government and industry in the policy community 
in a way that enables a co-operative relationship to operate.
A lack of parliamentary influence over the design and operation of the PPRS 
means that there is the absence of a parliamentary ‘veto point’ and of the 
ability of Parliament to administer any external ‘shock’ to the stability of policy
276 Wright M. (1991), pp.510-11.
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and precipitate its reform. The policy community is small, self contained and 
to some extent informal, and characterised by executive dominance.
The concentration of executive competencies within a single department of 
state (the DOH) is an unusual institutional feature of British pharmaceutical 
supply side regulation. The department has an official ‘sponsorship’ function 
for the industry as well as the responsibility for negotiating prices as a 
customer. This enables it to balance policy aims at the departmental level, 
lending it greater authority in its dealings with the Treasury.
All these factors will be tested for their validity as key factors underpinning 
the continuing form and content of the PPRS by the use of five related 
working hypotheses, elaborated below and analysed in empirical studies of 
the 1993 and 1999 PPRS negotiations and agreements and the passage of 
the 1999 Health Bill.
3.6.1 Summary: Assumptions about key structural and institutional factors
Assumption 1: The market for pharmaceuticals in the UK underpins the 
PPRS by enabling sufficient rewards for both government and industry within 
the scheme, and enabling policy aims to be balanced.
Assumption 2: The global organisation of industry lends it bargaining 
resources it would not otherwise have and makes government more alive to 
the need for an active industrial policy.
Assumption 3: The ‘liberal’ nature of the British state means there is the 
desire by government for ‘light-touch’ and co-operative regulation using 
limited administrative, technical and legal resources.
Assumption 4: Parliament has a peripheral role in this policy field and does 
not constitute a veto point or external influence on the policy community.
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Assumption 5: The siting of an industrial policy function within the 
Department of Health gives DOH authority and competence to act and 
highlights the government’s industrial policy aims, enabling a co-operative 
regime.
3.6.2 The working hypotheses
In answering the question as to why a co-operative, non-statutory system of 
regulation has been at the heart of the economic regulation of the 
pharmaceutical industry and has represented and enabled the successful co­
existence of government and industry aims for so long, five hypotheses are 
proposed, which arise from the examination of the structural and institutional 
context of policy making, as set out above. The hypotheses will be analysed 
through an examination of two successive re-negotiations of the PPRS and 
the passage of the 1999 Health Bill.
The five assumptions above underpin five working hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Actors on both sides will seek to maintain the current structure 
of the pharmaceuticals market, and hence the regulatory goods it yields, and 
will not pursue strategies that would undermine it.
Hypothesis 2: Industry will seek to utilise its global structure as a bargaining 
resource to counteract the legal monopoly of government, which in turn will 
pay greater attention to their industrial policy aims.
Hypothesis 3: Policy proposals that require significant technical, 
administrative and legal resources on the part of government will not be 
pursued, in particular a legislative approach to regulation. They will seek 
maintenance of the co-operative regime.
Hypothesis 4: Parliament will not be an influential actor in determining policy 
outcomes, which in turn will be reflected in the limited direct attention to it by 
both government and industry.
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Hypothesis 5: The dual role of the DOH will prove decisive in defining policy 
and maintaining the co-operative regime by counteracting the procurement 
focus of the Treasury.
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3.7 The pharmaceuticals market
Assumption 1: The market for pharmaceuticals in the UK underpins the 
PPRS by enabling sufficient rewards for both government and industry within 
the scheme, and enabling policy aims to be balanced.
Hypothesis 1: Actors on both sides will seek to maintain the current structure 
of the pharmaceuticals market, and hence the regulatory goods it yields, and 
will not pursue strategies that would undermine it.
The British pharmaceuticals market acts as an ‘enabler’ of the co-operative 
policy community. The small size of the market (it’s relatively low value by 
international standards), assisted by the extent of the use of generics and of 
OTC medicines (paid for direct and not by the NHS) enable certain policy 
paths to be taken because they limit the potential budgetary implications, a 
key ‘regulatory good’ for government. The behaviour of British GPs has a 
reinforcing influence on these features. In addition, outcomes of the PPRS 
further shape the market and create regulatory goods for industry, which they 
are keen to maintain: higher prices for newer products and a quick product 
launch.
2773.7.1 Features of the British pharmaceuticals market
■ Relatively small size by overall value.
■ Significant degree of therapeutic conservatism among doctors.
■ Relatively large generics market.
■ Relatively large OTC market.
■ Higher prices are concentrated on new in-patent medicines.
■ Quick launch: products reach the market immediately following licensing.
277 See 1.6 for more details.
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3.7.2 The market as an ‘enabler’ of a co-operative policy community
Government’s approach to the market must be seen through the prism of its 
dual policy aims. In terms of procurement policy, its aims are confined to 
costs and there is an overlap between the Treasury’s objectives and those of 
the DOH. But in its industrial policy aims, the government, both DOH and 
DTI, seek more complex outcomes. The shape of the market enables them to 
achieve this balance, and in so doing to deliver regulatory goods to industry 
within the co-operative regulatory framework, which the government also 
seeks to maintain (see Hypothesis 3 below).
The concerns of a research-based industry are likely to be focused on new 
and in-patent medicines, which they will seek to get to market quickly and at 
a good price. The constraints on drug consumption enable these to be 
delivered without unsustainable growth in the medicines budget. In turn, the 
maintenance of a stream of new medicines fulfils not only industrial policy 
goals but budgetary ones as well, because new medicines may have positive 
budgetary implications in the broader NHS context by reducing the needs for 
other health care interventions. Attitudes to the shape of the market will also 
be influenced by this concern.
Hence because the government’s regulatory aims are diverse (they seek cost 
containment but also support for R&D and encouragement of new 
medicines), it can best achieve them through a co-operative relationship with 
the industry.
Key among the regulatory goods that industry will seek in the PPRS is the 
maintenance of free pricing of new products. Sacrifices in other areas will be 
seen as worthwhile if this feature of the PPRS -  itself linked to the co­
operative nature of the scheme -  is maintained. Reimbursement procedures 
can add months to the time lapse between product registration and market 
introduction, in some cases up to 18 months. This feature of the PPRS -  
‘free-pricing-at-launch’ -  is valued by industry and recognised by the
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government: “Access to the market is their big issue,” said a DTI civil 
servant.278
The regulatory goods that the two sides seek from the PPRS will shape their 
strategies and approaches. In essence, the positive balance of advantages 
for each side that underpin this hypothesis are that both government and 
industry seek or value things that they see the PPRS as helping them to 
achieve because of the way it maintains or creates features of the British 
market. The sacrifices they make in the PPRS are sufficiently minimal for 
them not to risk its overhaul.
The ability to ‘optimise’ policy is therefore created by the contextual and 
structural conditions of the two sides. The importance of industrial policy and 
the ability to pursue it within the confines of cost containment; this in turn 
underpins the ability of industry to gain regulatory goods through a co­
operative framework. The two sides have a common interest279
3.7.3 Market size
Perhaps the most important feature of the market as an enabler of the PPRS 
is its size, in cost terms. The spend per head is low by international 
comparison. In 1999, per capita spending on pharmaceuticals in the UK was 
£107 compared with £251 in the US, £183 in France and £140 in 
Germany.280 This low volume is not directly attributable to the PPRS and is 
underpinned by various forms of ‘rationing’ including demand side measures 
that limit doctors’ spending. It is related to the structure of the NHS with its 
gatekeeper GP system and its implicit rationing of health care services 
through limited supply and the queuing system. However, it is also partly 
‘cultural’: some countries such as France and Spain are renowned for high 
prescription rates and others, the UK in particular, for lower ones.
278 Interview, DTI civil servant 1.
279 Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987), p.298.
280 ABPI (2000a)
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3.7.4 Therapeutic conservatism
One cause of the smaller market in the UK is the prescribing behaviour of 
GPs. There is documented ‘therapeutic conservatism’ among British 
doctors.281 In part the structure of the NHS lends itself to this behaviour, 
reinforced by increasing demand side controls. New medicines take far 
longer to reach wide usage. This can be seen as a major enabling factor in 
the PPRS because it reduces the risk to the NHS budget of new ‘blockbuster’ 
drugs launched quickly at relatively high prices. With prescription and 
consumption patterns more akin to France and Spain, this would present the 
government with considerable budgetary risk.
Shifting to more expensive products was identified as the principal driver of 
increases in the drugs budget in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the 
therapeutic conservatism of GPs is therefore a key factor in the containment 
or otherwise of the drugs budget.282
3.7.5 Generics and OTCs
The relatively high proportion of generics in the prescription market and the 
high proportion of OTCs in the market as a whole also take the pressure off 
the government in the PPRS. The government have encouraged generic 
prescribing in order to cut pharmaceutical costs and many more products are 
licensed for OTC sqle than in some European markets.283 Both these factors 
reinforce the shape of the market that is created by its relatively small size: 
innovative products can more comfortably command higher prices because 
other areas of the market are relatively low cost for the taxpayer.
281 House o f Commons Health Committee, Session 1993-4. HC Papers 80-1, 7 July 1994, paragraph 
30; David Taylor (1992); Department o f Health (2001), paragraph 2.14.
282 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
283 See 1.6 and Table 1.5.
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3.7.6 Value to industry
The regulatory goods created by the PPRS for industry are a quick launch 
and free pricing at launch (the latter both a good in itself and a facilitator of 
the quick launch).
The market is significant for global companies because it enables relatively 
high prices to be obtained on the products that are most important to the 
research-based industry: the new, innovative medicines following their 
launch. The scheme continues to allow free pricing (set by the company) for 
new patent products and this feature of the market is inseparable from the 
scheme itself. Within the scheme, this compensates industry for continually 
falling prices across a company’s portfolio of products, while fulfilling a 
government aim of promoting new medicine discovery.
The other -  and, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, related -  feature of 
the market created by the PPRS is the quick launch. The ease of passage to 
market following licensing approval has great significance for global 
companies because they create positive spin-offs in other markets. Having a 
product ‘up and running’ in a major market has the potential to influence 
authorities elsewhere and creates pressures and opportunities to make it 
available there.
3.7.7 Regulatory goods
This hypothesis supposes that these features of the market and the PPRS 
are the ones that the industry would most seek to defend in the policy 
process, while the enabling features of the market are those features that 
allow government to do this because they limit the financial impact of greater 
freedom.
The assumption of this hypothesis is that sufficient regulatory goods are 
provided by the PPRS for both sides to defend the broad structure of the 
market and not to risk its radical change -  either because market features
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enable the PPRS to continue or where they are explicit features of the PPRS 
itself. The goods that are provided for each side must be seen in the light of 
their aims in the policy process and what they see themselves as having to 
achieve from the co-operative policy community of the PPRS for it to be 
worth their while continuing in it.
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3.8 The global context
Assumption 2: The global organisation of industry lends it bargaining 
resources it would not otherwise have and makes government more alive to 
the need for an active industrial policy.
Hypothesis 2: Industry will seek to utilise its global structure as a bargaining 
resource to counteract the legal monopoly of government, which in turn will 
pay greater attention to their industrial policy aims.
The salience of industrial policy aims is reinforced by a further structural facet 
of the sector: the global nature of the industry. It is this that defines industrial 
policy aims, because it defines the targets of the government’s industrial 
policy attention. The global nature of the industry and the national structure of 
its markets create special dynamics in the government-industry relationship. 
They enable the industry to employ its global structure as a counterbalance 
to the government’s legal monopoly in their bargaining over policy and 
regulation. Government’s commanding position as a customer and a 
legislator is kept in check by the global corporate power of industry, in the 
context of the government’s industrial policy concerns.
The regulatory goods therefore flow both ways. The corporate structure of 
the industry means that it is footloose to a degree that commands 
government’s attention, a fact which it can use to its advantage, as an 
important resource in regulatory bargaining.
3.8.1 Organisation of the industry
The concentration on the supply side of the industry arises from its nature. 
Barriers to entry in the industry are relatively high. There are some absolute 
cost disadvantages to new market entrants owing to the patenting of existing
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products; and companies already in the market possess some economies of 
scale that may give them an advantage, though this is not clearly the case.
The foremost barrier to entry is through product differentiation, where 
branding of products creates an uphill task for any new entrant to change the 
habits of a prescriber.284 This is exacerbated by promotional competition, 
where creating a large market requires significant resources. Controls on 
advertising that may have been devised to reduce this can have the effect of 
entrenching it, as they can (including through the PPRS) be defined as a 
proportion of turnover, assisting the large, entrenched firm over the new or 
small firm 285
Therapeutic sub-markets can be more concentrated still, with considerable 
price inflexibility. As drugs are for the most part essential items, demand is 
inelastic and price is therefore not a major factor in determining levels of 
aggregate demand or that for a particular patented product. Indeed, within 
the patented sector, accounting for the large majority of value in the market in 
most countries, price competition is effectively precluded.286
These industrial and demand side factors give the large pharmaceutical firms 
a commanding position. More recent economic developments have tended to 
further drive consolidation, across all industries, not just pharmaceuticals, 
and in this sector the dominance of a few firms has accelerated over the 
1990s. The sector therefore has consolidation pressures on the supply side. 
At a time when globalising pressures have also emerged through increased 
trade and global brands, the large pharmaceutical firms have become giant 
global entities.
284 Reekie, W.D. (1969), pp.3-5.
285 Reekie, W.D. (1969), p. 19.
286 Reekie, W.D. (1969), pp. 12-13.
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3.8.2 Globalising pressures
The forces of globalisation have created pressures for the consolidation of 
industries through merger and acquisition activity as well as the organisation 
of the firm on a more global basis, with an allocation of resources determined 
by the organisation of the firm’s functions across national borders. The 
growth of world trade, which has been faster than the growth of world GDP 
for several decades, has driven the globalisation of corporations.287
The pharmaceutical industry can be seen as a ‘global’ one rather than, in the 
terms of Michael Porter, a ‘multi-domestic’ one, because its competitiveness 
in one country is affected by its behaviour and competitiveness in others.288 
Firms organise themselves across space through the use of global finance, 
global technologies and global customers.289 The nation state is less relevant 
to their activities.290 Definitions of what constitutes a global firm are not 
entirely consistent but criteria identified by various writers show clear areas of 
consensus. On any measures, the globalisation of firms is continuing 
apace291 and pharmaceutical firms are at the forefront of this process.292
Consolidation in the pharmaceutical sector is driven by the vast scale of R&D 
now required to produce a new product and the vast sales personnel needed 
to market it once it is produced. The increasing cost of developing drugs 
requires firms to have larger markets in which to recover the investment 
(perhaps leading to a situation of ‘natural oligopoly’ where the existence of 
more than a few firms would prevent this recovery of costs from being 
possible).293 Despite the large mergers and acquisitions that have changed 
the corporate shape of the sector through the late 1990s, these two factors
287 Saari, David J. (1999), chapter 2.
288 Porter, M.E. (1986), pp.226-46.
289 Barnet, R.J and Cavanagh, J. (1994), pp. 13-22.
290 The extent o f attachment to the nation state o f origin is a matter for debate: Porter sees global firms 
as retaining some attachment while Ohmae sees the nation state as unimportant to truly global firms. 
See Graham, Edward M. (1996), pp. 33-41.
291 Saari, David J. (1999), in particular, Appendix B.
292 In research by Roland Berger consultants, GlaxoSmithKline was second only to IBM as a truly 
global firm, according to its presence in major economies, brand position and supply base. Spectra 
magazine, Summer 2002, pp. 9-11.
293 OECD (1995), pp.55-61.
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are likely to further drive consolidation of the sector over the coming 
decade.294
3.8.3 Mobile capital
The principal effect on the national policy making arena of this process is that 
national governments are under pressure to keep and attract globally mobile 
capital. The industry has to have positive reasons for continuing to invest in 
the UK. The PPRS and other forms of regulation affect the roll-out of 
products into the marketplace. As a major, high-tech industry dominated by a 
small number of large firms, the pharmaceutical industry is in a good position 
to exploit these pressures and to counteract the economic power of 
governments on the demand side, by appealing to government’s industrial 
policy concerns.
Large global corporations can locate capital with relative ease. New 
investments can be located anywhere that public policy -  regulatory and 
fiscal -  is most conducive to profitability. National governments must now 
satisfy the demands of their “supranational capitalist constituents.”295
Capital flight is feared by policy makers, and the threat of it by multinational 
firms is a powerful influence over policy. Twenty-three US states adopted a 
new tax to overcome the problem of transfer pricing by multinational firms 
(where profits subject to tax are understated or eliminated in companies’ 
accounts). Following vehement opposition from a coalition of Japanese and 
European companies, including Sony, ICI, Unilever and Nestle, and direct 
threats to invest elsewhere, all states repealed the tax.296 This illustrates the 
potential of corporate bargaining resources over policy; and given the 
industrial importance of a research-based industry such as pharmaceuticals, 
they can be expected to be substantial.
294 See: interview with Sir Richard Sykes, Spectra magazine, Summer 2002, pp.4-7.
295 Scholte, Jan Aart (1997), p.443 & p.446.
296 Barnet, R.J and Cavanagh, J. (1994), pp.345-6.
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3.8.4 Corporate concentration
Furthermore, concentration, whether caused by micro economic conditions or 
the processes of globalisation, brings with it political power. Where 
government can consider a small number of large firms to represent the 
interests of an industrial sector, the organisation of co-operation and 
bargaining between the two is simpler. Very large firms can come to play a 
key political role under such conditions because governments court them as 
aggregated points of communication. Within a trade association, they may 
make its authority and competence over a sector simpler and more complete, 
hence aiding communication with government and in turn a co-operative 
regulatory regime.297
3.8.5 A national dimension
However ‘global’ in their organisation firms become, they may retain some 
level of attachment to their country, not least in terms of governments’ 
perception of them. Governments still identify firms as national flag carriers 
even where the firms themselves operate on a global basis. Although the use 
of national ‘flag carriers’ for the implementation of national policy objectives 
(e.g. for strategic industrial or security reasons, such as with ICI)298 has 
undoubtedly waned, their success globally is still seen as national
O Q Q
success.
There is a complex interaction between the global operations and national 
identity of firms and the purposes underpinning public policy towards them. 
Government’s may wish to use global economic forces to affect their home 
industry and attitudes to foreign direct investment (FDI) may be shaped by 
the particular needs that it sees the national economy or an industry as 
having.300
297 Grant, W. (1990), pp. 149-55.
298 Grant, Wyn. (1993), chapter 7.
299 Graham, Edward M. (1996), pp. 33-41.
300 Doz, Y.L. (1986), pp.226-46; Dunning, J.H. (1993), p.554.
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The reasons why firms seek to invest in a particular country are also various. 
They may include the circumventing of trade barriers (though this ought to 
diminish as a reason in a more global economy with freer trade), or the 
acquisition of raw material markets or strategic assets; or for reasons of 
greater organisational efficiency.301 Moreover, public policy in the home 
country may be of particular importance to a firm and have implications for its 
global success.302 This latter point may be of particular concern to 
pharmaceutical companies where national regulations can be compared and 
some governments may take their leads from others.
3.8.6 Comparison of national regulatory regimes
Governments seek comparative examples of policy, particularly among EU 
and OECD countries and some pricing systems explicitly base themselves on 
prices in other countries,303 so government actions can have implications for 
industry beyond the borders of the UK (or another country).
The national structure of markets combined with the global organisation of 
firms, gives an important international dimension to the regulation of prices. 
The pharmaceutical pricing regulations of different countries overtly follow 
other systems. Several European countries take their prices from a ‘basket’ 
of prices in neighbouring countries -  most of them include the UK to some 
extent; and some Commonwealth countries do the same. There is a direct 
effect in other markets of what happens in the UK.304
Aside from the direct effect of one regulatory system and market on another, 
global companies are in a position to compare national systems and may use 
favourable comparisons in their bargaining with government, again 
underpinned by their international mobility. Little is as simply effective in 
bargaining with government as demonstrating positive examples elsewhere. 
Given the dominance of American-based firms in the global marketplace, the
301 Dunning, J.H. (1993), pp.56-63.
302 Procassini, A.A. (1995), p.245..
303 Mossialos E, Ranos C, Abel-Smith B (eds) (1994).
304 Management Forum (2001); Jim Fumiss.
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conditions of the American market stand as an example to American 
executives in Europe and they are the ones most likely to lobby for 
liberalisation and least accept strict regulation.
3.8.7 Implications for policy
Governments seek inward investment, and seek to prevent outward 
investment by domestic firms, as part of their industrial policy aims. FDI can 
contribute to the growth of output in the national economy, as well as to 
raising productivity,305 as noted for British manufacturing facing American 
competitors in their home market.306 The UK in particular has been 
successful in attracting FDI during the 1980s and 1990s, and it has also been 
a major investor oversees.307
The UK government therefore has to be more aware of the causes of inward 
and outward investment than do other governments. For more developed 
economies, although output remains important, a major benefit of FDI is that 
it can enable technology transfer and boost R&D.308 This is particularly 
poignant where the industry is a high-tech one, such as in pharmaceuticals, 
and where the defence of the science base is a central motivator of 
government concern.309 The use of tax regulations and other policy 
instruments such as infrastructure development are commonly used by 
governments to affect the investment decisions of foreign (and domestic) 
firms.310
Owing to the desire of governments to promote home-based companies in 
the global market, large corporations are further able to encourage 
favourable policy regimes for their operations in the home country. A 
dominant position in the national market may be more easily tolerated as a 
result. “The much discussed ‘pressures of global competition’ have made
305 Moosa, Imad A. (2002), pp.68-102.
306 Graham, Edward M.(1996), p.36.
307 HM Treasury (1996).
308 Graham, Edward M. (1996), pp.14-15; Moosa, Imad A. (2002), pp.86-87.
309 Sharp, Margaret (1989), pp. 119-159.
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governments and citizens more ready to allow ‘their’ corporate flag-carriers to 
acquire market dominance of a degree an earlier generation would not have 
countenanced.”311 In promoting home companies overseas, governments 
must also face the loss of any control they may have had over the strategies 
of their ‘national flag carriers’, as they become global companies.312
3.8.8 Designing national regulation
The international organisation of firms complicates the design of national 
regulatory regimes, which are focused on its national operations. The PPRS 
is a case in point: detailed financial and operational information underpins the 
judgements of the Department of Health about how much capital is employed 
in the production of medicines sold to the NHS. As global organisation 
becomes more complex, deciphering this will become more difficult. In the 
1950s these sorts of problems were faced by the then VPRS, such as the 
amount of research carried out abroad to be factored into UK sales or the 
profits due to materials purchased overseas.313
Yet the PPRS has been designed with an international corporate focus. One 
of the overt aims of the government was to secure a globally successful 
British pharmaceutical industry through the PPRS. The government has 
recognised the global context and ambitions of industry and it is exposed to 
these commercial considerations in its dealings with it.
The global structure of industry therefore provides a powerful dimension to 
the relationship between government and industry, enabling industry to 
appeal to government’s industrial policy aims and thereby gain important 
concessions in their cost containment aims. Equally, this negotiating or 
bargaining ‘resource’ may be tempered, or bolstered, by events in other 
markets, through other regulatory systems; and global companies will define
310 Lenway, Stephanie Ann and Murtha, Thomas P. (1994), pp.513-36.
3,1 Jan Aart Scholte (1997), p.438.
312 Doz, Y.L.(1986), p.247.
313 Teeling-Smith, G. (1969), p.88.
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limits to the controls governments may impose while they seek industrial 
policy aims of corporate promotion and sponsorship.
128
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework
3.9 The co-operative state
Assumption 3: The ‘liberal’ nature of the British state means there is the 
desire by government for ‘light-touch’ and co-operative regulation using 
limited administrative, technical and legal resources.
Hypothesis 3: Policy proposals that require significant technical, 
administrative and legal resources on the part of government will not be 
pursued, in particular a legislative approach to regulation. They will seek 
maintenance of the co-operative regime.
An important ‘state-level’ influence on the nature of the PPRS and its 
persistence appears to be the broadly liberal approach of successive 
governments to the activities of industry, i.e. the ‘liberal’ nature of the British 
state.
3.9.1 Industrial policy and culture
The state has increased its role in the economy significantly over the post­
war period, a trend that continued through to the mid-1980s.314 Yet it is the 
nature of the state’s role and not only its scale that is significant and which 
structures the nature of policy communities in the industrial policy field.
The British state did develop close relations with various sectors of industry, 
quite apart from the widespread nationalisations of the post-war years. But 
the relationships that operated were co-operative and entailed bargaining 
between the two sides (or three sides, in the case of tripartite bargaining 
arrangements between the TUC, the CBI and the government in the National 
Economic Development Council in the 1960s and 1970s) -  what Beer calls 
‘quasi-corporatism’. Industry was not, for example, directed or forced by the
314 See: Cronin, James E. (1991), chapter 1.
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state to rationalise its organisation, as was the case in France, in return for a 
place at the policy making table.315 Britain’s attempts at an active industrial 
policy -  most notably under the Wilson governments -  were largely regarded 
as failures and eventually abandoned by the Callaghan government in the 
1970s.316
‘Industrial culture’ -  the perception of the proper role of the state in the 
economy, and the extent to which intervention by government is acceptable -  
shapes government-industry relations. British industrial culture can be seen 
as having a ‘liberal’ bias, which favours a ‘hands-off approach to the 
economy and a non-statutory approach to industrial regulation.317 Despite the 
expansion of the state’s role in the economy, a concept of a benevolent 
public power has not emerged in the UK and intervention in industrial 
decisions is less authoritative as a result.318
The less interventionist British state has been characterised as ‘weak’ and 
possessing little ‘autonomy’ in its design and implementation of industrial 
policy, in contrast to states such as Japan and France, which are seen to 
have directed private sector activity at the micro level, through the 
reorganisation of industrial enterprises. A ‘strong’ state has a greater degree 
of autonomy from societal actors and can act more strategically and less 
reactively and incrementally than a ‘weak’ state with a low degree of 
autonomy.319
3.9.2 ‘Strong’ states
In Japan, the powerful Economic Planning Agency and Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) administered plans and targets for
315 Beer, Samual H. (1965), p.296-7. Hall, Peter A. (1986), p.53.
316 Sharp, Margaret & Holmes, Peter (1989), pp.1-18.
317 Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987), p.278; Wilks, S. (1983), pp. 132-137.
318 Dyson, K. (1983), pp.31-38.
319 Atkinson and Coleman (1989), p.66fF
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reconstruction of the economy and its rapid development, including that of 
the Kiertsu, or industrial conglomerates with cross-shareholdings.320
The French Fifth Republic had in its design an overt aim to subvert the power 
of sectional (rather than public) interest groups. This approach finds 
expression in the post-war restructuring of French industry by the state.321 
Engagement with, and support from, the state went hand in hand with the 
requirement to restructure large parts of French industry. The French state’s 
role in the economy had an ideological lineage as well as a pragmatic 
incentive. It could be traced back to the mercantilist policies of Colbert 
controleur general (roughly, minister of finance) under Louis XIV, who sought 
to counter the economic dominance of England and the Netherlands. The 
development of the French economy in the Fifth Republic (from 1959) has 
been driven by the five year planning process and the interventionist directing 
of private investment across industrial sectors.322
The contrast should not be overdone. There is a wealth of literature showing 
that the Japanese economy exhibits far greater competition and clash of 
interests than the western ‘stereotype’,323 and the claim that the French state, 
while more centralised and purposeful, is no more expert or unified in its 
approach to industry.324 But the essence of the state’s attitude to the 
economy is different in both Japan and France in that the responsibility of 
government to intervene in corporate restructuring is a basic given, founded 
on the particular time and form of industrialisation.325 Industry and the public 
both accept and, crucially, expect greater public intervention and service 
provision in France than in Britain.326
320 For a summary o f post-war Japanese economic planning see: Vestal, James E. (1993), chapter 2; 
Japanese Economy and Economic Planning Agency (1979).
321 Wright, V. (1989), chapter 11.
322 See: Sheahan, John (1963).
323 See: Boger, Karl (1988).
324 Sharp, Margaret & Holmes, Peter (1989), pp. 1-18.
325 Sharp, Margaret & Holmes, Peter (1989), pp. 1-18; Hall, Peter A. (1986).
326 Morgan, Kevin (1989), pp. 19-55.
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3.9.3 The state and regulation
Theories of regulation suggest an objective and interventionist role: the 
purpose of regulation is to enforce or provide some sort of ‘public good’ that 
could not be provided or properly distributed without the intervention of the 
state, because the economic mechanisms for individuals to acquire these 
goods do not exist. Regulating industries has been justified by the need to 
overcome the economic effects of natural monopoly or intervene in markets 
that do not work for other reasons such as a lack of information for 
consumers.327 In the PPRS, the government’s position is more complex 
because it is a customer and not simply a ‘guardian of the public good’.
In the regulatory relationship that emerges between government and 
industry, the regulated might begin to determine the agenda, not least 
through their superiority of relevant information. The importance of business 
in general to governments would give added impetus to this basic 
relationship, and might lead to a situation of capture, where normal consumer 
vs. industrial interests prevailed. A weak state is more likely to succumb to 
capture than a strong, autonomous state. In the PPRS, the government 
seeks to represent itself as a consumer, through formal mechanisms across 
departments, including the Treasury. A traditional application of capture 
theory is not therefore appropriate in this case.
More broadly, the notion of state ‘autonomy’ is not easily applicable to this 
case because the government has industrial policy aims, as well as 
regulatory and procurement concerns, which may in themselves be suited to 
a co-operative regime.
Identifying strong and weak states at the macro level are of limited 
usefulness for the same reason as are state-level theories of policy making; 
what they do achieve is to suggest the sorts of influencing factors that may 
underpin the types of policy community that emerge within a particular polity.
327 For theories o f regulation and its purpose see: Baldwin, R. and Cave, M. (1999), chapter 2; Breyer, 
S. (1998); Breyer, S. (1982), chapter 1.
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This can only be determined in particular cases such as in the PPRS through 
empirical investigation. For example, Skocpol notes that autonomous state 
action can occur in a ‘weak’ state.328 She and Finegold studied New Deal 
agricultural policies in the US, where they concluded that the US Department 
of Agriculture was “an island of state strength in an ocean of weakness.”329 
There may, as in Smith’s view, be a trade-off in the power and autonomy to 
act between different parts or agencies of the state.330 But the state-level 
can be assumed, a priori, to influence the sub- state-level.
The British state displays features that have direct relevance to the nature of 
the PPRS as a regulatory regime and would appear, a priori, to naturally 
underpin a co-operative relationship between government and industry. 
These include a ‘hands-off and laissez-faire approach to industry in general, 
suggesting a desire for co-operation with industry as a default position; a 
relatively ‘open’ political elite which actively seeks the views of civil society 
actors and incorporates such consultation within the policy process; and a 
‘generalist’ civil service not historically equipped for complex regulation.
The laissez-faire approach of the state may be more salient a feature than 
any weak state characteristics -  explaining behaviour in terms of motive 
rather than capacity. Grant et al, for example, point to the considerable 
resources available to British governments in pursuing particular 
strategies.331
3.9.4 The liberal and open state
The failure of bureaucracy in dealing with the problems of a larger state 
derive “from the very success of the boldness of the effort of the Victorian 
reformer to give Britain an administrative personnel for a Nightwatchman 
State presiding over the breathtaking expansion of private industrial
328 Skocpol, Theda (1993), pp.86-109.
329 Skocpol, Theda (1993), p.XX
330 Smith, Martin J. (1993) p.54
331 Grant, Wyn, Paterson, William, Whitston, Colin (1987), pp.37-8.
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capitalism.”332 Economic planning required different and specific 
administrative skills.
The British sate has remained limited in its scope and, crucially, its ambition, 
and attached to liberal, laissez-faire principles,333 exercised and developed 
most through the period of industrialisation in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.334 This has given rise to an industrial culture that gives preference 
to ‘arm’s-length’ relationships with industry.335
These attitudes to the role of the state in the economy were articulated by 
political theorists such as Bentham and Mill, and, earlier, Adam Smith. By 
contrast, the more communitarian conclusions of philosophers such as 
Rousseau (while sharing important aspects of broader European and British 
political thought) underpinned a stronger sense of the possibilities of state 
action in France.
Such a heritage of political theory was indicative of an understanding the 
state’s role in favour of the individual, which translated easily into the firm. 
The nature of British industrialisation, and the Victorian and Georgian values 
that underpinned it, have had a lasting impact on the relations between 
government and industry.336
3.9.5 The Treasury and laissez-faire
The dominant agency in the British bureaucracy and government has 
historically been the Treasury, which has resisted the expansion of the 
state’s role in society as a “guiding principle” of its operations.337 The 
Treasury view’ was one of a minimalist state, which viewed public 
expenditure as unproductive, minimising the stock of capital for
332 Balogh, T. (1959), p.109.
333 Balogh, T. (1959),p.111.
334 Taylor, Arthur J. (1986), pp.226-263.
335 Dyson, K. (1983), pp.31-38; Grant, W. (1989), pp.85-88.
336 Grant, W. (1989), p.86.
337 Cronin, James E. (1991), p.5; Wilks, S. (1983), pp.132-137.
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investment.338 Laissez-faire was an ingrained doctrine of the Treasury and 
British government through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.339 Policy 
options aimed to solve particular problems, and were narrowly focused. An 
apparent anomaly arises with this view of the role of the Treasury in a 
modern state possessing broad responsibilities and a substantial role in 
society: where taxpayers’ money is at stake the Treasury may seek tighter 
control in an attempt to keep public spending in check.
The mismatch between the nineteenth century design of the British state and 
its late twentieth century role has been identified as a reason for the failure of 
much of public policy. “The historic incapacity of the British state persisted 
into the era of big government and the welfare state.”340 The perennial agony 
of the public expenditure round is the expression of this disjunction between 
the state’s design and its ‘welfare’ role.
The nature of the bureaucracy, relying on expertise from industry itself, 
naturally meant that government sought co-operation in any regulation that 
was introduced and co-operation became a regulatory good in itself for 
government. British governments attempted to balance various interests 
rather than develop a strategic position.341 This openness has meant that in 
some areas, the government has bargained with industry in devising its 
regulation, to the extent that industry interests became “governing 
institutions, part of the extended state.”342 Such openness, at least, suggests 
that a co-operative solution to regulatory questions is more likely than a 
command and control solution, more appropriate to an active directorial state.
However, the Thatcher period in British politics may be thought of as limiting 
to some degree the ‘openness’ of the state to influence from civil society 
groups and indeed it was an important facet of Conservative Party politics 
through the late 1970s and 1980s to suggest that the state had been
338 Peden, G.C. (1988), p .l l .
339 Wright, Vincent. (1969), pp.329ff.
340 Cronin, James E. (1991), p. 16.
341 Middlemas, K. (1986), p.348.
342 Middlemas, K. (1986), p.348-9.
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‘overloaded’ by a multiplicity of demands, which would in the end result in 
ever rising taxation.343 A new politics had arrived in which the volume of 
government spending was the central political issue, and this persisted 
through the 1980s and 1990s.344 It was therefore the unwillingness of the 
state to accept a broader role, rather than its immediate lack of capacity to do 
so, that shaped politics in the 1980s.
3.9.6 The civil service
Since the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854,345 which formed the basis of 
the modern career civil service, the service has been characterised by its 
professionalism, its permanence and its ‘generalism’.346 While the role of 
government in the economy and society has been transformed in the post­
war period, the tradition of the ‘talented amateur’ has remained with the 
British civil service and the information handicap is one of the principal 
barriers to general government intervention in the economy.347
This is in some contrast, for example, to the highly trained civil servants that 
emerge from France’s Ecole National d ’Administration (ENA), which trains 
would-be civil servants in finance, management and law.348 British attempts 
to adapt the non-interventionist state to the tasks of economic intervention in 
the 1960s by creating new departments and reallocating tasks among them 
generally ended in institutional confusion and failure.349
As early as the beginning of the 20th century the civil service had been 
criticised for facing growing responsibilities “with increasing insistence on a 
lack of expert knowledge.”350 This kind of service would surely be one that 
would find it very difficult to devise legally enforceable regulation in areas of
343 See Ham, C and Hill, M.(1993), pp.29-30, for a discussion of Public Choice theory.
344 See Mullard, M. (1993), chapters 8 & 10.
345 For a summary o f the development o f the British Civil Service, see: Griffith, Wyn (1954); Pyper, 
Robert (1995).
346 Hennessy, P. (1990); in particular, p.31 ff.
347 Young, Stephen. (1974), chapter 16.
348 Wright, V. (1989), pp. 119-121.
349 Young, Stephen (1974), chapter 14.
350 Cronin, James E. (1991), p.228.
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technical complexity, and the ability to assess the success or otherwise of 
implementation.351
The post-war period began with a radical Labour government that might have 
effected significant structural changes to the relationship between 
government and private enterprise, aside from the widespread nationalisation 
programme. In fact this did not happen, and the attitude of the civil service 
was an important factor. In the key 1945-51 period, “Labour was reluctant to 
introduce major changes that would have swelled the bureaucracy.”352 It 
feared creating cumbersome administrative structures and accusations of 
‘bureaucratism’.
3.9.7 Reliance on industry
Despite the criticisms of the Fulton Report in 1968, which had looked at the 
structure, recruitment and management of the civil service,353 as well as 
other examinations of its operation, the generalist culture of the British civil 
service by and large remains.354 The wartime civil service relied heavily on 
secondments from industry and this model was kept by the Atlee 
government.355 The nature of the civil service meant that “the business world 
was really the only source of people with the appropriate knowledge and 
skills. For the most part senior civil servants were men with an arts 
background and with neither the talent nor the desire to control the 
economy.”356 Price controls were conducted mainly by people drawn form 
industry, and very little other (worker or consumer) input.
This underpins a preference for co-operative forms of regulation. Grant notes 
how the post-war sponsorship of the chemical industry has been conducted 
by generalist civil servants reliant on information from the industry itself, as
351 Pyper, Robert. (1995), chapter 5.
352 Leruez, J. (1975), p.65.
353 Hennessy notes the narrowness o f the Fulton Committee Report as one that did not deal with the 
basic ground rules o f the civil service’s operation. The narrowness o f the Report would therefore 
mean it was unlikely to confront the basic culture o f the service. See Hennessy, P. (1990), pp. 190-195.
354 Peters, B. Guy (1995) pp.94-112
355 Leruez, J. (1975), p.64.
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well as other outside organisations, for forming policy.357 Wright notes the 
lack of information gathering capacity at the outset of the VPRS in 1957, 
which contributed to the “virtual monopoly of information and data”358 held by 
the pharmaceutical industry.
Indeed the Ministry of Health at the time of the first VPRS has been 
characterised as politically weak, having scarcely recovered from bruising 
battles with the medical profession over the setting up of the NHS (see 
Chapter 2). This influenced their bargaining power when the voluntary 
system was initiated. The freedom of doctors to prescribe was also a directly 
related issue and had now been promised to the profession, limiting the sorts 
of price control mechanisms that might be implemented by the ministry.359
3.9.8 The state and government-industry relations
All these features of the British state are hypothesised here to affect 
government-industry relations in the PPRS, because they underpin the 
government’s perceived need and, critically, its desire to form policy within a 
co-operative framework. Grant refers to the ‘exchange relationship’ of 
government-industry relations through which government gains the 
information required to develop policy. It also relies on the exchange process 
for implementation.360 A policy community has at its centre this process of 
exchange between government and industry.361
The laissez-faire origins of the British state underpin a more co-operative 
relationship between government and industry in general.362 The aims of the 
government overlap, it is hypothesised here, with the aims of the industry 
creating an area of consensus that is a sufficient basis for bargaining over 
areas of controversy. This suggests that the industrial policy concerns of
356 Leruez, J. (1975), p.65.
357 Grant, W. (1990), p. 152.
358 Wright M. (1991), p.513.
359 Hancher, Leigh (1989), pp.84-89.
360 Grant, Wyn (1993), pp.46-65.
361 Macmillan, K. and Turner, I. (1987), p.121.
362 Vogel, David (1986), chapter 6.
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government facilitate bargaining and co-operation because large firms cannot 
easily be cajoled into investment and employment, and their private actions 
have public implications.363
The laissez-fare tradition of the British state does not mean that governments 
do not have industrial policy aims but it does shape the way in which they 
seek to achieve them, as it shapes the way in which government approaches 
industry in an area where its ‘big state’ welfare role brings the two into 
contact.
3.9.9 The co-operative regime
In the PPRS, as with other co-operative regimes, ‘negotiated compliance’ is 
preferred to strict enforcement, and regulators wish to avoid taking legal 
proceedings to enforce regulation.364 Both sides see it as in their interests to 
engage in bargained agreement. They perceive ‘gains from trade’. 
Government is able to limit the resources devoted to inspection and 
enforcement while business is relieved of the uncertainty about the arbitrary 
actions of public officials.365 Co-operation, as a regulatory good for each side, 
becomes a ‘core value’ of the policy network -  a feature of it that underpins 
and enables the various aims of each side to be achieved, or at least 
achievable.366
This assessment of the nature of the British state suggests that in the PPRS 
the government will limit its assessment of choices and analysis of policy 
options to maintain a low level of technical, administrative and legal 
resources and to maintain a co-operative relationship with industry through a 
voluntary regulatory framework.
The nature of the British state underpins a preference for a co-operative 
regulatory regime on the part of government, bolstered further by the
363 Hancher, Leigh and Moran, Michael (1989), p.275.
364 Peacock, A. (1984), p.l 15.
365 Peacock, A. (1984), p.94.
366 Wright, M. (1991), pp.510-11.
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particular aims of industrial policy which lend themselves to a harmonious 
relationship between the two sides. This is hypothesised to be a central 
dynamic in defining the sorts of outcomes of regulatory bargaining that take 
place in the PPRS.
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3.10 The role of Parliament
Assumption 4: Parliament has a peripheral role in this policy field and does 
not constitute a veto point or external influence on the policy community.
Hypothesis 4: Parliament will not be an influential actor in determining policy 
outcomes, which in turn will be reflected in the limited direct attention to it by 
both government and industry.
In the post-war period, industrial organisation, the state’s de facto role in the 
economy, and the general decline in the power of the Commons have 
rendered the British Parliament a far more peripheral actor in the policy 
process than classical descriptions would suggest.367 In the relationship 
between legislature and executive, the UK is not a classically ‘liberal’ state. 
Beyond this generic feature of the UK system, the negotiation and 
administration of the PPRS is particularly confined to the executive and 
appears to be little influenced by parliamentary input, aiding and reinforcing 
the confined scope of the PPRS policy community.
3.10.1 Parliament and the policy process
The peripheral role of Parliament in much of the policy making process is a 
significant feature of policy making in the British polity. The UK has been 
characterised as a ‘post-parliamentary’ democracy’.368 The British 
Parliament’s marginality is evident most in comparison to the American 
system, in which Congress has a central role.369 The ‘iron triangle’ was a 
close working relationship between lobby group, congressional committee 
and executive agency. This idea has obvious similarities to the later policy 
community approach to policy analysis, though within the context of an
367 Judge, David (1990), chapter 2.
368 Richardson, J.J. and Jordan, A.G. (1979).
369 Lijphart (1984), Chapters 5 and 6.
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influential Congress.370 It built on Neustadt’s ‘bargaining’ model of American 
politics.371 Policy would be a compromise not only through the structure of 
the Congress, but because of the relationship between Congress and 
Administration.
The contrast here between the US and UK is noted by Lijphart who quotes 
Jean Blondel: while about “one-third of rule making may still be the 
prerogative of the U.S. Congress, ... not more than perhaps four or five per 
cent of the rule-making can be ascribed to the British Parliament.”372
Executive dominance of the policy process is not unique to Britain. The US 
Congress stands as an idiosyncratically powerful legislative body among the 
parliaments of the major democracies. It has a genuinely legislative function, 
with representatives and senators able to introduce legislation in a way that is 
not possible in the Commons. The British Parliament is similar to the function 
of the French Assembly, Japanese Diet and Canadian Parliament. The 
German Bundestag stands somewhere between the US and UK models, with 
MPs having more freedom than their British counterparts and the timetable of 
the chamber being less dominated by the executive.373
The ‘myth’ of ‘parliamentary’ democracy in modern Britain is something that 
has developed over a long period of time. While the strengthening of the 
executive has been associated with the developing post-war economy, the 
loss of any significant legislative initiative by Parliament goes back to well 
before the Second World War.374 Scrutiny of the government is in addition 
dominated by highly disciplined political parties. The ‘fusion of powers’ 
between the legislative and executive branches, as emphasised by Bagehot 
in his 1867 analysis of the constitution,375 limits the effectiveness and 
influence of individual Members of Parliament and therefore the effectiveness
370 Marsh and Rhodes (1992) p.8.
371 Neustadt (1960)
372 Lijphart (1984) p.78.
373 Loewenberg, G. and Patterson, S. (1979); chapters VI and VII.
374 Middlemas (1979) p.307 ff.
375 Bagehot (1867)
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of lobbying by industry (or any other group), while at the same time 
Parliament’s real role in determining legislation is limited.
There is a further weakening of the legislature’s place because of the 
balance of power between the political and permanent parts of the executive. 
Ministers may be accountable to Parliament for their actions but they are 
informed and advised by permanent civil servants who are likely to know far 
more about any policy area than the minister himself. Indeed the two factors 
are mutually supportive: “feeble ministers are an outcome of feeble 
parliaments.”376
3.10.2 Policy subsystems
Nevertheless, the state is not monolithic. Richardson and Jordan 
characterise policy making in the UK as fragmented into policy subsystems 
that are largely closed to ‘non-members’: “a series of vertical compartments 
or segments, each segment inhabited by a different set of organised groups 
and generally impenetrable by ‘unrecognised groups’ or by the general 
public.”377 This may itself imply a lack of legislative scrutiny, as vertical silos 
are executive ones. But as different policy areas may be structured 
differently, there is the possibility that Parliament has significant influence in 
some policy areas -  such as those involving very large amounts of 
government spending or areas of particular concern to the public -  and not in 
others.
3.10.3 Parliament and the PPRS
The PPRS arrangement especially sidelines Parliament and concentrates 
decision making among a few executive actors. It appears to be a policy 
community marked by a significant amount of ‘black box’ negotiations 
between a select few industry and executive actors. For the policy area under
376 Heclo, H. and Wildavsky, A. (1981), p.379.
377 Richardson, JJ. and Jordan, A.G. (1979), p. 174.
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study here, therefore, the legislature can, a priori, be said to have a 
peripheral role to play.
There had been some parliamentary attention to the PPRS but, as is 
described in Chapter 2, the operation and development of the scheme has 
remained only tentatively touched by Parliament since 1957. It has exercised 
some interest and influence in the past: the various committees that predated 
the VPRS -  Cohen, Guillebaud and Hinchcliffe378 -  and the scrutiny of the 
Public Accounts Committee have intervened in the process of policy making 
in this area with considerable effect. But on the PPRS itself, there had been 
little involvement. The relationship between industry and Parliament appears 
to have reflected this. The scheme was an arrangement between the ABPI 
and the DOH and industry’s efforts were directed accordingly. Industry’s 
relationship with government meant there had been little need to cultivate 
strong parliamentary contacts.
3.10.4 The ‘Limited List’ debacle
A major policy development in 1984-5 served to jolt this complacency. A 
‘Selected List’ of medicines that could not be prescribed on the NHS was 
drawn up, known colloquially as the ‘limited list’.379 The crisis precipitated a 
positive effort by industry to enhance its parliamentary contacts.
Parliament became vocally involved in the debate about the list, focused this 
time on the effects on patients, and the event became something of a turning 
point in industry’s attitude to the role of Parliament. One industry 
commentator involved in public affairs through the 1980s and 1990s noted:
“When the Limited List was announced in the House by Norman Fowler in 
November ‘84, not one of us in the industry had retained parliamentary
378 The Standing Joint Committee on the Classification o f Proprietary Medicines, the Cohen 
Committee, 1949; The Guillebaud Committee on NHS expenditure, 1953; The Hinchcliffe Committee 
on Effective Prescribing, 1957.
379 Schedule 10 o f the GMS Regulations. See 2.4.2
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advisers. The pharmaceutical industry didn’t have a clue. After that we
380became far more active and did retain parliamentary advisers.”
3.10.5 Lobbying
It was not until 1993 that they really needed them, and this was again more 
for promoting discussion of the Selected List extension than for the PPRS. 
MPs signed a motion asking the government not to go ahead with the list 
extension.381 Through the 1990s, industry did have useful parliamentary 
contacts on which to draw where necessary. They fall into different broad but 
not mutually exclusive camps: there are Parliamentarians with some medical 
interest in the industry such as members of the medical profession, 
especially in the Lords; there are those with an industrial interest, either from 
a constituency point of view where the industry is a major employer, or from a 
wider ‘British economy’ perspective; and there is an NHS-related 
constituency concern where patient interests are affected by policy on 
medicines.
The PPRS does not have implications for patient and medical interests 
directly and therefore it is the constituency commercial interests that are most 
linked to the scheme from MPs’ perspective. The medical approach had 
proved the most effective in lobbying on the limited list in 1984-5, as there 
were direct implications for prescribing and the industry could also ensure 
that affected patients knew of the issues at stake, bringing pressure on MPs 
from their constituencies. The Health minister in charge of the Limited List 
admitted that the lobbying by industry (which failed to change the 
government’s direction) had “certainly stirred up a lot of fears amongst 
Conservative backbenchers.”382
A further aspect to industry lobbying is that where medical issues are 
concerned, the profession has a role to play. In 1984-5, the industry and the 
BMA (British Medical Association) stood on the same side of the argument,
380 Interview, industry executive 9.
381 Scrip No 1805,23 March 1993, p.3.
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amplifying the constituency significance of the lobbying campaign. In 1984-5, 
this union of BMA and ABPI proved extremely effective, albeit eventually 
futile, as industry found itself sitting alongside an experienced player in the 
lobbying game. As the Minister of State noted:
“The BMA were particularly unscrupulous in their campaigning. They chose 
to present generic drugs as clinically inferior to the branded alternatives and 
orchestrated sustained campaigning to the effect that sick people would be
383deprived of the only efficacious treatments they could receive.”
The hypothesis is that Parliament has not played a decisive role and 
continues to be on the sidelines of policy development in the PPRS, and that 
this is a significant factor in the nature and type of regulation in the PPRS. 
The three studies here will examine how influential Parliament has been in 
both agenda setting and in the process of policy formation, and how industry 
lobbying has affected the exercise of its role.
382 Letter from Kenneth Clarke QC MP, Minister o f Health during 1984-5; 23 May 2000.
383 Letter from Kenneth Clarke QC MP, Minister o f Health during 1984-5; 23 May 2000.
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3.11 Role of the Department of Health
Assumption 5: The siting of an industrial policy function within the 
Department of Health gives DOH authority and competence to act and 
highlights the government’s industrial policy aims, enabling a co-operative 
regime.
Hypothesis 5: The dual role of the DOH will prove decisive in defining policy 
and maintaining the co-operative regime by counteracting the procurement 
focus of the Treasury.
A notable distinguishing feature of the British system of regulation is the 
particular institutional architecture that places a responsibility for the strength 
and success of the pharmaceutical industry with the Department of Health.
Group style theories of the policy process, such as policy community 
approaches, aim to show that government is not homogenous but rather a 
complex of interacting entities: “government leaders have competitive, not 
homogenous interests”.384 The political process within government is of 
central importance to the outcomes of policy in this area, as any other. For 
example, the broader context of policy both within and outside the DOH (then 
DHSS) was the focus of much political and media debate at the time of the 
introduction of the ‘Limited List’ in 1985. As The Guardian noted at the time, 
“The real author of the DHSS’s limited list proposal is neither Mr. Norman 
Fowler, the Secretary of State, nor his Health Minister, Mr. Kenneth Clarke. 
He is Mr. Peter Rees, Chief Secretary of the Treasury.”385 Indeed the power 
of the Treasury in British government is a key factor in the nature of the 
British state, which is also assumed here to exercise an important influence 
on policy (see 3.5.5).
384 Allison, Graham and Zelikov, Philip (1971), p. 146.
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3.11.1 The power of the Treasury
The principle of Treasury control’ has consistently stifled any proposed 
innovations in the administration of government. New institutions, such as the 
National Economic Development Council, charged in the 1960s with 
enhancing British economic growth through strategic support for industry, 
and the Department for Economic Affairs under Harold Wilson in the 1960s, 
failed to overcome the stranglehold that the Treasury had over economic 
policy.386 The Treasury, it has been suggested, limits the autonomy of any 
other departments to act.387
The Treasury’s role remains to control expenditure and it expects 
departments to ‘bid high’ and ask for more money than they intend to get in 
budgetary negotiations.388 Given that the DOH consumes such a large share 
of public spending (23% in 2002),389 it is of central importance to the 
Treasury (and has historically been responsible for significant 
overspending390). The pharmaceutical budget represents around 12% of the 
NHS budget and therefore over 2Y2% of all public expenditure.
3.11.2 Departmental politics
Clearly, if the resources to ‘sponsor’ the pharmaceutical industry are to be 
agreed by the Treasury, the institutional arrangement of its sponsorship is a 
key factor. Conflating this role with that of procurement requires the DOH to 
take it into account in its discussion with Treasury officials. Without the 
resources to sponsor the industry through its procurement, the DOH would 
not be able to do so: “experienced officials know that expenditure is policy; 
policy is expenditure ... the machinery of British central government is 
deliberately designed to promote this mixture.”391 The sponsorship role of the
385 The Guardian, 14 December 1984
386 Cronin, James E. (1991), pp. 11-17 &p.231; See also Brittan, Samuel (1964), pp. 11-18.
387 Thain, C. and Wright, M. (1995), p.537.
388 Heclo, H. and Wildavsky, A. (1981), chapter 3.
389 HM Treasury (2003), p.8.
390 Beer, Samual H. (1956), pp.29-32.
391 Heclo, H. and Wildavsky, A. (1981), p.345.
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DOH (i.e. responsibility for industrial policy aims) enables a closer regard to 
the industry’s position to be taken into account through the PPRS and funded 
adequately in the spending round.
Through the government’s industrial policy aims, the interests of the 
government are aligned with those of the industry. The government aims to 
achieve a competitive and globally successful British pharmaceutical 
industry.392 But the government is also the primary customer. Significant 
interdepartmental friction could be expected to arise from this dual role, were 
its two aspects exercised by different departments.
Yet intra-government bargaining is significantly shaped by the breadth of 
competence of the DOH, which gives the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) a more limited (and less formal) role in the ‘sponsorship’ of the industry. 
The DOH as a sponsoring department has formal responsibility for 
representing the industry’s interests. This role, it is hypothesised here, 
decisively colours the Department’s interaction with the Treasury when it 
comes to the overall pharmaceutical budget and regulatory regime.
As a core spending department, it is important in its discussion with the 
Treasury about its annual budget (the public spending round) that the 
Department of Health takes account of its sponsorship function. If the 
sponsorship function lay with the DTI, the DOH would represent only its 
spending concerns to the Treasury in the spending round and it would be up 
to the DTI -  a non-spending department with limited influence in the Treasury 
-  to argue for a sufficiently generous settlement for the DOH to enable the 
sponsorship function to be fulfilled. Even if the Treasury is seen as not 
entirely malign, the increased effort of a spending department to show 
industrial policy concerns will help persuade it of the case for spending more 
money.393
392 Department o f Health (1999a).
393 See: Deakin, Nicholas and Parry, Richard (2000), pp.79-98.
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3.11.3 Dual sponsorship
As it is, both the DOH and the DTI face the Treasury as industry ‘sponsors’ 
(formal and informal), possibly skewing governmental actors towards 
supporting broader industry interests and away from a focus solely on 
procurement. Any change in the competence of the Department of Health 
would undermine the co-operative nature of the policy community because it 
would potentially shift decisively the government focus towards cost 
containment objectives and away from sponsorship objectives. Without the 
sponsorship role within the Medicines, Pharmacy and Industry Division 
(MPI),394 the Finance Division and its cost containment objectives would 
define the Department’s approach to the industry. Pressure on costs may 
push departmental officials to seek pharmaceutical prices closer and closer 
to marginal costs, undermining the research base of the industry. On this 
basis, the pharmaceutical budget would likely be an early target within the 
DOH.
The bureaucratic organisation aligns and embeds pharmaceutical industry 
issues within a highly political area of policy. Macmillan and Turner note the 
sensitivity of health as a political issue, in the public domain: “Our interviews 
with government and industry representatives have led us to conclude that 
politicians will seek to avoid measures that can be portrayed as detrimental 
to the health service and patient care in particular.” In relation to the 
introduction of the Selected List of 1985 they continue: “But here the target 
was much softer due to the pharmaceutical industry’s image.”395
3.11.4 Co-operative framework
Aside from the balance of power between departments and the greater ability 
of DOH and DTI together to represent the longer term interests of the 
industry, the sponsorship role creates a co-operative framework for the
394 For the 1993 and 1999 negotiations, the division was known as the International and Industry 
Division (IID).
395 Macmillan, K. and Turner, I. (1987), p. 125.
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formation of policy which would disappear. Wright sees this as a central point 
in the creation of the VPRS at its outset: “Crucial to the evolution of a 
community ...was the concentration of legal authority and policy jurisdiction 
(regulation and sponsorship) in one department.”396
Although the PPRS itself does aim to support a successful industry, the 
change in the nature of the Department would make it more difficult to 
sustain at the point of each renegotiation of the scheme.
The hypothesis here is that the Department of Health’s dual role is the key 
institutional device that enables government goals to be balanced and 
industry interests to be taken on board right at the centre of policy making. It 
gives the DOH broad competence to represent the industry and the interests 
of the DOH and to act on behalf of government as a whole: it is central to the 
balancing of sponsorship aims with the procurement concerns of the 
Treasury. This competence to act enables industry to put its faith in the DOH 
in the negotiating process and any shift of this function to the DTI would be 
resisted by industry.
396 Wright M. (1991), p.513.
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The preparation by both the government and industry sides in 1999 was 
substantial, in contrast to all previous negotiations of the PPRS. Both sides 
had undertaken extensive research into the scheme, for months and even 
years prior to 1999, as a basis for developing quite specific, even quite 
radical, aims for the negotiations. They had done so in quite opposite 
directions. Industry sought to examine the basic validity of the scheme in 
changed circumstances; the Department of Health aimed to make 
enforcement of the scheme far more formal and robust and intended, in part, 
to pursue a statutory route.
Ironically, it appeared that the lack of substantial preparation in the past had 
persuaded each side that gains could be extracted from the other through 
meticulous preparation and boldness of presentation. Each side believed it 
had the advantage of surprise and consequently both were shocked. Battle 
commenced in the summer of 1998.
4.1 The political context
The 1993 PPRS, as with all previous schemes, became eligible for 
renegotiation after five years. It did not as a matter of course expire after five 
years. One party to the scheme had to state its preference for the negotiation 
of a new, replacement scheme. This is what happened in 1998, when the 
government indicated to industry that they wished to pursue a 
renegotiation.397
There had been a new Labour government elected in May 1997, bringing 
with it an overhaul of political faces for the first time in 18 years, in which the 
entire ministerial team in the Department changed simultaneously. An 
overhaul of political masters would not necessarily affect the PPRS, 
embedded as it was in the bureaucratic machinery of the DOH. Nevertheless, 
at first it seemed as though a break with the past might be sought by the new
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team: “The new ministers found it deeply puzzling. They did not like the look 
of it at all and they thought it was a recipe for collusion,” noted a senior civil 
servant in the Department of Health.398
This negative view of the PPRS from the new ministers was, however, partly 
directed at the bureaucratic organisation of the various functions carried out 
by the DOH. The sponsorship and PPRS roles were at that time fused within 
the same Branch. This structure was changed promptly and a new 
Sponsorship Branch created. Changes to the PPRS itself would have to 
await the outcome of studies by the Department into alternative regulatory 
regimes, but there were nevertheless other factors that drew the 
government’s attention to the scheme and which suggested that a major 
change in its operation might be sought.
4.2 Government’s aims for the negotiations
4.2.1 Compliance
During 1998, there had been a persistent problem of compliance with the 
scheme. “There were some small companies that put two fingers up to us in 
1998 in terms of ignoring price restraint,” said one senior civil servant.399 The 
cash value of their reneging on their PPRS obligations was not significant but 
the press had got hold of the story: “They were not significant companies, 
they were very small companies, but there were a lot of them and it got quite 
a lot of publicity in the papers,” he added.
Through 1998, stories were widespread in the national press that drew 
attention to the flouting of the PPRS agreement. The Guardian noted the 
price rise by Alliance Pharmaceuticals of an important maternity drug to
397 Interview, DOH civil servant 10.
398 Interview, DOH civil servant 10.
399 Interview, DOH civil servant 5.
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£1.40 from 18p a millilitre, in contravention of the PPRS.400 ICN 
Pharmaceuticals and Castlemead Healthcare had both made significant price 
increases without authorisation from the DOH 401
In all three cases the products in question were recent acquisitions under 
license from large pharmaceutical companies including Novartis, Rhone- 
Poulenc Rorer and Roche. The granting of product licenses in this way 
appeared to be a means of getting around the PPRS and of avoiding the 
publicity that a large company would attract in contravening the scheme.402 
Furthermore,"... there was also one big company that didn’t comply at all. Its 
lack of compliance meant that there were potential problems in terms of 
credibility.”403 This circumventing of the PPRS did have real cost implications 
and it undermined the scheme from the perspective of other major 
companies that were playing by the agreed rules.
As well as the overt flouting of the scheme, there was also a backlog of case 
work in operating the PPRS, in part because companies had been lax in 
submitting their AFRs. Connected to overt non-compliance was an issue of 
cooperativeness and efficiency.
4.2.2 Transparency
Another important issue was the need for greater transparency. The lack of 
transparency in the scheme had been highlighted and criticised from several 
quarters.
■ The Health Select Committee
In its report of 1994, the Health Select Committee had said that the scheme 
should be clearer and specified certain actions as part of this process,
400 The Guardian, 12 August 1998
401 The Guardian, 13 August 1998
402 The Guardian, 21 September 1998
403 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
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including the presentation of Reports to Parliament. This Committee’s report 
was a key cause of the DOH’s position in the negotiations.404
■ Reports to Parliament
The Reports to Parliament that eventually followed the request from the 
Select Committee showed that areas of the scheme were opaque to outside 
observers and they showed that the efficiency of the DOH was lacking in 
relation to the scheme, with case work on AFRs significantly behind schedule 
(see 5.3).405
■ The Transparency Directive
The informality of the PPRS as a voluntary scheme might in itself be in 
contravention of the European Directive on the transparency of medicine 
prices of 1989. This Transparency Directive’, as it had become known, 
required reform of the more obscure aspects of the PPRS.
The principal problem was the ‘bands’ of various allowances within which 
different companies would confidentially agree with government a particular 
place. It was not clear that the PPRS came up to the standards of the 
Directive, even though the government of the time had only accepted the 
Directive on the basis that the PPRS would not be affected.
Such ‘behind the scenes’ bargaining would have to be reformed in order to 
comply with European law. “Government had concluded that European 
transparency requirements made a range no longer viable,” said an industry 
source.406 The only way of complying clearly with the Directive might be to 
put the scheme on some sort of a legal footing.407 The Directive had not been 
responded to immediately, but it was recognised that a legal challenge to the 
scheme may one day be brought. Indeed, Article 5 of the Directive (see box)
404 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
405 Department o f Health (1996).
406 Interview, industry executive 13.
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was orientated specifically to the PPRS. Although not mentioned by name, 
the PPRS was the only profit capping system of medicine cost control among 
EU countries. Section (c) in the Article was the one most obviously missing 
from the scheme.
Article 5 of the European Transparency Directive408
Where a Member State adopts a system of direct or indirect controls on the profitability of 
persons responsible for placing medicinal products on the market, the Member State 
concerned shall publish the following information in an appropriate publication and 
communicate it to the Commission:
(a) the method or methods used in the Member State concerned to define profitability: return 
on sales and/or return on capital;
(b) the range of target profit currently permitted to persons responsible for placing medicinal 
products on the market in the Member State concerned;
(c) the criteria according to which target rates of profit are accorded to an individual 
responsible for placing medicinal products on the market, together with the criteria 
according to which they will be allowed to retain profits above their given targets in the 
Member State concerned;
(d) the maximum percentage profit which any person responsible for placing medicinal 
products on the market is allowed to retain above his target in the Member State 
concerned.
This information shall be updated once a year or when significant changes are made. 
Where, in addition to operating a system of direct or indirect controls on profits, a Member 
State operates a system of controls on the prices of certain types of medicinal products 
which are excluded from the scope of the profit control scheme, Articles 2, 3 and 4 shall, 
where relevant, apply to such price controls. However, the said Articles shall not apply where 
the normal operation of a system of direct or indirect controls on profits results exceptionally 
in a price being fixed for an individual medicinal product.
4.2.3 Cost containment
The 1990s had seen a significant increase in the pharmaceutical bill to the 
NHS, and in the last year (1997-8) the total bill had risen by 9.7%.409 This
407 Scrip No 2372, 23 September 1998, p.2
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represented a far steeper rise than health spending overall. The proportion of 
the health budget taken up by pharmaceuticals had risen from 8% to 14% 
between 1993 and 1997.410 The pharmaceuticals bill to the NHS had been 
rising, on average, by 9% a year for the previous decade.411 This had not 
gone unnoticed within the Department of Health or by the new ministers now 
in charge of the NHS, which had been a key political issue at the 1997 
General Election.
This constituted the third main aim of the government. The government 
intended to stem the rise in drug costs to the NHS: “W e had, and we made it 
quite explicit to the industry, an aim of an expenditure saving,” said a senior 
DOH civil servant412 Although the outcome of negotiations was an across- 
the-board price reduction of 4.5%, the government’s opening position was 
6%, though this was one that they expected to be negotiated down. 
Immediately following the election, the new ministers had mooted a far bigger 
cut in the pharmaceuticals bill, which they saw as an easy target in the 
overall health budget. The figure they chose was completely arbitrary. “The 
aim in 1997 was to cut 10% from the drugs budget,” said a member of the 
pharmaceutical all-party parliamentary group (APPG).413
4.2.4 Sponsorship I  R&D
The government was also responsible for ‘sponsorship’ of the industry, to 
ensure its success in a global marketplace. To this end the government had 
a fourth purpose of the negotiations, driven from the top: ‘W e  aimed in 
particular to reward research and innovation. That was one of our principal 
objectives,” said a senior politician 414
408 European Communities (1998). Directive relating to the transparency o f  measures regulating the 
prices o f medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope o f  national health 
insurance systems.
409 Scrip No 2413, 19 February 1999, p.3.
410 Tucker A. and Taylor D. (2000), p.20.
411 Accountancy Age, 22 July 1999
412 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
413 Interview, Parliamentarian 12.
414 Interview, Government minister 7.
158
Chapter 4: 1999 PPRS
4.2.5 The aims of government: Summary
1. To secure more reliable compliance with the scheme (and better time 
keeping).
2. To achieve greater transparency in the decision rules of the scheme.
3. To achieve a significant price reduction.
4. To give greater support to R&D, innovation and competition.415
While encouraging research and development would be supported through 
the details of the scheme, compliance and transparency impinged on its 
general character and the broader principles.
4.3 Industry’s approach and aims
Industry embarked on a long process of preparation for the negotiations of 
1998-9. The outcome of their efforts was a formal identification of their 
collective priorities for reform and a sufficient unity of purpose to enable them 
to undertake negotiations through a small group of delegates 416 The industry 
was internally divided about the PPRS and other regulatory issues, along two 
fault lines. “There are deep divisions within the industry and this makes it 
difficult for the ABPI to speak for it as a whole. There are divisions along 
nationality and size lines and in particular, there is always tension between 
the British and American companies,” said a member of the pharmaceutical 
APPG.417
It was well known that a large American company in particular was very 
unhappy with the PPRS and was actively campaigning for greater 
deregulation of the pharmaceuticals market. A memo from a lobbying 
company representing several multinational pharmaceutical companies had 
suggested at the beginning of the negotiations that Merck Sharp and Dohme
415 Department o f health (1999), p.13
416 Scrip No 2428, 14 April 1999, p.4.
417 Interview, Parliamentarian 12.
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was considering withdrawing from the PPRS.418 It was from the American 
companies that pressure for a review of the market in the UK largely came. 
Industry’s views of the UK market differed to a significant degree along this 
nationality faultline419 “The American owned and managed companies tend 
to object to the Scheme -  even voluntary -  whereas the British companies 
will happily go along with it and believed it provided them with a better basis 
for selling products at home in a reasonable market than any arrangement in 
other markets,” a senior politician noted 420
4.3.1 The development of a negotiating structure
In order to reach a united position from which negotiations with the 
government could proceed, the ABPI had gone to great lengths to solicit 
industry opinion and to set up a structure that could see through the 
negotiations in a way that would be acceptable to its whole membership. It 
achieved this consensus by canvassing opinion and conducting votes among 
the membership on negotiating positions and on the amount of leeway to be 
allowed to the negotiators. This research included ‘stakeholder’ surveys of a 
broad range of opinion, including the medical profession and industry.
There were also sub-groups created to look at particular aspects of the 
scheme and report back. The membership meeting that followed this 28- 
month process gave the Negotiating Team of five people and the Advisory 
Committee of seven421 a mandate to negotiate without referring back to the 
membership. This was done by drawing up a summary of desired outcomes 
and negotiating aims.422 The outcome of intra-industry negotiations, and the 
basis of the mandate given to the teams to negotiate, was a ‘scattergram’, 
which defined their negotiating stance and strategy and the limits to their 
concessions.
4,8 The Guardian, 21 September 1998; Scrip 2372,23 September 1998 p.2
419 Interviews, DOH civil servant 10; DTI civil servant 1; Parliamentarians 12 & 21; industry 
executive 9.
420 Interview, Government minister 7
421 ‘Five plus two’, consisting o f five company representatives and two ABPI staff as a secretariat. 
There were therefore a total o f 12 involved in either conducting or advising the negotiations.
422 Management Forum (1999); Michael Bailey.
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In the long-term they identified the areas they saw as crucial to their business 
and profitability as primarily research-based innovators of pharmaceutical 
products. In the short-term, this process enabled them to identify areas of 
immediate concern for the forthcoming PPRS negotiations. “By gridding it up 
like this, it helped pick out the features of the Scheme that were more or less 
attractive to us along the grid of ‘free market’, and it managed to give the 
industry a strategic framework within which to negotiate, because we could 
all agree we wanted to move in a particular direction. The goal was to hold 
them or shift them to the left.”423 (See Chart 4.1)
423 Interview, industry executive 9
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4.3.2 The identification of specific aims
The scattergram showed that an ultimate aim -  or rather, an ideal -  would be 
the phasing out of the PPRS in favour of a free market and other aspirations 
looked beyond the PPRS itself and would require its replacement rather than 
its reform. Another longer term aspiration was the removal of any price 
control during the patent term. The scattergram highlights, in the central box, 
the top aims for industry for the 1999 negotiations. After the relaxing of sales 
promotion restrictions, the next aim was an increase in the allowable rate of 
return on capital (ROC). Moreover, industry hoped to avoid the introduction of 
a statutory PPRS and an ROS-only (Return on Sales) PPRS. The so-called 
‘export disincentive’ was also something industry wished to address. (This 
meant that companies could effectively be penalised for increasing exports if 
their UK market remained static, because the ROC mechanism would 
allocate fewer costs to UK production.)425
The removal of limits on promotional spending was also a key aim: “We 
wanted to loosen the restrictions on promotional expenditure and have more 
freedom to behave as ordinary commercial organisations.”426 The strength of 
industry feeling on this matter was expressed by another industry 
spokesperson:
“British government generally has a rather 19th century view of industry. They 
think that making things is brilliant because that’s what made Britain great; 
researching and discovering things is a bit iffy, because that’s done by 
people in white coats who didn’t read classics; actually selling things, in other 
words arranging for the patient and the taxpayer to get some benefit, is a 
disgraceful activity that ought to be stamped out. That’s the reason we have 
this very draconian control of sales promotion.”427
425 Scrip No 2385, 6 November 1998, p.4.
426 Interview, industry executive 9
427 Interview, industry executive 13
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In addition, and aside from the PPRS itself, the industry had discussed the 
need to re-examine market conditions in the sector, which it believed had 
changed dramatically since the PPRS was first set up. The ABPI believed 
that essential factors affecting demand and competition had shifted in a way 
that meant a deregulatory path could be pursued and government policy 
aims still achieved. An additional aim was to get the government, whatever 
the new Scheme might be, to undertake a thorough examination of these 
factors and report formally on them, as a way of assessing the prospects for 
deregulation.
4.3.3. The aims of industry: Summary
1. To Remove promotional limits
2. To increase the ROC
3. To ameliorate the so-called ‘export disincentive’
4. To prevent a statutory PPRS
5. To prevent an ROS only PPRS
6. To institute a ‘competition review’ of the pharmaceutical market
4.4 Principal changes in the 1999 scheme
Key areas of the scheme that were changed in 1999 were the Margin of 
Tolerance (MOT), which was widened significantly to 140% above and 50%  
below the ROC; a new lower promotional allowance for price rises of 3%; 
some additional R&D support mechanisms; the removal of ‘grey areas’ of the 
scheme for greater transparency; and the removal of an explicit reference to 
contribution to the ‘economy’ (see 2.3.7 for more details). See Table 4. for a 
summary of changes.
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Table 4.1: Principal changes in the 1999 PPRS
Item 1993 1999
ROC range ROC range of 17-21%. Introduction of new lower rate of 
17% for price increase 
applications. Fixed for normal 
business at 21 %, replacing the 
range.
MOT / grey area 25% of target profit, either way; 
except in year of price increase
Widened significantly to 50% 
lower than the ROC limit and 
140% above.
Promotional
allowance
6% of sales plus £400K fixed 
amount per company, plus 
varying product servicing 
allowances of £100K, £50K, £40K 
and £30K per product.
Remained at 6% and a new lower 
rate of 3% was introduced for 
price increase applications.
R&D allowance Negotiated with each company, 
according to average industry 
spend, company’s UK 
investments, the company’s 
global R&D spend as % sales.
20% rate for normal business and 
17% for price increase 
applications; additional 0.25% of 
expenses per in-patent molecule 
could also be counted.
Price cut 2.5% over 3 years 4.5% across portfolio of the 
company, will ability to modulate 
prices.
Contribution to 
economy
Specific reference (para 4.6) as 
basis of negotiations on target 
ROR (Rate of Return); also one 
factor in agreement on 
promotional allowance.
No explicit mention of this as a 
factor contributina to specific 
areas of the scheme.
New products Free pricing; profits can be kept to 
top limit of MOT
Free pricing; profits can be kept to 
top limit of MOT
General ‘grey areas’ Several ‘grey areas’ for 
negotiations between company 
and DHSS, including over target 
ROR and promotional allowance.
The clear ‘grey areas’ were 
removed from the scheme.
There was also a commitment by the government to undertake a review of 
competition within the sector. The result was the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Competitiveness Task Force (PICTF). The task force examined the state of 
competition in the pharmaceutical marketplace and many of the contextual 
factors that impinge on pharmaceutical investment in the UK economy. This 
was as a response to industry’s claims that the supply side of the market had 
become far more competitive over recent years, gradually making the need
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for supply side regulation of any sort less necessary to contain costs.428 As 
one said: “There is a plethora of demand side controls which we think are 
very effective, and we clearly have a role in clarifying to government that all 
those demand side controls are effective and that they can therefore relax 
controls on the supply side.”429
4.5 Timetable of the negotiations
Unlike in previous schemes, the negotiations themselves were the end point 
of a long process of research and discussion by each side to arrive at their 
respective negotiating positions. The timetable is detailed in Table 4.2 430
428 Department o f Health and ABPI (2002).
429 Interview, industry executive 3
430 Management Forum (1999); Scrip No. 2455 16 July 1999; Interviews, industry executives 6, 11 & 
13; DOH civil servants 5 & 10.
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Table 4.2: Timetable for the negotiations of the 1999 scheme
1995/6 Government decision that there would be a renegotiation at 
the first possible opportunity in 1998.
February 1996 Industry task force formed, reporting to Vincent Lawton of 
MSD
Mar ’96-Jan ’97 Industry’s ‘external stakeholders’ and ‘industry attitudes’ 
surveys conducted
Early 1997 mid-term review of 1993 scheme completed
April 1997 Industry’s sub-groups formed
July 1997 Industry conducts CEO’s meeting
Autumn 1997 DOH discounts therapeutic option and moves decisively 
towards favouring a renegotiation of the PPRS
July-Dee 1997 Industry’s second ‘industry attitudes’ survey conducted
27 October 1997 Talks about talk between the two sides -  to arrange timetable 
and locations
5 December 1997 Preliminary position agreed within industry
January 1998 Industry’s second ‘external stakeholders survey’ conducted
May 1998 Industry conducts CEO’s meeting *
June 1998 Formal neaotiations commenced
July 1998 
Aug-Dee 1998 
September 1998
Government presents its proposals to industry negotiating 
team (‘Neg 9’)
Industry conducts internal meetings on government’s 
proposals
Press reports about the clauses in the Health Bill
October 1998 Current PPRS expires
January 1999 Health Bill published
February 1999 Industry conducts CEO’s meeting
May 1999 Government presents revised proposals
June 1999 ABPI presents revised proposals; further CEO’s meeting
Julv 1999 Aareement reached and siqned
October 1999 New PPRS commences
4.6 The process of the negotiations
Both negotiating teams had clearly defined aims which they sought to deliver 
to their respective constituencies. Each party entered the negotiations with a
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public position that was not acceptable to the other. The negotiations would 
determine to what extent each party would be able to use its bargaining 
resources to push the negotiations in its direction, and whether there would 
be a point where they would cease to believe that the PPRS could deliver 
their minimum regulatory needs.
4.6.1 Research and preparation
The politics of the 1999 PPRS therefore marked a significant watershed in 
the scheme’s history. This was illustrated by the presentation to the ABPI of 
the government’s opening position on the PPRS negotiations, in a paper 
named “Neg 9”. One industry participant noted: “Their opening position was 
simply unacceptable. We thought Neg 9 was either a bargaining position or 
just naivety.”431
The early part of the negotiations were spent with each side coming to terms 
with the fact that the other had prepared as meticulously as they had. 
Industry spokespersons admitted that they were shocked by the 
government’s preparedness for the negotiations and the amount of analysis 
they had done. They felt they had to gain back ground lost by this powerful 
opening gambit by the government side.
“In 1999 there was a quantum shift in our preparation -  we did a very, very 
professional job. We spent a lot of money, a lot of time, we did it really well; 
we walked into the first meeting and we discovered to our horror that the 
Department had done exactly the same!”432
“They were surprised at how much preparation we had done. They came to 
the table with what they thought to be a well worked out position and we 
came with a position too, which was quite different from previously, where 
we hadn’t come with a position. You could witness the tensions between the
431 Interview, industry executive 6
432 Interview, industry executive 13
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companies on their side, as they were forced to accommodate themselves to 
what the government was proposing to do.”433
4.6.2 Negotiation through the press
By the autumn of 1998, it had been made clear in the press that the 
government was proposing the introduction of a statutory scheme that would 
be passed through Parliament in the form of several clauses attached to the 
1999 Health Bill.434 The press mused over the possibility that the PPRS may 
be coming to an end, with perhaps the least radical option being to put the 
scheme on a statutory basis.435 Some press stories characterised the 
clauses in the Health Bill as a replacement of the PPRS, and they had clearly 
been briefed to that effect 436 The Guardian reported a likely “head-on 
collision” with multinational drug companies as it declared that the voluntary 
PPRS was to be “scrapped” in favour of a system of pegging prices through 
“legally binding contracts”.437
The government had responded decisively to moves by American companies 
-  notably Merck, Sharp & Dohme -  to withdraw from the PPRS. It had raised 
the spectre of a legally binding system of regulation, invoking its key resource 
as a lawmaker (with a ‘legal monopoly’), rather than only a customer. 
Equally, the revelation by companies that they might withdraw from the 
scheme was revealed through a leaked memo from the company’s political 
lobbyists, GPC Market Access.438 Industry reaction to the revelation of 
legislation was to publicise imminent danger to the economic well-being of 
the industry.439
433 Interview, DOH civil servant 10.
434 HMSO. Health Act 1999, paragraphs 33-38.
435 The Financial Times, 23 September 1998.
436 The Times, 21 September 1998; The Guardian, 21 September 1998.
437 The Guardian, 21 September 1998
438 Scrip No 2372, 23 September 1998, p.2.
439 The Times, 20 October 1998
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4.6.3 Impact of other regulatory developments
In addition to the 1999 Health Bill, which contained clauses to enact a 
‘statutory scheme’, industry was worried by ‘noises’ from ministers that they 
did not regard as favourable.440 Other measures made the policy landscape 
very complex: policy and economic analysts in the industry had to judge how 
a raft of separate measures might interplay. Several demand side measures, 
including cash limited budgets for doctors, had recently been introduced. It 
was difficult to understand how the PPRS as a supply side measure and 
these new demand side measures would impact on each other. The National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), first announced as part of the White 
Paper on the NHS in November 1997, was also about to be inaugurated, 
though with little clarification on how it would affect pharmaceutical 
products.441
One industry team member commented of NICE: “What is the point of 
negotiating freedom of pricing at launch, which is what we have under the 
PPRS, if in fact the government says you cannot launch your product, as it 
eventually did in the cases of Relenza and Propetia 442 Your calculations on 
what this negotiation might mean for your industry or your company would be 
worthless.”443
The declaration by government that there was going to be a statutory 
scheme was (given industry’s negotiating priorities) a severe blow to the 
negotiations: “It made them much harder. We did not believe they were 
coming to negotiate in good faith.”
440 Interview, industry executives 3 & 9
441 The Independent, 2 July 1998
442 Within a few months o f the new PPRS agreement being signed, NICE recommended that Relenza 
not be prescribed on the NHS; Propetia was put on Schedule 10, which limits its usage within the 
NHS to specified cases.
443 Interview, industry executive 9
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4.7 The pharmaceuticals market
Assumption 1: The market for pharmaceuticals in the UK underpins the 
PPRS by enabling sufficient rewards for both government and industry within 
the scheme, and enabling policy aims to be balanced.
Hypothesis 1: Actors on both sides will seek to maintain the current structure 
of the pharmaceuticals market, and hence the regulatory goods it yields, and 
will not pursue strategies that would undermine it.
In 1999, perceived changes in the market for pharmaceuticals underpinned 
the industry’s insistence on a full examination of the market, which resulted in 
the PICTIF process. In addition, the negotiations yielded more familiar trade 
offs between the two sides in arriving at an agreement.
4.7.1 The price cut
There had been a tradition of an overall price cut in PPRS agreements and 
industry has been prepared to contemplate and agree to this as part of the 
overall deal in which its primary concerns are met.
In 1999, industry maintained this stance. One industry source described the 
focus of DOH’s own agenda and industry’s response to it as follows:
“The DOH had promised Treasury X-hundred million pounds savings from 
the drugs bill and they told us we had to give it to them. We said we would 
trade a price cut for other things: will give you X-hundred million off this year 
and let us negotiate what that X-hundred million is.”444
Industry sources agreed that the price cut was something they acquiesced in, 
in order to gain or maintain wider benefits:
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“I think everybody feels that they got sufficient potential or actual benefit to 
compensate for the price they had to pay through the 4.5% overall price 
reduction.”445
“Nobody liked the 4.5% price decrease but we accepted it in order to give the 
government a good one-off hit, for which we got some good trade-offs in
..446response.
“Without the free pricing element, you would have to ask the question 
whether the PPRS is a valid form of agreement for us.”447
It was, then, overall profits and, specifically, the distribution of funds across 
product ranges, as well as speed to market that most concerned industry.
How the price cut was distributed was also important to the ABPI -  
emphasising the value of the market as it was structured through the PPRS:
they valued the higher prices available to them, through the free pricing
mechanism, for their research-intensive products at the top end of the
market. An industry source explained the approach they took to the
negotiations: “If you want to save money, we will take it from the patent- 
expired end of our older, more established drugs.”448 The modulation 
attached to the overall price cut allowed companies to cut prices wherever 
they wished in order to achieve an aggregate percentage reduction across 
the whole of their portfolio. They therefore maintained some degree of control 
of their pricing strategies and the distribution of the required cuts.
4.7.2 Industry’s regulatory goods
Department of Health officials agreed that there were things more important 
to the industry than price, as one noted: “In the end they were prepared to
444 Interview, industry executive 9
445 Interview, industry executive 3
446 Interview, industry executive 11
447 Interview, industry executive 6
448 Interview, industry executive 9
172
Chapter 4 :1 99 9  PPRS
take an extension of the price cut as part of the trade-off for not changing the 
rate of return on capital.”449 This was also the Treasury’s reading of the 
situation: “For the big companies, the UK market is relatively small but they 
have still seen it as quite important.”450
There was a broad consensus among industry team members and 
commentators that a quick launch is an attractive feature of the UK regime: 
“The UK market is one of the markets in the world where once you have your 
license you can launch with a decent price -  freedom of pricing for your first 
entry to market with no other barriers to entry. That is very positive,” said one 
ABPI negotiator.451 A senior civil servant in the DTI reflected the 
Department’s recognition of industry’s concerns: “For industry, it was mainly 
about getting things onto the market in the UK as quickly as they could.”452
Again, this feature of UK regulation is seen as positive in relation to other 
European markets: “After the United States, the UK has always traditionally 
been a country in which new medicines are launched early. One of the 
reasons for that is that you get immediate reimbursement.”453 He explained 
the importance of freedom of pricing to the industry:
“People in our industry do regard free pricing of New Chemical Entities as 
the jewel in the crown of the PPRS and it is true. If you’ve got a New 
Chemical Entity you can choose your own price. You can get your license on 
Monday and launch on Tuesday; you don’t have another hoop to jump 
through. The value of it is the fact that we can say, ‘we have got our license, 
we’re launching tomorrow, the price is £4.63’.”454
However, the industry side recognised the market-distorting effects of free 
pricing; they saw it as compensation for the lack of a freer market in which to 
sell their products:
449 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
450 Treasury civil servant 24
451 Interview, industry executive 11
452 Interview, DTI civil servant 1
453 Interview, industry executive 13
454 Interview, industry executive 13
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“With freedom of pricing at launch, we launch drugs at a higher price than we 
would do if we were trying to launch them to be competitive with competing 
products on the market. You are not launching at a price to compete 
necessarily, because that’s not how the PPRS is structured. You will never 
get a price rise in the future, so the price you set just erodes year on 
year.”455
The industry side recognised the value of this key part of the PPRS and can 
again be seen to have accepted quite a substantial price cut partly because 
of the value they placed on free pricing at launch.
4.7.3 The evolving market
On the more general level, there was a questioning unlike any before of the 
need and effectiveness of supply side regulation. While keen not to allow 
their advantages to be whittled away, and prepared to pay the price, literally, 
to keep them, the ABPI pushed hard and won an important concession from 
government: to undertake a thorough examination of the nature of 
competition in the sector.
The negotiation of the 1999 scheme therefore reveals that industry 
questioned the value of the sort of market structure the PPRS has shaped, 
but this was an outcome of conflict within the industry camp that the ABPI 
was obliged to reconcile and in the end all firms supported it collectively, 
contesting the basis and assumption of the PPRS of a lack of competition in 
the supply of medicines.
They sought recognition from the DOH of a growing competitiveness in the 
market and a growth in demand side controls. A quid pro quo reduction in 
supply side regulation was sought. “We believe that the market for 
pharmaceuticals -  the supply of medicines to the NHS -  will be an
455 Interview, industry executive 9
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increasingly competitive area,” said one industry source.456 The 1999 
scheme yielded for the industry an agreement to examine the state of the 
market and to institute a process of ‘progressive deregulation’ so far as a 
competitive market was shown to exist.
The context of this was a perceived shift in industry’s R&D focus to the US457 
as well as growing demand side measures that made the consumption of 
medicines in the UK more sensitive to price. “If you introduce other demand 
side hurdles then you undermine the basis of the PPRS,” noted one industry 
negotiator.458
4.7.4 The government and cost control
Cost containment was a central part of the government’s agenda -  one of its 
key regulatory goods and an enabler of the PPRS regime and the co­
operative government-industry relationship in it. The negotiations were, after 
all, taking place because the Treasury had insisted on their doing so at the 
earliest possible opportunity and had insisted on cost savings as part of their 
outcome. Potential savings were identified by the Department. “W e were 
aiming to knock £200 to £250 million of the bill for existing drugs, which we 
could then calculate for the years to come, and that’s what we did,” said a 
senior politician 459
Nevertheless, officials acknowledged the positive value of new medicines, in 
part as alternatives to more costly medical interventions: “I wouldn’t mind if 
the pharmaceuticals bill was 96% of NHS spending, providing it was making 
people well,” a senior politician noted.460 But the balance had to be achieved: 
“Our opening position and the subsequent positions were all ones that would 
try to recognise in the price the value of new, quality, innovative in-patent
456 Interview, industry executive 11
457 Indeed in the two years following the new PPRS, three European ‘giants’, Franco-German Aventis, 
Swiss Novartis and British GlaxoSmithKline, have moved their research headquarters to the US. See 
European Business Forum (2002).
458 Interview, industry executive 6
459 Government minister 7.
460 Government minister 7.
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medicines, and pay for that by pushing down the price of the out-of-patent 
branded medicines towards the generic price.”461
4.7.5 The government and industrial policy
As well as medical effectiveness, industrial policy aims were also salient and 
support for the science base was recognised explicitly. In this respect, the 
top-end of the market was the most critical: “If you’re trying to promote an 
industry with a long-term future then you need to help promote research and 
reward its outcome and that was what we were trying to do. It wasn’t a 
concession by us. W e wanted it as well!”462
The success of the PPRS was demonstrable in the way that investment in 
R&D had been sustained in the UK: ‘W e ’re a small country, it’s a small 
market but we’ve sustained, pound for pound, a far bigger pharmaceutical 
industry than anybody else.”463 A senior civil servant in the DTI made the 
same point: “From our perspective, we wanted to make sure that when 
people are looking to make future investment in research centres and high 
added value activity, they choose the UK.”464
4.7.6 Conclusions
The industry’s collective view was that concessions within the PPRS -  
notably the substantial overall price cut -  ought to be made. It was 
recognised that the government was determined to achieve a substantial 
expenditure saving over the short-term and that the integrity of the scheme 
would require it. Keeping spending under control proved to be an enabler of 
the system and therefore of its positive aspects for the industry side.
The DOH approached the negotiations forcefully but recognised the key 
regulatory goods that industry required to be kept on board (and unified
461 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
462 Government minister 7
463 Government minister 7
464 Interview, DTI civil servant 1
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under the ABPI, given the unrest among some American companies). For the 
maintenance of the price restraint they accepted the competition review.
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4.8 The global context
Assumption 2: The global organisation of industry lends it bargaining 
resources it would not otherwise have and makes government more alive to 
the need for an active industrial policy. ,
Hypothesis 2: Industry will seek to utilise its global structure as a bargaining 
resource to counteract the legal monopoly of government, which in turn will 
pay greater attention to their industrial policy aims.
The industry changed rapidly through the 1990s and senior politicians were 
concerned by its restructuring and its apparent shift towards the US and 
away from Europe. The sponsorship branch of the DOH regarded regulation 
in the UK as a potential material factor: “There are certain areas of policy the 
government is pursuing, or may not be pursuing, that affect the global 
competitiveness of the industry.”465
4.8.1 The political salience of the pharmaceutical industry
At the top of the political hierarchy (and regardless of the debate about the 
dual role of the Department of Health), senior politicians with across-the- 
board policy responsibility -  not least the Treasury and the Prime Minister -  
have a broader perspective on the status of industry. A senior civil servant 
pointed out that as the negotiations began, the Prime Minister met with key 
business leaders to discuss some of these issues. “Sykes, McKillop and 
Leshly466 met with the Prime Minister over breakfast meetings to discuss the 
competitiveness of the UK economy and other issues such as science and 
research. They had a direct line of communication that was of a different
465 Interview, DOH civil servant 4
466 The then CEOs o f the ‘global’ British companies Glaxo Wellcome, Astra Zeneca and SmithKline 
Beecham, respectively.
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order to that of the other industry players.”467 While the PPRS negotiations 
were conducted by the Department of Health, the importance of the industry 
meant that they had a political context that went far further up the hierarchy, 
to the very top.
In fact the issues discussed at PM-CEO level were ones that did eventually 
find their way into the final PPRS agreement in the form of the Competition 
Review. Another DOH civil servant noted its significance, “The task force that 
has been set up with ministers from five departments and global CEOs is a 
unique body for an industry in this country.”468
In the end, the PPRS negotiations could not be separated from broader 
policy and confined to a procurement exercise for the NHS owing to the high- 
tech, high value nature of the industry and its global structure.
4.8.2 Global industry and bargaining resources
In April 1999 the ABPI held its annual dinner, to which it is customary to invite 
the Secretary of State for Health as a guest of honour. At the dinner, the 
ABPI President, Michael Bailey noted the position of the UK in the context of 
a globally organised industry: “He warned that pharmaceuticals was a global 
industry and the UK had to compete with other countries for investments in 
R&D and manufacturing, addressing his remarks at the other mid-dinner 
speaker, the Secretary of State for Health, Frank Dobson.”469 As well as a 
warning about the nature of the industry, this was a timely reminder, mid-way 
in the PPRS negotiations, that the industry is not obliged to invest as heavily 
as it does in the British economy. The structure of the industry was an 
important bargaining chip in negotiations with government. A senior DOH civil 
servant explained the extent of mobility in the British market in particular:
“Most of the major companies are global, or at least multinational. Some of 
them -  Merck, to some extent GlaxoWellcome, to some extent SmithKline
467 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
468 Interview, DOH civil servant 4
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Beecham, are global in the sense that they have a corporate headquarters 
somewhere, but they are not actually wedded to any country or any one 
operating regime and the chief executives of those companies, accountable 
to shareholders, have no particular affinity with any one country. The 
German companies, on the other hand, are multinational, but their German 
heartland is very important to them -  their German base is a very high 
proportion of their sales and so on.”470
Industry sought to exploit the mobility of its investments during negotiations: 
“The danger of disinvestment was a fact that was constantly pointed out to 
the government side,” said one member of industry’s negotiating team 471 
This was dependent on a broad range of factors, including “reasonable 
pricing structures and also reasonable support for research and development 
and a reasonable academic environment.” Another member of the 
negotiating group also made the link between R&D investment and market 
conditions: “On balance the UK is still a reasonably good place to do 
research and development provided we’ve got a market for our products at 
the end of it.”472
The investment argument worked and government -  at Secretary of State- 
level -  overtly tried to bolster mechanisms that would encourage R&D 
investment: “The object was twofold. While we wanted a good bargain for the 
next five years for the NHS and the taxpayer, at the same time we aimed to 
encourage investment in research-led pharmaceuticals here,” said a senior 
politician in the DOH 473
4.8.3 Industrial policy and investment
Government largely accepted the investment argument during the 
negotiations. “Ministers wanted to work with the pharmaceutical industry 
because the government does value the investment in this country and it was
469 Scrip No 2429 16 April 1999 p.5
470 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
471 Industry negotiator 13
472 Industry negotiator 3
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made quite clear that you couldn’t have a voluntary reference pricing system; 
it would have meant legislation,” said a senior DOH civil servant. This point 
also stresses the nature of the PPRS itself -  as a voluntary scheme, industry 
has to agree to it, regardless of how correct or not government may have 
thought its economic arguments were. Industry could not be forced to sign.
The DTI also had a role in drawing attention to the connection between the 
activities of a globally mobile industry and the stringency of national 
regulation. “W e wanted to make sure that when people are looking to make 
future investment in research centres or high added value activity that they 
choose the UK and we were concerned that the PPRS would impinge on 
those decisions because it did affect their operating environment, which is 
why we felt we had to take an interest in it.”474
The PICTF study of competition that was set up as part of the PPRS 
eventually concluded that the global structure of the industry was a significant 
factor. “The conditions required for the industry to retain its competitive 
position are changing in the face of significant shifts in the global business 
environment. These shifts are driving pharmaceutical companies to take a 
much closer look at what each location offers in terms of ... attractiveness of 
local market conditions."475
4.8.4 Oversees policy and markets
Systems o f regulation in other countries provided points of comparison for 
both government and industry during the negotiations.
People from both sides of the negotiations noted the importance of cross- 
referencing between countries in policy outcomes over the PPRS: “The 
danger was that the R&D investment would be sucked into the countries 
where the early launches are going to happen. You can’t quantify this -  you
473 Government minister 7.
474 Interview, DTI civil servant 14
475 Department o f Health (2001), paragraph 2.2.
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can’t make an algebraic expression for it, but it was a possibility if we weren’t 
careful,” noted one industry negotiator.476 The value of the early launch was 
highlighted as an issue for the industry side, notwithstanding the possible 
effects of NICE judgements in particular cases. Indeed the arrival of NICE 
meant that freedom of pricing was all the more important in an atmosphere 
where industry felt its products may face a ‘fourth hurdle’ to the marketplace.
Some industry figures found it difficult to assess the effect of the PPRS in a 
global context with the shadow of NICE in the background, which was seen 
as highly significant for the interplay between the British market and oversees 
markets: “W e made the point several times that if you’re excluded from your 
home market, it has an impact on your global competitiveness. You can’t 
export from a market that won’t allow you to sell there itself because export 
prices are based on UK prices; oversees customers ask for evidence of 
acceptability in our home market and our home market is therefore a 
disproportionate percentage of value.”477 ‘Home market’ here refers to the 
place of clinical trial and launch (not a company’s origin) and therefore 
directly links pricing regulations with locations of R&D.
The importance of the place of first launch was emphasised by another 
industry figure: “Your trialists are your opinion leaders and are crucial to the 
reception of a product in other markets.”478 These points give real backing to 
industry’s arguments about disinvestment. If market conditions (not 
specifically value) are seen as adverse, one important reason for researching 
and trialing in the UK would be gone.
4.8.5 The Treasury’s position
Even the Treasury had taken this argument on board in their internal 
discussions about how hard to push for savings in the PPRS, or for 
restructuring that would produce savings further down the line: “The UK
476 Industry negotiator 13
477 Industry negotiator 9
478 Industry negotiator 3
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market is important to the industry for gaining regulatory approval. ... if they 
gain approval in the UK from the MCA and the drug is well established and 
gets a track record in the NHS then that is a significant benefit to them selling 
the drug in oversees markets.”479 All three government departments involved 
in the negotiations therefore recognised the broader international significance 
of the early launch that the PPRS provided.
However, Treasury officials further realised that recognising and maintaining 
this important aspect of the British system also enabled them to push for cost 
savings: “While I do not think the industry would be prepared to see their 
drugs as sort of loss leaders in the UK market, they do to some extent accept 
something of a trade-off between somewhat reduced margins in the UK 
against the potential for export sales.”480 An industry negotiator agreed with 
this point: “The big research-based drugs companies all said that because 
we’re innovation-based and the whole of our competitiveness is based on 
innovation, if you’ve got a tight drugs budget the best way to save money is 
through existing drugs.”481
4.8.6 Oversees policy and regulation
Regulatory regimes can be directly compared by firms and industry. Where 
some aspects are better elsewhere, this can be used as a pointer by 
industry; where they are worse, they can serve as a warning. Most stark in 
this respect are statistical comparisons. The pharmaceutical industry in the 
UK may be regarded as having a high profitability but the 1990s were very 
profitable for the industry globally. The 21% ROR in the PPRS did not 
compare well with the industry’s main market: “The UK level is below the 
industry’s global average profitability. It used to be around the 21% mark but 
it isn’t now. The industry global average is now in the low 30s, maybe 33% so 
the UK is well below that, and, of course there’s no guarantee that you
479 Treasury civil servant 24
480 Treasury civil servant 24
481 Industry negotiator 9
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actually get that return, it’s just an upper limit,” said one industry 
negotiator.482
Nevertheless, one industry commentator noted that a significant driver in the 
industry’s acceptance of the PPRS and its willingness to join government in a 
partnership was the prospect of practised alternatives; “The alternative 
doesn’t bear scrutiny. That’s direct price control and where it’s been applied 
in the developed markets of Western Europe it has not been of value to the 
industry.”483
It was not only on the government that companies were able to apply 
pressure: the ABPI also found itself under pressure from American 
companies that had become more dominant through the 1990s. In July 1999, 
Scrip magazine noted regarding the competition review that the American 
companies were less obliging than European ones in discussing regulation. 
“The DOH may have had to agree to this plan so that US-based companies, 
historically against such controls, would accept the PPRS terms.”484 The 
1999 negotiations show that the American companies were able to exert a 
pressure from within the ABPI that they had apparently not had back in 1993. 
“The proposers [of the competition review] were the major American 
companies,” noted one industry team member.485 American companies bring 
with them assumptions about the operation of the market from their free 
market base. “There is a philosophical difference between the way in which 
American organisations view Europe, and Britain in Europe, and how the 
business of pharmaceuticals fits into health care provision.”486
4.8.7 Corporate internationalism
Corporate internationalism both changes the attitudes and concerns of home- 
based companies and brings into play overseas companies with different
482 Industry negotiator 9
483 Interview, industry executive 6
484 Scrip No 2457 23 July 1999 p.4-5
485 Interview, industry executive 6
486 Interview, industry executive 6
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cultural approaches. They must also be accommodated in the structure and 
decision making process of the ABPI, in arriving at its negotiating stance. The 
global corporate structure of the industry does mean that the British trade 
association must take on board the perspectives of overseas companies.
A further way in which the global structure of industry impinges on the 
regulatory regime is through the internationalisation of the company’s 
activities and the difficulty this creates for many of the complex calculations 
that need to be made in the PPRS. As the senior DOH civil servant in charge 
of the negotiations noted, “There’s a difficulty of having a return-on-capital 
scheme in a global business. It’s alright when the assets are all in this 
country, but when they are spread around the world it makes it more difficult 
and this is something that’s happening through mergers. I don’t think you 
could say that it’s making PPRS inappropriate now, otherwise we wouldn’t 
have renegotiated it but it is a question for the future.”487
4.8.8 Conclusions
The global context was an important structural influence on the 1999 
negotiations. Developments in the sector did give industry a strong 
bargaining position, especially at a very senior level where CEOs and top 
government officials and ministers -  up to the PM -  became involved in 
broad questions about the sector and the British economy. The competition 
review was an outcome of this emphasis on industrial policy aims.
Nevertheless, the Treasury and DOH did have a powerful procurement and 
regulatory agenda, in particular over the compliance issue. A balance of 
advantages was again achieved for the large firms, though dissent was 
palpable from some of the American firms and they exercised a novel and 
tangible influence over the proceedings.
This politicisation on a global scale and the added complications of regulating 
business that is spread across countries raised longer term questions for
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government officials about the viability of the PPRS. Global corporate 
structure was thought likely to have an increasing impact on government- 
industry relations in the sector.
487 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
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4.9 The co-operative state
Assumption 3: The ‘liberal’ nature of the British state means there is the 
desire by government for ‘light-touch’ and co-operative regulation using 
limited administrative, technical and legal resources.
Hypothesis 3: Policy proposals that require significant technical, 
administrative and legal resources on the part of government will not be 
pursued, in particular a legislative approach to regulation. They will seek 
maintenance of the co-operative regime.
The 1999 PPRS negotiations sat alongside an apparently clear attempt by 
the government to legislate over areas of the scheme. The government was 
seemingly willing to overturn the co-operative regime in favour of 
enforcement through the law.
4.9.1 Analysis of the government’s options
The work of the Department of Health prior to the negotiations reveals that 
there was a dispassionate and broad ranging assessment of the status quo 
by the government. “The full monty was there, from a procurement function, 
through an RPI-X formula, to therapeutic substitution. What we did not 
consider was a completely free market,” commented a senior civil servant in 
the Department of Health.488 Another senior civil servant in the DOH noted 
that the technical ability of government, within resource constraints, had 
improved considerably between the 1993 and 1999 schemes simply owing to 
the improvements in the technology available to it: “The use of information 
technology was not nearly as developed as it is today. Factors such as that 
have enabled us to do more this time than they did last time.”489
488 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
187
Chapter 4: 1999 PPRS
Yet one by one the options for reform seemed to present obstacles, or to be 
inapplicable to the industry. RPI-X was considered to be unsuitable to the 
pharmaceutical industry. This relies on inflation prediction in order to set the 
‘X ’ figure, but the products of the industry are not uniform -  research 
intensive new drugs cannot be valued in the same way as older drugs, 
whether brand name or their generic alternatives. The RPI-X formula was not 
thought to reflect the complex nature of value distributions throughout the 
sector’s product range. “If you are regulating water, then water is water. 
Medicines are not one product and there are changes in population in terms 
of new products coming on stream and RPI-X cannot deal with new 
products,” the civil servant added.490
Several months before the negotiations commenced, the government side 
had recognised these practical obstacles to radical reform. “W e concluded 
relatively early on in the autumn of 1997 that the infrastructure really was not 
there for thinking about the therapeutic option.491 W e did not have the 
infrastructure for decision making or the infrastructure for delivery. We would 
have needed to transform completely the whole structure,” said one senior 
DOH civil servant.492
With an eye on the need for immediate savings, the traditional route 
appeared to be the least cumbersome. It also reflected the Treasury’s 
budgetary concerns: “W e were a part of the process of examining 
alternatives to the PPRS and of developing the government’s overall 
position,” noted a Treasury official.493 The blanket price cut was recognised 
as a quick and effective mechanism to achieve this, as a senior DOH civil 
servant described: “It’s very simple to say what the effect of a price cut will be
489 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
490 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
491 ‘Therapeutic Substitution’ had been discussed for many years. It is a system where a pharmacist 
can substitute a generic for a brand name drug written on a prescription. The respondent here is 
referring to a more radical system where the appropriate drugs for all conditions are centrally defined 
by government and a positive list o f prescribable drugs drawn up for every indication.
492 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
493 Interview, Treasury civil servant 24
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because you just pay 41/£% less for your medicines than you otherwise 
would. It’s easy to model that.”494
4.9.2 Desire for a voluntary agreement
The government’s cost containment aims can be achieved most simply in the 
PPRS through the across-the-board price cut. Part of this simplicity is related 
to its having been agreed voluntarily with industry, and this is a fact that 
formed the basis of many judgements about the PPRS and alternatives to it.
Of the various other options that had been looked at, the way in which they 
might affect the voluntary nature of the agreement proved central to the 
decision not to pursue them: “Reference pricing is something we would never 
have got a voluntary agreement on. Ministers wanted a voluntary agreement, 
they wanted to work with the industry. A reference price system would have 
meant legislation, and that is something you couldn’t introduce very 
quickly.”495 This potential option was therefore counted out despite a great 
deal of research having been undertaken.
So the desire for the continuation of a voluntary scheme was made clear 
from the top -  the Secretary of State -  even though it had initially been 
ministers in the new government that had been most suspicious about a 
‘cosy’ government-industry relationship in this area 496 They were the ones 
that eventually insisted on a voluntary approach.
Voluntarism was also a key issue for the DTI. As would be expected, the 
Department was unequivocal about the need for a co-operative system. A 
senior DTI civil servant noted: “The most contentious business was whether 
the regime should be made statutory or not, and we knew the industry would 
not want that to happen. Our Secretary of State flagged that up at some
494 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
495 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
496 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
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stage. He emphasised the importance of trying to get the negotiation done on 
a voluntary basis.”497
The PPRS negotiations reveal that both sides acknowledged the limit to the 
government’s appetite for replacing the voluntary PPRS with a different form 
of regulation, despite the clauses in the Health Bill that aimed to introduce a 
statutory scheme, which had been dubbed a ‘replacement’ by much of the 
press. The passage of the Bill was concurrent with the negotiations and the 
same people from both the DOH and the industry were involved in the two 
processes. Since the inspiration for both the broad examination of 
alternatives in the PPRS and the introduction of the clauses in the Health Bill 
were similar, the commitment to voluntarism had in practice still to satisfy the 
government’s need for assurances over compliance.
Industry eventually recognised that the government favoured a renewal of the 
voluntary agreement, once the uncertainty that arose in the autumn with the 
initial announcement of statutory provisions had subsided. “W e worked on 
the basis that the officials did not want a statutory scheme. I think they were 
frightened of having to cope with a statutory scheme. The organisation it 
would take to operate would demand more than eleven chaps down at 79 
Whitehall,” commented one member of the industry team 498
Nevertheless, there had undoubtedly, it was felt, been a shift in the 
government’s attitude. “Their approach was more compulsory and 
regulatory.”499 Industry’s perception that government wanted a voluntary 
agreement was thus tempered by this recognition that they were approaching 
the negotiations from a more determined perspective than in the past. The 
department intended to solve the immediate weaknesses of the scheme, and 
were prepared to contemplate otherwise undesirable changes if necessary. “I 
do not want to down-play the determination of government. It was very clear 
that government at all levels were utterly determined that if we were going to
497 Interview, DTI civil servant 1
498 Interview, industry executive 13
499 Interview, industry executive 6
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have a new scheme it must be one that works and for which they can be 
accountable, and which can be transparent.”500 It seemed to some industry 
negotiators that the DOH might indeed sacrifice -  albeit unwillingly -  the 
voluntary form of the PPRS in order to secure the compliance and 
transparency that they sought. The aim for both parties was to avoid the 
position where such a choice had to be made, and the limitations on the 
government’s new determination to act proved decisive.
4.9.3 The limitations on government
There were two aspects to the desirability of a co-operative structure for the 
government. First, the administrative resources required to operate the non- 
voluntary alternatives would be far greater. Second, certain technical aspects 
were thought of as unnecessarily complicated, such as the therapeutic 
option.
A more vigorous regulatory regime was viewed as technically too difficult for 
the potential political benefits and a shift to a different type of system was 
counted out before the negotiations began. The government recognised that 
very minimal resources were required to operate the PPRS: “It is light-touch. 
There are only 15 people here dealing with it.”501
Furthermore, despite the improvement in the Department’s technical ability, 
through the application of IT, this still presented a hurdle. “The base data 
were more readily available for nationalised industries, than for us operating 
a relatively loose regulatory regime, which is what the PPRS is.”502 An 
alternative to the PPRS would likely mean having to gather this sort of data, 
and without the active co-operation of the companies involved.
Within the PPRS, the government does, in fact, have a very wide-ranging 
understanding of the pharmaceutical industry. One industry spokesperson
500 Interview, industry executive 13
501 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
502 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
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noted, “Government had access to all the annual financial returns in a way 
that industry did not. They saw the figures before they negotiated.”503 This 
access to information is special, and unlike any other industry except the 
utilities. Nevertheless, government is reliant on industry co-operation through 
the PPRS in order to get it. “Industry is very willing to share the information 
that it has got about its own performance,” the industry team member added. 
The maintenance of this ‘willingness to share’ is something the DOH would 
wish to keep.
To some extent, ‘technical’ limitations on government consisted simply of a 
knowledge gap, which would have to be filled if a strict and inflexible 
regulatory system were to be implemented. Industry commentators also 
believed that government did not fully understand the impact of its various 
regulations on the industry, as they were then being introduced. This would 
seriously compromise their ability to design and operate a more complex 
regulatory system. The recent development of demand side measures were 
not analysed sufficiently according to one industry participant and this lack of 
technical assessment of various measures hindered their ability to regulate in 
a stricter way. The source commented: “They have not put the systems in 
place to measure the impact of things such as PACT or generic prescribing 
on medicines supply.”504 Better measurement of the impact of regulations 
would be essential to devising a more rigid statutory scheme because it 
would have to stand up to continuous legal scrutiny and it would be far more 
difficult to ‘tweak’ to take account of the interplay with other regulatory 
mechanisms, particularly on the demand side.
4.9.4 The potential for litigation
One significant feature of statutory regulation arises from the fact of non­
cooperation itself, as an industry team member noted: “Legislation works 
both ways. It can be interpreted from both the industry’s side and the 
government’s side. Did they really want a situation where the pricing of
503 Interview, industry executive 3
504 Interview, industry executive 11
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medicines to the NHS and the profitability of the industry -  key elements for 
both of us -  were constantly being put through the courts?”505
The prospect of regular litigation was a point that was almost universally 
referred to by participants and commentators on both sides. Litigation as a 
central feature of regulation was something that the DOH wanted to avoid. It 
was a point stressed far more than the direct resource implications of any 
alternative model of supply side regulation. “It would change the relationship, 
because we would be for ever in court, and they are a very litigious industry. 
Always suing. It [the PPRS] avoids the use of regulation, which is good in 
terms of the regulatory burden and involving us in conflict in the courts with 
the industry,”506 said one senior civil servant.
An industry member noted the same implications of a statutory scheme, and 
the likely origin of much of the potential litigation: “It would cost them a 
fortune; everything would take forever, and the ‘L’ word -  endless litigation. 
You know what a litigious lot the Americans are. The first time anything hit 
the rocks, plane loads of corporate counsel would arrive at Heathrow, and 
the thing would become a nightmare.”507 The ‘legal monopoly’ of government 
can be seen to be seriously qualified in these concerns about litigation. While 
government can make law, industry can contest it and the government 
wished to avoid a regulatory regime that was constantly open to legal 
challenge.
This lack of technical and administrative capacity, lack of impact assessment 
and lack of willingness to pursue regulation through the courts are all 
indicative of the government’s own attitude to its limited regulatory role, at the 
‘cultural’ as well as rational level. This was borne out by one senior DTI civil 
servant who volunteered: “I think really it is a general principle of not wanting 
to put in place extra burdens and detailed regulations to tie companies down
505 Interview, industry executive 11
506 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
507 Interview, industry executive 13
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or up. It is more the general philosophy of not wanting to add to the burdens 
of business than anything specific about this particular industry.”508
4.9.5 Conclusions
The Department of Health did genuinely consider a broad range of options 
for the regulation of the industry, in light of the emerging criticisms of the 
PPRS -  notably lack of transparency and lack of compliance. Some of these 
options were far more ‘interventionist5 than the PPRS and would have 
required both a legal framework and a significant increase in departmental 
resources in order to administer them. The options considered, including the 
therapeutic option and RPI-X, were thought either inapplicable or too 
complex.
These more interventionist options were rejected for several key reasons, 
including the unwillingness of the Department to devote resources to the 
regulatory framework that would not yield sufficient gains to warrant this extra 
effort. It was not thought that a legally binding system would deliver the broad 
range of policy objectives. In part the Department did not believe that it was 
easily able to administer alternatives, in part because the ‘base data5 
necessary to implement a strict regulatory regime were not readily available. 
The ‘exchange relationship5 of the two parties in the PPRS policy community 
was thought to yield regulatory goods that could not be achieved easily by 
other means. The benefits of co-operation were accepted and the prospect of 
constant litigation was regarded with trepidation.
In addition there was a genuine recognition in the DOH (and a strong 
assertion in DTI) that industry had a ‘right’ to operate as freely as possible. 
There was no desire in itself to seek to control commercial activity more than 
necessary to achieve a fair deal in procurement. This was reinforced by the 
pragmatic recognition of industry’s ability to operate freely in a global context, 
and to invest elsewhere.
508 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
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Having each used their ultimate bargaining resources -  legislation and the 
threat of disinvestment -  the core value of the government-industry 
relationship, co-operation, was re-emphasised.
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4.10 The role of Parliament
Assumption 4: Parliament has a peripheral role in this policy field and does 
not constitute a veto point or external influence on the policy community.
Hypothesis 4: Parliament will not be an influential actor in determining policy 
outcomes, which in turn will be reflected in the limited direct attention to it by 
both government and industry.
The pharmaceutical industry’s relationship with Parliament, and MPs in 
particular, has been a long-standing concern of the ABPI and this remained 
the case in 1999.509 One industry spokesperson commented that on balance, 
“the level of understanding of pharmaceutical issues in both Houses of 
Parliament is not as high as one might hope.”510 Industry lobbying is seen as 
centred on the executive branch: “The pharmaceutical industry are a big 
lobby machine and they lobby themselves but they also lobby through us,” 
said one senior civil servant in the Department of Health.511 The industry 
association’s own annual report notes “regular discussion at the most senior 
level.”512 And of all the issues that might concern Parliament the PPRS is the 
most obscure and the least likely to generate direct constituency concerns, 
except for those MPs with industrial interests in their constituencies.
4.10.1 Legislation
The 1999 PPRS was distinct from its predecessors because at the time of its 
negotiation the passage of the Health Bill through Parliament meant that a 
statutory alternative to the voluntary scheme would now exist as an
509 ABPI Annual Reviews consistently showed Labour MPs in particular had unfavourable views o f  
the industry. The view that industry was ‘profit orientated’ was shared by over 60% of all MPs, as 
reported in the 1995 ABPI Annual Review.
5)0 Interview, industry executive 13
511 Interview, DOH civil servant 15
512 ABPI (1999a) p.9
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enforcement mechanism. Because its detailing in the press suggested that 
the statutory scheme was a replacement of the PPRS, rather than as the 
‘back-up’ scheme that the government later claimed, Parliament was thrust 
uncharacteristically centre stage in the politics of the PPRS.
The Health Bill, which began its passage through Parliament part way 
through the PPRS negotiations, meant that Parliament now had a central role 
but the clauses in the Bill were officially separate from the negotiations. The 
renegotiation of the voluntary scheme took place in the normal way, without 
any explicit role for Parliament.
4.10.2 Parliament and the negotiating agenda
The non-compliance with the 1993 scheme became a major issue because 
of the press attention. It had been raised in Parliament on several occasions. 
For example in the House of Lords, Baroness Lockwood had asked the 
government “What arrangements they will make to ensure compliance with 
the renegotiated Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme.”513 The 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Department of Health, 
Baroness Hayman acknowledged regret at the “increasing non-compliance 
by a limited number of companies with the current voluntary scheme.”514
Non-compliance had created a political impetus among both ministers and 
civil servants to seek changes in the new scheme to counter the possibility of 
it reoccurring. Specifically, the passing of manufacturing and marketing 
licenses by some large companies to small firms which then raised prices 
had gained significant attention and was brought up in Parliament.515 The 
Secretary of State for Health, Frank Dobson, had replied on 25 November 
1998 to a question about compliance: “In these circumstances the 
Government have concluded that to ensure full compliance with a new
513 Hansard. House o f Lords Debates, 26 November 1998
514 Hansard. House o f Lords Debates, 26 November 1998
515 See, for example, Commons Written Answers, 26 October 1998; 25 November 1998
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agreement it will be necessary to take reserve powers in the forthcoming 
NHS Bill.”516
There was a degree of industry scepticism about the non-compliance issue. 
Some people believed the government had blown it out of proportion in order 
to precipitate a crisis. One industry figure described the ‘crisis’ thus: “One or 
two companies, which were not part of ABPI, had acquired products from 
ABPI companies that were very low price and they put the price up to a 
reasonable level.”517 But many in industry believed that the substance of the 
crisis was not about cash but about perception -  principally the way it had 
played out in Parliament. Industry sources noted the reaction of politicians to 
the parliamentary questioning: “Officials were embarrassed for their ministers 
by the lack of compliance and ministers similarly were embarrassed at 
Question Time and they would go back and kick the civil servants because 
they’d been made to feel embarrassed in the House.”518 Parliament’s 
outspokenness previously on transparency suggested that any future 
examination of the scheme in committee would focus on deliberate non- 
compliance that was known in the public arena.
Alongside the Transparency Directive from Brussels, Parliament had been 
key to highlighting the issue of transparency, pointing to its opaque operation. 
The department had taken on board criticisms of the scheme by the Health 
Select Committee in 1993/4 (immediately following the previous scheme). 
The committee had also criticised the institutional structures within the 
Department of Health for dealing with pharmaceuticals and the industry, in 
particular the placing of the PPRS and sponsorship functions within the same 
branch. “They thought putting them in one person in one branch was far too 
close a relationship,” said a DOH civil servant.519 This had inspired the 
splitting of the functions into two branches, which had now taken place.
516 Hansard. Commons Written Answers, 25 November 1998
517 Interview, industry executive 6
518 Interview, industry executive 13
519 Interview, DOH civil servant 4
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Role of the Health Select Committee
The Health Select Committee is charged with scrutinising the work of 
government in the field of health by examining the “expenditure, 
administration and policy” of the Department of Health.520 It had produced a 
report in 1993-94 that focused on the NHS drug budget and which as part of 
this has analysed the working of the PPRS. While praising the scheme in 
many respects the report also criticised some aspects of it. The committee’s 
most strenuous criticism was over a lack of transparency in the scheme and 
its incomprehensibility to both public and Parliament:
"... evidence presented to us makes clear that there is a widespread desire 
for greater transparency in the scheme’s operation. We share that desire. 
The regulation of the price of medicines is a central part of the Department of 
Health’s management of the NHS’s £3.3 billion drugs budget, and yet it is not 
open to public scrutiny. This engenders an unhealthy climate of suspicion 
and misunderstanding amongst those who seek to understand the Scheme, 
and undermines the principle of public accountability ... We therefore 
recommend that the Department of Health introduce greater transparency 
into the Scheme: in particular, by means of publishing a report on the PPRS 
... This report should be laid by the Secretary of State before Parliament.”
The result was a Report to Parliament in 1996, followed by a second in 1997 
and a third in 1999. There have been reports in both 2000 and 2001, since 
the current scheme was signed. The 1999 report notes the lack of 
transparency in the PPRS prior to 1999.522
The work of the Committee and the Reports to Parliament were the 
background to the process of arriving at a departmental position for the 
1998/9 negotiations. As a senior civil servant noted, “We faced a need to 
account to Parliament as a result of the Health Committee’s critique of the 
lack of transparency in the Scheme and we had to explain to Parliament that
520 See website: www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/ctteesys.htm
521 House o f Commons Papers (1994), paragraphs 87-88.
522 PPRS Report to Parliament 1999, paragraph 4.2
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we were two years behind on the case work.”523 Important modifications to 
the scheme in 1999 were made as a result.
The Reports to Parliament
In order to make more clear how the scheme operated, the Department of 
Health prepared Reports to Parliament, beginning in 1996. These ranged 
over issues of technicality, operation, and compliance. On the latter, for 
example, the 1996 Report noted, “At 30 April 1996 action has not been 
completed on 19 AFRs from 1993 (of a total of 50 for that year); and of the 50 
AFRs due for 1994 (the majority of which should have been received in the 
summer of 1995) 36 had been received and action completed on 11 .”524
The reports highlighted (from the Department of Health itself) both the lack of 
efficiency of the PPRS Branch in completing its workload and of companies 
in submitting required data (their AFRs). Hence the reports answered, to 
some degree, Parliament’s call for greater transparency but in so doing they 
exposed some of the inefficiencies of the scheme, giving rise to further 
criticism. Making the operation of the scheme more efficient became a further 
aim of the government in the 1999 negotiations.
The transparency of the scheme was a subject that could be dealt with at 
renegotiation, and was taken on board by the officials at the Department. 
“We decided that the new PPRS, regardless of the figures, should be more 
transparent within the confines of respecting companies’ confidential data,” 
said a senior civil servant.525 Another senior civil servant noted the sense of 
urgency in organising the report. “Part of my instructions when I arrived were 
to get the Report to Parliament in place so that we could not be accused of 
running a gangster scheme that nobody could understand,” he said.526
523 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
524 Department o f Health (1996), paragraph 3.2.4
525 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
526 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
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The 1999 agenda: Conclusions
Non-compliance had been highlighted in Parliament and had become a minor 
political hot potato; lack of transparency had been a long standing 
parliamentary criticism of the scheme; and the efficiency of case work had 
become an issue after the Department’s own Reports to Parliament had 
revealed just how behind with its work the Department had become, in part 
because companies were not taking their submission dates sufficiently 
seriously. These reports, in turn, were inspired by the select committee’s 
criticism of the scheme.
4.10.3 Parliament and the negotiation process
In so far as the Health Bill was a mechanism of pressure for the DOH in the 
negotiations, Parliament’s role was enhanced through the linking of the 
legislation to the negotiations (see Chapter 5). They were linked too because 
of what the government intended to achieve: one industry figure said that 
industry representatives in the negotiations suspected some sort of 
legislative approach from government as soon as they had seen the ‘Neg 9’ 
document. “What was in Neg 9 clearly could not be agreed voluntarily. We 
knew it would have to have a legal basis, so the clauses in the Health Bill 
didn’t come as a complete shock to us.”527
Parliamentarians, however, were not knowledgeable about the scheme and 
not easily able to make judgements about it. Industry’s attempts to influence 
MPs and peers would generally require a great deal of information and 
explanation. “The PPRS is a pretty abstruse subject for most 
Parliamentarians. There are a lot of people who take a personal interest in 
health issues but the PPRS lies at the periphery of most people’s radar 
screens as regards the health service and it is very technical and very 
complicated,” said one Parliamentarian who was active in the passage of the 
Health Bill.528 Any debate about the PPRS -  which would only come about as
527 Interview, industry executive 6
528 Interview, Parliamentarian 18
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part of debates on the Health Bill, therefore seemed to suggest a role, and 
certainly an opportunity, for industry to lobby.
4.10.4 Parliament and industry lobbying
Industry did possess established parliamentary contacts where it could begin 
this process. Political advice and the parliamentary contacts that underpin it 
exist at three levels, in relation to industry organisation: through the trade 
association, the ABPI; through the broadly national ‘groups’ of companies, 
APG, BPG and the European group; and through individual companies. 
Advisers at all these levels worked to foster and utilise parliamentary 
contacts during the PPRS and the Health Bill debates.529 It is at the industry 
level -  the ABPI -  that the most important contacts for the PPRS exist and 
where most lobbying in 1999 took place. “Individual companies do employ 
lobbyists but the most important contact is through the ABPI. It’s the 
Association that was important for the PPRS and the Bill,” said a member of 
the Lords.530
The All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) provides an institutional link for 
the industry to MPs. “We have a constant dialogue with it,” according to one 
industry source.531 Interested MPs include those with constituency interests 
(the industry being an important high value employer) as well as other MPs 
and Lords whose interests are as part of the medical profession; and others 
who are interested from the perspective of particular patient groups. The 
APPG is an interest group and has no formal role in any legislation or 
regulation but members of the group had good communications with 
ministers, and communicated industry concerns to them. One member of the 
group said that he had regular meetings with the Secretary of State, and 
discussed the PPRS with him during 1999.532 He noted how, prior to the start 
of the negotiations, the “Secretary of State wanted to meet industry figures,
529 Interview, Parliamentarian 12
530 Interview, Parliamentarian 20
531 Interview, industry executive 11
532 Interview, Parliamentarian 12
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without civil servants present,” and a dinner meeting was duly arranged 
through the APPG contact.533
Parliamentary contacts were utilised more generally during the PPRS 
negotiations as an additional source of pressure on government, i.e. to direct 
pressure to the Department of Health regarding broader PPRS issues. 
“During the negotiations, individual companies certainly spoke to MPs about 
the PPRS,” an industry source commented.534
A senior politician also noted the use of parliamentary contacts: “The drugs 
industry wrote to quite a few people in the course of the negotiations in an 
effort to weaken our stance and strengthen their own hand.”535 Government 
also felt the need to explain to MPs their position: “We were able to say to the 
MPs, well these are the things we’re bearing in mind -  we are trying to save 
money for the NHS but at the same time we’re trying to come up with a 
scheme which is more favourable to the research-based pharmaceutical 
industry and that’s what you want because you’ve got a great big laboratory 
in your area,” he added. Thus the economic clout of industry was a major 
factor in determining the activity of MPs owing to their constituency interests.
4.10.5 Conclusions
Parliament was certainly active during the negotiations, largely owing to the 
passage of the Health Bill. But it had also contributed significant input in the 
years leading up to the negotiations and played a major role in defining the 
government’s aims and direction in reform of the scheme. Transparency had 
become a central issue for the Department because of the Health Select 
Committee’s comments and the PPRS Reports to Parliament in 1996 and 
1997. Compliance had become a political issue as well because of 
parliamentary questioning of ministers and the back-log of case work had
533 Interview, Parliamentarian 12
534 Interview, industry executive 3
535 Interview, Government minister 7
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been highlighted by the Reports to Parliament. All of these issues formed 
primary parts of the Department’s agenda for the 1999 PPRS negotiations.
The extent of involvement of Parliament in setting the agenda for reform is 
significant and its role here cannot be discounted or dismissed as 
‘peripheral’. However, the process of the negotiations in 1999 was not 
influenced directly from Parliament. Parliament, and in particular 
Parliamentarians, cannot be considered to have exercised a veto over 
proceedings in the PPRS. As in 1993 (see Chapter 6), Parliament was an 
arena through which the government and the industry communicated with 
each other during the process of the negotiations, and, while important, was 
a proxy for their relationship.
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4.11 Role of the Department of Health
Assumption 5: The siting of an industrial policy function within the 
Department of Health gives DOH authority and competence to act and 
highlights the government’s industrial policy aims, enabling a co-operative 
regime.
Hypothesis 5: The dual role of the DOH will prove decisive in defining policy 
and maintaining the co-operative regime by counteracting the procurement 
focus of the Treasury.
The 1999 PPRS negotiations were significant for the organisation of the 
executive because all three departments had made their role in the scheme a 
priority. The Treasury had initially insisted on a renegotiation; the Department 
of Health had undertaken an unprecedented examination of price regulation 
elsewhere and was seeking to create some sort of enforcement mechanism 
for the voluntary scheme; the DTI now had a specific responsibility for the 
Biotechnology industry, which was intimately connected commercially with 
the pharmaceutical sector, and in which Britain had become the leading 
European nation.
4.11.1 Objectives of the Department of Health
The sponsorship role was seen by officials in the DOH as an essential 
counterbalance to the attitudes of the broader department and health service: 
“Putting it rather crudely, there are quite a lot of people in the NHS who 
regard the industry in a very negative way -  who see it almost as the enemy 
-  and there are some elements of that within the Department.”536 Because of 
the sponsorship function, the role of the head of division cannot be 
underestimated here. His task is to fuse the procurement and sponsorship
536 Interview, DOH civil servant 4
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roles together in the PPRS. Indeed another senior civil servant put the effect 
on the DOH of the sponsorship role, executed through the Industry Division, 
in starker terms:
“There are bVz thousand people working in the Department of Health. All of 
them bar one want to screw the pharmaceutical industry as hard as they 
possibly can. One person who’s got to be aware of something a bit wider 
than that is the Head of the Division that’s negotiating the PPRS.”537
Aside from influencing policy, sources in the Treasury saw the sponsorship 
function as bureaucratically more efficient: “If the DTI was to hold the 
sponsorship role for the industry you’d replicate that expertise. It’s a long 
standing policy that sponsorship rests with the Department that has got 
particular expertise.”538
A point made by both Treasury and the DOH was that the two aims of policy 
have to be reconciled at some point in the bureaucratic structure, it’s simply a 
case of choosing where that is. The overt conflict of interest had been 
addressed by the changes made within the Department of Health, ensuring 
the same individual was not responsible for PPRS and sponsorship as had 
previously been the case. A Treasury civil servant noted, “Government as a 
whole does have a set of objectives, in relation to different industries, that 
conflict. Putting the different objectives in different departments is not 
necessarily the easiest way to resolve them.”539 And a department of health 
civil servant concurred: “If the sponsorship role was put in DTI, we could 
imagine a fairly violent clash between the two interests. The close proximity 
makes for a more sensible and amicable resolution of any tensions that might 
exist between those two roles,” said a senior DOH civil servant.540
537 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
538 Interview, Treasury civil servant 25
539 Interview, Treasury civil servant 24
540 Interview, DOH civil servant 4
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4.11.2 The approach to the negotiations
For the purpose of the 1999 negotiations, it was the task of new ministers to 
indicate the broad balance that was to be struck between the procurement 
and sponsorship roles of the DOH, and one senior civil servant was in no 
doubt that the emphasis was being shifted: “In the Health Department it was 
made pretty clear from the Summer of ’97 onwards that what the Department 
was in business for [in the PPRS] was to get the best deal for the Health 
Service.”541 Furthermore, “The requirement in the PPRS negotiations to have 
an eye to the balance between the NHS need for decent prices and the 
interests of the industry who need to be able to invest in R&D, is a central 
part of PPRS anyway,” said a DOH civil servant.542 The pressure in the 
Department for a good deal for the NHS and the nature of the PPRS itself 
suggest that the overt sponsorship function may not have influenced the 
negotiations greatly.
This was not the view of the main actors. A senior politician noted that the 
sponsorship role did influence the approach to and outcome of the 
negotiations: “It made it easier to get a balance of advantage,” he said. “I 
think it would have weakened our position and therefore the government’s 
position if it [the DOH] weren’t the sponsoring department responsible for the 
industry.”543 In other words, the particular shape of bureaucratic organisation 
was a central factor in the ability of government to balance its conflicting 
policy aims. The PPRS, as a fusion of the health and industrial policy aims 
can still be shifted in its focus and the sponsorship role of the negotiating 
department was influential.
4.11.3 Industry’s view of the sponsorship role
Industry sources universally believed that the sponsorship role had been 
positive in 1999, again for the balance and breadth that it brought to the
541 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
542 Interview, DOH civil servant 4
543 Interview, Government minister 7
207
Chapter 4: 1999 PPRS
Department’s approach to them. Some fear was expressed that the DOH 
should ever have a purely procurement perspective.
“At the moment it [the DOH] can balance the need to get a decent price on 
the products we have today with the need to make sure there’s a stream of 
products coming forward for the future. Otherwise the Department of the 
Health would increasingly be forced towards the Treasury position, where it 
has no interest in our industry except buying the products we have today as 
cheaply as it can.”544
“The fact that the sponsoring department has to bear the three parameters in 
mind -  innovation, export, and costs -  forces them into a more balanced 
view.”545
“If the Department were simply the purchaser, it would probably take a very, 
very enlightened person within the Department to accept that there was the 
need for the R&D investment there is in our industry.”546
The latter noted that the sponsorship role helps to emulate the relationships 
that occur in the private sector between many industries and their suppliers. 
“If you look outside our industry, all sorts of companies have genuine long­
term relationships with their suppliers, and very often work with their 
suppliers to develop new ideas and new products. That doesn’t normally 
happen with government but having the sponsorship role in the same place 
helps to overcome the absence of that aspect of a purely private sector 
relationship.”547
4.11.4 The role of the DTI: Shuttle diplomacy
The DTI was also active prior to and during the PPRS negotiations. Like the 
Treasury, an important role played by the DTI was to influence the initial 
negotiating position of the DOH, to which its input was central. “Our
544 Interview, industry executive 13
545 Interview, industry executive 6
546 Interview, industry executive 3
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Secretary of State wrote to their Secretary of State and raised a few general 
points of principle about what he hoped would be achieved in the 
negotiations, stressing things that were particularly important in terms of DTI 
policies on competitiveness and so on,” said a DTI civil servant.548 The DTI 
approach prior to the start of negotiations was in turn influenced by industry 
lobbying: “There was quite a lot of open sharing of information. The industry 
people talked to us and they told us which issues were most important to 
them and those were reflected in our Secretary of State’s letter.”
Once the negotiating process began, the DTI performed an important 
communications function. The negotiations began with deadlock at the 
publication of the DOH’s position paper, Neg 9, which was presented as 
‘government-wide’. “W e were told that the opening negotiating position was 
agreed across government before they started,” noted a senior industry 
negotiator, “so when we saw it, we went straight to the DTI to ask for clarity 
on what they’d sent us.”549
This ‘phoney war’ situation was repaired largely by DTI clarification. “DTI 
subsequently confirmed to us that they had seen the opening position, but 
they’d been assured that that was a fully negotiable opening position,” the 
industry figure added. Following DTI clarification of the DOH’s position, 
industry indicated its willingness to talk: “The top guys -  Richard Sykes, Jan 
Leschly -  passed the message that they were prepared to negotiate.”550 DTI 
could clarify the ‘position’ presented by DOH to whatever extent was 
necessary to get the negotiations moving. They therefore openly suggested 
that the position was indeed negotiable.
Some voices in the Department of Health suggested that DTI’s 
representation of industry’s complaints to the DOH was more political than 
real. A senior DOH politician noted: ‘W e  warned DTI that industry would start 
making representation to them and to the Prime Minister and said that both of
547 Interview, industry executive 3
548 Interview, DTI civil servant 1
549 Interview, industry executive 9
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them should ignore them, and that broadly speaking is what they did. The 
DTI went through the motions of telling us what they were saying and we 
went through the motions of telling them, but they were doing exactly what 
we said we they would.”551
Representatives from DTI perceived themselves as playing a more real role, 
as did industry figures and some officials from the DOH. A sort of ‘go- 
between’ role emerged as the DTI became ‘recruited’ by both sides to kick 
start the negotiations and put some perspective on each side’s opening 
position, for the benefit of the other:
“DTI said that the agreement they’d come to was that DOH was the lead 
negotiating body and that other Departments had agreed that it was right for 
them to come in hard -  they fully expected us to come in hard. They [DTI] 
expected that there’d be a rapprochement between the two negotiating 
positions and that DTI was not going to intervene before we’d started 
negotiating seriously, but would remain available when we got down to the
c e p
last one or two points, if we couldn’t close the gap.”
4.11.5 Industry and the role of DTI
There was a general view among industry representatives that the DTI was 
genuinely helpful: “DTI’s backing was important. We kept in contact to make 
sure that when any discussions were taking place with Dobson or Hayman, 
DTI knew the implications and could say ‘stop’.”553
DTI officials represented their role as a go-between: “I think gradually during 
the process we were taken into the confidence of both sides about how far 
each would go. From time to time we would cajole one side or the other to be 
a bit more flexible on one point or another,” noted a senior DTI civil
550 Interview, industry executive 9
551 Interview, Government minister 7
552 Interview, industry executive 9
553 Interview, industry executive 6
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servant.554 DTI officials were also clear that they had cards to play had 
negotiations not progressed well. “We would have been able to get our 
Secretary of State to write to Frank Dobson. Having that sort of external input 
can sometimes have added strength rather than the point coming up from 
within the same organisation,” said a DTI official.555
The role of the DTI in the negotiations -  at least in terms of process -  was 
significant. They constituted a vital link between the DOH and industry at a 
key time. There is no evidence to suggest that this role would have been any 
greater had DTI rather than the DOH been responsible for formal 
sponsorship; and yet any gap that they would have needed to bridge would 
doubtless have been wider.
4.11.6 The role of the Treasury
The negotiation of the PPRS in 1999 was heavily influenced by the Treasury 
from the beginning. The Treasury had been instrumental in initiating a new 
scheme: “The Treasury were not at all satisfied with the ‘93 settlement and 
were determined there would be a renegotiation at the first possible point,” 
said a senior DOH civil servant.556
All three departments were involved in arriving at the opening negotiating 
position of the government and the Treasury input was from a senior level. 
“There was formal discussion of what the negotiating position should be at 
ministerial level -  the Chief Secretary for us -  and there was also an 
exchange of letters.”557 Furthermore, the analysis of alternatives in which the 
Treasury was involved occupied a significant amount of the health team’s 
time over the previous year: “The PPRS was a big and fairly sustained piece 
of activity for us,” noted a Treasury official.558
554 Interview, DTI civil servant 1
555 Interview, DTI civil servant 1
556 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
557 Interview, Treasury civil servant 25
558 Interview, Treasury civil servant 24
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The Treasury initiated the demand for a quantitative reduction in expenditure 
for the forthcoming financial year -  the outcome of which was the 4.5% price 
cut, which had begun, at Treasury’s insistence, at 6% .559 “The Treasury had 
a particular interest [in the PPRS] at that time. W e were looking for savings 
on the drugs bill as a result of the negotiations.”560
The government’s opening position in the negotiations (Neg 9) was attributed 
by industry to the Treasury’s influence and the presence of the Treasury was 
felt in their discussions of it with the Department of Health. “W e didn’t think 
that Dobson was in a position to go back to the Treasury and negotiate an 
agreement with them, even if he thought our case was reasonable. We felt 
Treasury had told him what they wanted and it was his job to negotiate it.”561
Moreover, a senior politician volunteered that the overall price cut was not an 
outcome of the negotiation. “We decided in advance what sort of reduction in 
overall cost to the NHS per year we were looking for,” he said.562 And 
Treasury officials agreed that “the actual numbers were informed by the 
outcome of the comprehensive spending review of 1998.”563 As the DOH 
negotiates on behalf of the whole government, the Treasury had some initial 
input and final veto over any agreement.
Not all opinion saw the Treasury as solely focused on short-term cost 
calculations. Treasury officials themselves did claim a broad understanding 
of the industry and a concern for more than short-term cost savings: if the 
value of medicines could be illustrated in terms of the broader NHS budget 
then this would be taken into account.564 One Parliamentarian agreed: 
“Treasury sees the industry as an earner as well as an expense because of 
its contribution to the balance of payments,” he said.565
559 Source close to the Treasury
560 Interview, Treasury civil servant 25
561 Interview, industry executive 6
562 Interview, Government minister 7
563 Interview, Treasury civil servant 24
564 Interview, Treasury civil servant 24
565 Interview, Parliamentarian 12
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Overall, the Treasury’s influence can be seen as significant -  initiating the 
renegotiation and defining the area of the overall cost savings in the short­
term.
4.11.7 Conclusions
One feature of the 1999 negotiations is the active part played by the DTI. 
This substantial role was not precluded by its lack of a formal sponsorship 
function. Furthermore, the DOH’s position was consistently informed by its 
obligation to consider the industry from a commercial perspective as well as 
a procurement one.
Meanwhile, the Treasury’s influence was characteristically very significant 
and there is no indication that a DTI armed with a sponsorship function would 
have shifted the Treasury’s position regarding the balance of health 
(procurement) and industrial policy. The head of the industry division in the 
DOH was critical to the achievement of a balance of policy (which is his 
function) and the reduction of the Treasury’s initial objectives for expenditure 
savings. The role of the DOH in sponsorship was a central factor in the 
maintenance of the co-operative policy community, given its initial breakdown 
following publication of the government’s Neg 9 document.
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The passage of the Health Bill in 1999 appeared to mark a crisis in the 
relationship between government and industry. Attached to the Bill, which 
otherwise sought substantial reform of the NHS, were a few clauses relating 
to the purchase of medicines and the regulation of the pharmaceutical 
industry with regard to medicine prices and company profits: in short, clauses 
that referred explicitly to the PPRS and its operation.
This appeared to represent a ‘doomsday scenario’ for the PPRS policy 
community, in which the ultimate ‘resource’ of the government -  its legal 
power -  was pitted against the commercial power of industry. The 
government seemingly aimed to use its legal authority to undermine the very 
nature of the policy community and re-orientate the whole regulatory 
framework to a statutory one. The passage of the Bill would demonstrate how 
far the government was prepared to pursue this strategy and whether 
industry would seek to respond with its own considerable bargaining 
resources.
5.1 Aims of the Health Bill
The clauses in the Bill were intended as the government’s means of 
enforcing the PPRS, in reaction to the recent non-compliance by some 
companies. The Bill, if passed into law, would set the PPRS within an 
enforceable statutory framework that would enable the Secretary of State to 
veto price increases with the force of law and impose the terms of the 
PPRS.566
The clauses sought to do two different things, both to serve this same 
purpose:
566 Scrip No 2391,27 November 1998, p.5.
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■ First, they sought to introduce legislative provisions with regard to the 
PPRS -  in the terms of the Bill, “Powers relating to voluntary schemes”.567 
These would give powers to the Secretary of State to enforce the PPRS 
where it was not adhered to by a signatory. They appeared to represent 
the replacement of the PPRS as a genuinely voluntary arrangement with 
some sort of hybrid scheme -  part voluntary and part statutory. These 
powers would also enable the direct imposition of price controls on 
products if the Secretary of State saw fit.
■ Second, other clauses were aimed at making provision for the Secretary 
of State to introduce an entirely separate statutory price regulation 
scheme that could be imposed on pharmaceutical companies where the 
Secretary of State wished -  titled “Statutory schemes” in the Bill.
The aim of both these groups of clauses was as an enforcement mechanism 
for the PPRS, which was now, simultaneously, being re-negotiated between 
the Department of Health and the ABPI.
The Health Bill therefore represented something quite special in the history of 
government-industry relations in the pharmaceutical sector. It undermined 
the key regulatory goods for industry, which were attributable to the co­
operative regime between government and industry, and it raised questions 
about the role of the DOH as the sponsoring department. Fundamentally, it 
seemed as though the desire of successive governments to avoid statutory 
regulation did not hold for the newly elected Labour government and it 
appeared to accord Parliament an unprecedented role in the framing of 
pharmaceutical price regulation.
The Health Bill, in other words, had important implications for the 
assumptions about why the PPRS had survived for so long as a co-operative 
regime: the perceived unwillingness of government to administer detailed and 
legalistic regulations; the peripheral role of Parliament in the regulatory
567 House o f Lords Bill number 15, 1998-9.
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framework; the desire to maintain the structure of the British pharmaceuticals 
market and the regulatory goods that the PPRS underpinned within it; and 
the legitimacy -  from different points of view -  of the DOH’s dual role.
The clauses in the Bill were initially press released, ahead of the Bill’s 
publication, as a replacement of the voluntary scheme and contributed 
significantly to a deterioration in the relationship between government and 
industry towards the beginning of the PPRS negotiations.568
5.1.1 What the Bill sought to do: Summary
The detail of the Bill aimed to give the Secretary of State the power to:569
■ Enforce the PPRS by giving legal force to some of the main principles of 
the scheme, including the prohibition on price rises that had been 
implemented without the consent of the Secretary of State.
■ Control prices of medicines directly (alongside any PPRS), extending the 
Secretary of State’s powers from price capping to price setting.
■ Provide a regulatory framework for any company to whom the PPRS does 
not apply.
■ Introduce a statutory scheme in place of the PPRS for any company, at 
his discretion.
5.1.2 The Heath Bill and the PPRS negotiations
The simultaneity of the Bill and the PPRS negotiations meant that the events 
in one arena shaped those in the other. They were also linked through 
personnel. A sub-group of negotiating members was assigned to work on 
amendments to the initial draft of the Bill.570 A group of three senior industry 
people studied the Bill in some detail and “suggested improvements to 
government” directly, the spirit of which were largely incorporated into the
568 For example, see The Guardian, 21 September 1998; The Times, 21 September 1998; The 
Financial Times, 23 September 1998.
569 House o f Lords Bill number 15, 1998-9.
570 Interview, industry executive 13; Interview, DOH civil servant 5
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final draft.571 The people assigned to discuss the Bill were also involved 
directly in the PPRS negotiations. “What is formal and what is informal? 
Industry people were centrally involved in the amendment process and the 
link between the negotiations and the Bill was overt,” said one member of the 
Lords.572 The Bill was changed in ways that were important for industry.
5.2 Passage of the Bill through Parliament
There were some key issues that dominated discussion of the Bill in the 
Lords and in Commons Committee. The issue raised most insistently 
concerned the apparent ability, according to the Bill, of the Secretary of State 
to impose a statutory scheme on the basis of completely subjective 
judgements. The Bill did not specify that there had to be a contravention of 
the PPRS for the statutory provisions to be imposed and this proved to be a 
principal sticking point. As a senior civil servant conceded, “There were 
several changes, including a clause that means that if a company has signed 
up to the voluntary scheme it cannot have a statutory price control measure 
or profit control measure imposed on it."573 This change was amendment 
No. 163, moved by Earl Howe, relating to Clauses 27 (control of prices) and 
28 (statutory scheme). Earl Howe described these clauses, which stated that 
the Secretary of State can impose the statutory scheme, as “doing away with 
the voluntary nature of the PPRS by taking on powers to fix the prices of 
drugs as they choose.”574
Although Amendment 163 was withdrawn, there were concessions 
incorporated in the final draft of the Bill that ensured that discussion with the 
company concerned was required before any such decision could be 
taken.575 Furthermore, the company had a right to “make representations”
571 Interview, industry executive 13
572 Interview, Parliamentarian 20
573 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
574 Hansard, House o f Lords, 1 March 1999. Earl Howe, Health Bill debate.
575 See The Health Act 1999, Sections 33 to 38.
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about any points referred to by the Secretary of State.576 The Bill was altered 
to include provisions for discussion with the ABPI, including on the setting up 
of any statutory scheme.577
This issue of what the terms were to be under which the Secretary of State 
could impose the statutory scheme and of the required consultation formed a 
significant part of the debate in Standing Committee in the Commons. 
Opposition MPs drew attention to the scale of the powers being conferred on 
the Secretary of State to make arbitrary decisions regarding individual 
companies. Again, proposed amendments were withdrawn here on the basis 
that the minister would go away and consult with industry on the issues it 
raised. Such consultation was in any case taking place through the group of 
industry people assigned to look at the Bill.
The concurrence of the PPRS negotiations led to accusations of an ulterior 
purpose of the clauses in the Bill, namely to increase the government’s 
bargaining power in the negotiations on the voluntary PPRS.578 Certainly, the 
interlinking of the two processes did have an effect on the negotiations and 
many involved in both those and in the passage of the Bill, from both 
government and industry, saw them as interrelated. The approach of the 
opposition therefore became not so much to promote the industry cause as 
to be extremely sceptical about the secondary powers being taken by 
government, and this was their focus in much of the debate.
5.2.1 Amendments to the Bill
Amendments, in both Lords and Commons, centred on several specific 
issues:
■ The terms on which the Secretary of State could impose a statutory 
scheme on a company;
576 Scrip No 2453, 9 July 1999, p.3.
577 See Scrip No 2410, 24 February 1999, p.2.
578 The second motive was suggested by several interviewees.
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■ The notice that he ought to give when doing so;
■ The right of appeal or representation by companies when this situation 
arose;
■ The requirement to consult with industry in several areas where the 
Secretary of State was being given new powers, including secondary 
legislation;
■ That there should be an overt limiting of the statutory scheme to 
companies who are not signatories to the PPRS;
■ Limiting direct price setting powers to non-members of the PPRS;
■ That the costs of R&D should be taken into account;
■ That some definitions were very loose, including that of an “NHS 
medicine”; “fair and reasonable” and “reasonable in all the 
circumstances”, etc.
■ The legal nature of powers to regulate bestowed on the Secretary of State 
and Henry VIII clauses.579
Many of these concerns did work their way into changes to the Bill and some 
amendments that industry considered essential to their broader relationship 
with government were made. The initial aims of the Bill largely worked their 
way through to the legislation, with the modifications noted above. There 
were six sections:580
1. Section 33, “Powers relating to voluntary schemes.” This allows the 
Secretary of State to judge that “acts or omissions” by a company mean 
the purposes of the PPRS are not being fulfilled, and a procedure to expel 
the company from the scheme can be undertaken. This section also gives 
one part of the PPRS a legal footing, namely the prohibition by the 
Secretary of State of price increases on health service medicines.
2. Section 34, “Power to control prices.” This section allows the setting of 
prices by the Secretary of State for products from companies that are not
579 Henry VIII clauses empower a Secretary o f State to use secondary legislation to amend or repeal 
primary legislation.
580 The Health Act 1999, Sections 33 to 38.
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part of the PPRS. (Statutory Instrument 2000/123 was introduced to 
enforce a 4.5% across-the-board price cut on NHS business for 
companies not part of the PPRS, principally under the auspices of the 
clauses in this section.)
3. Section 35, “Statutory schemes.” This allows the Secretary of State to 
impose a statutory price regulation scheme on any company that is not 
signed up to (or who has been expelled from) the PPRS.
4. Section 36, “Statutory schemes: supplementary.” Gives a broader range 
of possibilities to the content of any statutory scheme, allowing any 
actions that will achieve the purposes of such a scheme.
5. Section 37, “Enforcement.” Outlines actions and penalties that may be 
implemented in order to enforce regulations and any statutory scheme.
6. Section 38, “Controls: supplementary.” Specifies aspects of previous 
clauses; most importantly this section repeals parts of the 1977 National 
Health Service Act in relation to health service medicines.
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5.3 The pharmaceuticals market
Assumption 1: The market for pharmaceuticals in the UK underpins the 
PPRS by enabling sufficient rewards for both government and industry within 
the scheme, and enabling policy aims to be balanced.
Hypothesis 1: Actors on both sides will seek to maintain the current structure 
of the pharmaceuticals market, and hence the regulatory goods it yields, and 
will not pursue strategies that would undermine it.
The Health Bill raised important questions regarding the market for 
pharmaceuticals. Most basic was that it seemed no longer to provide a 
positive structural context in which to conduct ‘light-touch’, voluntary 
regulation. It also appeared that the government may be prepared to create 
an ambiguous situation regarding the key regulatory goods of industry in the 
PPRS -  free pricing and a quick launch.
5.3.1 Industry’s regulatory goods
One of the benefits for industry within the PPRS was the relatively high initial 
price they could charge for new products (which would then be gradually 
eroded by inflation) and, crucially, the ability to get to market immediately 
following regulatory approval. The powers that the Bill aimed to introduce 
would allow the Secretary of State to set prices directly, seemingly making 
nonsense of the voluntary scheme by removing the assurance of this key 
aspect. However, a major benefit for government -  and an enabler of the 
other features of the regime -  was the overall containment of costs to the 
taxpayer and the Bill showed the government’s determination to enforce this.
If the two sides benefited from different features of the structure of the 
market, then to threaten one of the key aspects that was seen by industry as
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being to its advantage (and which underpinned its acceptance of other 
aspects that were not) could be expected to undermine the equilibrium of the 
government-industry relationship and the policy community. This part of the 
Bill would therefore be a test of the commitment of both sides to the nature of 
the market as it presently existed within the voluntary framework.
The price setting provisions in the Bill were curious. On the one hand, direct 
price setting was something that the PPRS specifically did not do; on the 
other, the clause in the Bill was a reformulation of an existing provision in the 
1977 Health Act581 (repealed by the 1999 Act) and not therefore entirely new. 
But the Bill aimed to introduce two types of price setting. As well as being 
able to set prices directly through clause 28(1 )(a), the Bill would allow the 
Secretary of State to deny price rises for any NHS products, through clause 
26(4)(a).582 The first of these was the most worrying for industry but this was 
the provision that existed in the 1977 Act.
The innovation in this part of the Bill consisted of the other clause -  to deny 
by law price rises of products from companies that are within the PPRS. 
While this was a pragmatic response to the compliance issue, it also marked 
a genuine watershed. One central aspect of the PPRS -  the price cap -  now 
had the force of law; and the scheme, through this provision, was now in part 
a statutory one. However, as this provision ‘shadowed’ the PPRS, its 
significance was in its form rather than its content.
More significant for judging the approach of industry representatives to the 
structure of the market was their reaction to the (unamended) clause 
28(1 )(a). When industry figures first saw the Bill, their reaction was severe. “It 
was outrageous,” commented one. ‘W e  went to the DTI and said to them that 
what we were being presented with was completely unacceptable. We are 
supposed to be entering a negotiation [on the PPRS] and we have been 
presented instead with this draft legislation.”583
581 National Health Service Act 1977, Section 57.
582 House o f Lords Bill number 15, 1998-9
583 Interview, industry executive 9
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5.3.2 Government’s recognition of the industry’s key ‘regulatory goods’
The government did not persist with their clause 26(4)(a). They did recognise 
the gravity of this proposal and the way it would alter the nature of the market 
for industry. Their intention in the simultaneous PPRS negotiations was to 
reinforce, in the new scheme, the skewing of prices to ensure higher prices 
for new products, and this was explicit.584 As the government’s aim in the 
PPRS negotiations was to ensure that the ‘high-prices-for-new-products’ 
principle remained, they would not undermine this in the legislation.
The clause was duly amended to state that this power would not be operable 
for the products of any company signed up to the PPRS. In this way the 
clause moved the overall regulatory framework in favour of the industry: it 
was a clarification of the existing 1977 legislation to specifically exclude 
PPRS signatories, which the ‘emergency’ powers previously did not do.585
Industry’s approach became more congenial as the Bill was amended, but 
the amendment process showed that the government recognised the 
regulatory goods that the PPRS provided for industry -  namely free pricing 
(and relatively higher prices) at launch, as well as the speed to market that 
this facilitated. Any regulatory process required to set prices would very likely 
undermine the speed to market while pricing decisions were made.
The amendment of the Bill dealt specifically with this issue and the final 
version added a clause that prevented the use of the direct price setting 
powers for any company that was a member of the PPRS. The provision for 
a future Secretary of State to limit any prices even for PPRS members was 
therefore removed and along with it the threat to this particular feature of the 
British market, the relatively high launch price and the quick launch. It also 
prevented a clause that may have become a basis for the slowing down of
584 Interview, Government minister 7
585 Interview, DOH civil servant, interviewee 5
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the launch process while a pricing decision was made, depending on how its 
use developed in practice.
5.3.3 Conclusions
The process of the Bill’s passage showed that the government did recognise 
and accept the centrality of industry’s regulatory goods to the PPRS regime. 
The one part of the original Bill that might have threatened these was 
amended to ensure that this did not happen. The government’s aims in the 
Bill were in any case limited and other areas of the Bill sought to reinforce, or 
alternatively did not affect, the central features of the functioning of the 
market through the PPRS.
The otherwise limited nature of the Bill’s provisions is evidence of a 
conservative approach to policy by government in order to maintain the 
features of the scheme that both sides valued. Its chief purpose for the 
government was to make the PPRS work: at a very basic level, the Bill 
sought to reinforce and safeguard the structure of the market by preventing 
selective non-compliance by some companies, which could have undermined 
it, both politically and in its function.
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5.4 The global context
Assumption 2: The global organisation of industry lends it bargaining 
resources it would not otherwise have and makes government more alive to 
the need for an active industrial policy.
Hypothesis 2: Industry will seek to utilise its global structure as a bargaining 
resource to counteract the legal monopoly of government, which in turn will 
pay greater attention to their industrial policy aims.
The Health Bill and amendments to it were argued for in Parliament by 
bringing many of the international features of the industry’s structure and 
operation to bear. The Bill itself may have had serious implications for 
industry in taking one of the more liberal regimes in Europe into a legislative 
framework. Parliamentarians involved in the debate drew on many of the 
characteristics of the global industry to argue for restraint and this had an 
important impact on the resulting outcomes.
5.4.1 Global industry and bargaining resources
Just as the Health Bill was significant for the policy community here because 
it seemed to demonstrate the deployment of the government’s legal authority, 
so the global structure of industry was the principal factor in industry’s 
consideration of how much to employ its primary negotiating resource, the 
threat of disinvestment.
The focus of lobbying to Parliament and of discussions between government 
and industry was that if the atmosphere in the UK turned sour for the sector, 
investments would likely go elsewhere (in reality, the US). While the ‘threat’ 
of legislation had in this case become the reality of it, the industry ‘threat’ of 
disinvestment also had some force behind it. Over the previous decade the
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centre of gravity of the research-based industry had shifted from Europe to 
the US, and on the assembly and manufacturing side, many UK operations 
had shifted to low-tax Ireland.586 The threat was therefore more real than it 
had been in previous times. “Government was quite worried about withdrawal 
of the industry. The industry, especially US firms, were getting a bit rattled by 
what was going on,” said one MP.587
Industry commentators suggested that disinvestment was brought up as an 
issue precisely in response to the decision to legislate, which industry had 
always tried vociferously to avoid: “The danger of disinvestment was a fact 
that was constantly pointed out to the government side. The UK represents 
only a few per cent of the large companies’ markets but the fact is that 
companies tend to do things in those countries that have good operating 
environments.”588 Another industry spokesperson agreed, and cited the fact 
of legislation as an important negative factor: “You are not going to attract 
investment or make the UK an environment where people will want to do 
business in this sector if you impose unnecessary legislation upon them.”589
5.4.2 R&D and the market
The extent to which the operating conditions in the UK market are connected 
to the investment decisions regarding R&D is ambiguous, as two 
Parliamentarians suggested:
“The big pull factors for the industry here are the strength of the UK science 
base and the English language. We have excellent scientists who are also 
far cheaper than anywhere else in Europe and certainly than in the US.”590
“The main thing that attracts them here is actually the quality of research 
labour in the UK because academic salaries are relatively low, especially 
compared with the US. There is a very competitive market for biological
586 See Chapter 1
587 Interview, Parliamentarian 16
588 Interview, industry executive 13
589 Interview, industry executive 11
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scientists. Beyond that there is also a certain critical mass here in the sector
591now and there are benefits in that kind of agglomeration.”
The key issue regarding investment is extremely nuanced. The general 
atmosphere the UK as a place to do business is important and the regulation 
of the UK market in itself may not be functionally connected to R&D but it 
sets the scene and reflects the general attitude of government to industry. 
While the threat of legislation in the form of the Bill was something that 
focused industry minds, equally the threat of disinvestment was taken 
seriously by the government, and this is reflected in the amendments to the 
Bill, which reiterated the freedoms that the PPRS underpinned.
5.4.3 Oversees policy and regulation
The UK may have particular resonance when approaches to policy across 
Europe are compared because it is viewed in general as having achieved a 
successful balance between cost containment and industrial policy aims. 
During the passage of the Health Bill, the importance for industry of 
maintaining this, not for its own sake but as an example to other countries, 
was clear to Parliamentarians. One MP noted: “Their concern is not so much 
about the British market, and not being able to get a good enough return 
there, but the signals that sends to other regulatory schemes, as what the 
British do is often used as a guideline.”592 An industry spokesperson 
concurred: “What sort of signals is that sending out? ... On the whole, in a 
European context, the UK has always been a reasonable place to be and this 
seemed to us to be a very retrograde step.”593
This cross fertilisation of policy has become more widespread as the 
pressures of health costs have deepened across European countries. 
Aspects of the PPRS have been overtly copied by, for example, France and 
Italy in modifying their otherwise very different approaches to regulation.
590 Interview, Parliamentarian 22
591 Interview, Parliamentarian 21
592 Interview, Parliamentarian 16
593 Interview, industry executive 11
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Moreover, the US provided a point of comparison from the other direction: a 
more liberal operating environment. The influence of American executives 
was as an important pressure in all areas of policy, whether the Health Bill, 
the PPRS, or NICE. As one MP put it, “A lot of the people come from the US 
and say, ‘well we can’t advertise to consumers, we don’t have freedom of 
pricing’ and so on. There is a lot of pressure from these US executives.”594
The Health Bill, coinciding as it did with the PPRS negotiations, meant that 
the CEOs, in their meetings with the PM and senior ministers, were able to 
impress upon government at the highest levels their concerns. The way the 
Health Bill was amended, with government backing, showed that the 
arguments were winning through. The ABPI also had to represent the views 
of American companies in its position, and they were instrumental in arriving 
at it.595
5.4.4 Conclusions
The general operating conditions for the industry in the UK was the focus of 
its lobbying. The message was simple: if conditions become sour, investment 
will suffer. Industry suggested legislation would mean disinvestment, 
although this argument was not taken seriously by many politicians active in 
the debates; the conditions for research were seen as far more important.
Nevertheless, the government did take notice of these arguments, which in 
any case were in part about quite nebulous notions of the operating 
environment. American firms were more sensitive to this change of 
atmosphere in the UK, which in part was a cultural attitude. In this sense the 
dynamic structure of the global industry was recognised as a determining 
factor in the structure of government-industry relations. Moreover, the effect 
of what was happening in the UK on other regulatory bodies was a primary
594 Interview, Parliamentarian 16
595 Interview, industry executive 6
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concern of industry, and recognised as so by some of the MPs involved in 
the Bill.
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5.5 The co-operative state
Assumption 3: The ‘liberal’ nature of the British state means there is the 
desire by government for ‘light-touch’ and co-operative regulation using 
limited administrative, technical and legal resources.
Hypothesis 3: Policy proposals that require significant technical, 
administrative and legal resources on the part of government will not be 
pursued, in particular a legislative approach to regulation. They will seek 
maintenance of the co-operative regime.
Scrip magazine commented of the 1999 agreement, “The new PPRS is in 
effect no longer a voluntary scheme.”596 The 1999 Health Bill appeared to 
counter quickly and decisively the assumption underlying the hypothesis that 
government will not pursue a legislative approach to regulation.
5.5.1 The co-operative system and the purpose of the Bill
The Bill appeared to be a major shift in the government’s own assessment of 
its regulatory role and a significant broadening in its array of options for 
reform of the PPRS. It was also, by definition, a change in its position 
regarding co-operation and a voluntary form of regulation. The questions the 
Health Bill raised were whether these apparent shifts in position were 
genuine and substantial; and whether the previous limits to the government’s 
action could now be considered not to apply.
The statutory scheme, if ever used, would represent a significant increase in 
administrative resources. Other aspects of the Bill also gave to government 
the kind of legal backing that would undermine the informal and co-operative 
relationship between government and industry. This begs the question of
596 Scrip No 2457, 23 July 1999 p.4
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whether the Health Bill indicated that the government was willing to deploy 
the resources to define, introduce, implement and police statutory regulation 
of medicine purchases.
The non-compliance from some companies suggested that the co-operative 
relationship had already been undermined by their actions. The Bill was 
aimed at overcoming what the Secretary of State had described as the 
“shortcomings in the PPRS”.597 The Bill must be seen in the context of the 
government’s determination in the PPRS negotiations to tighten up parts of 
the scheme. The clauses in the Health Bill served as a reminder to the 
industry that they were serious about this task. The Bill provided a good 
bargaining chip in the formally separate negotiations over the new scheme.
Furthermore, there were statutory provisions already in existence for the 
direct imposition of prices on medicines, present in the 1977 Health Service 
Act. These in turn were the descendants of wartime special powers (see 
5.5.5). The Act provided an opportunity to update these and make them 
relevant, rather than to introduce new powers. It enabled these powers to be 
specifically directed at companies to whom the PPRS did not apply.598
These four points suggest that the Bill cannot easily be presented as 
evidence of the government’s willingness to undertake comprehensive 
statutory regulation of the industry. In summary, the four points are:
1. Specific purpose related to existing regime, i.e. compliance
2. Limited use of the law
3. A bargaining chip in the PPRS negotiations
4. Clarification of existing law
5.5.2 Compliance
The years leading up to the PPRS negotiations and the Health Bill were 
marked by a period of non-compliance with the PPRS by several
597 Scrip No 2432,28 April 1999, p.4.
598 See Scrip No 2455, 16 July 1999, p.2.
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companies.599 Most of the companies concerned were small but one was a 
large multinational; and while the sums involved were not great, they were 
nevertheless significant for the drugs budget and could potentially become 
larger still. The Bill was presented in these terms to the industry. A senior 
politician explained the government’s position:
“We thought that the statutory back-up to the scheme was necessary 
because there was an increasing number of mavericks who were not willing 
to comply. There were two aspects to that. One was that it was costing 
money -  £30 to £40 million a year; and secondly, if major companies were 
allowed to get away with it then the more reputable ones would start 
questioning their agreement to the voluntary arrangement in the face of non- 
compliance by their major competitors.”600
Hence the law was being used because the co-operative relationship was 
seen to be failing. If the scheme was not fulfilling its purposes for the DOH, 
questions were bound to be raised about what the government and tax payer 
were getting out of it. Second, because there was in fact still a co-operative 
relationship between government and most of the industry, there were large 
parts of the industry that were themselves alarmed at the non-compliance by, 
in particular, the large multinational firm. This meant that the government’s 
finding of a solution to the problem was something the majority of firms were 
happy, in principle, to support. As one put it, “There were certainly parts of 
industry that were aggrieved that other parts of industry had been profiting 
from not playing the game and therefore would join the government in finding 
a way to solve the problem.”601 It was understood that the non-compliance by 
industry was the root cause of the need to legislate: “W e only have ourselves 
to blame as an industry for that because we could not discipline our members 
to come into line,” noted another industry commentator.602
599 See also Chapters 2 & 4
600 Interview, Government minister 7; Figures also quoted by Baroness Hayman, Health Bill Debate. 
Hansard, House o f Lords, 1 March 1999
601 Interview, industry executive 13
602 Interview, industry executive 3
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The reasons for the DOH’s recourse to legislation, while not welcomed by 
industry, were understood by the majority of firms and its purpose, if not its 
form, was welcomed to a degree. Rather than evidence that government felt 
capable of initiating a new legalistic framework, the use of legal instruments 
can be seen as a successful outcome of the relationship that existed 
between the two sides and as an accepted means of preventing it from 
deteriorating inexorably.
5.5.3 Limited use of the law
There are two separate aspects to the legislation that was proposed in the 
Health Bill. One aimed to come into operation only when the voluntary 
arrangement had failed or been reneged upon; the other was to confer 
powers that would be directly related to the PPRS and which would derive 
their content from it and enforce certain aspects of it, such as the price 
capping mechanism (present in all schemes since 1957). The Bill also 
enabled the Secretary of State to strike a company from the PPRS (in the 
Act, with stated reasons and a right of appeal) and for prices to be imposed 
directly (at first, even on companies that had signed up to the PPRS but in 
the Act, only on those not part of it).
The limited scope of the law served to emphasise rather than contradict the 
point that government would not wish to design and implement legislation 
that would achieve their complex aims on its own, and, crucially, within a 
context of adversity and ill-will between government and industry. The Bill 
proposed quite loose legislation that could not work except alongside the 
PPRS. There was no pressure to legislate with detailed perfection because of 
the existence of the “voluntary scheme” to which much of the Bill referred 
directly on many occasions. Indeed, the whole framing of the Bill relied on the 
presence of a voluntary PPRS, and the clauses would have been vacuous in 
its absence.
Said one MP, “With a statutory scheme alone, there would be a huge amount 
of work and they would have to get it right. Government would certainly worry
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about that.”603 The present government has, he added, been very keen not 
use the law to regulate complex industries: “if you look at the genetic and 
insurance industries they [the present government] are very keen on 
voluntary agreements. They’re not very keen on statutory moratoriums on the 
use of genetic testing, for example.” The implication is that over the course of 
the post-war period in which the VPRS/PPRS has existed, the present 
government were rather less keen on statutory regulation than many of its 
predecessors and unlikely to opt for a legal framework. Another 
Parliamentarian (Lords opposition) agreed, “The government do not want to 
have to face the prospect of a statutory scheme if they can possibly avoid
»604
The broad principles in the Bill are more important than the detail because 
the law would not apply to companies in the PPRS, and the content of the 
law when enacted would be defined by the detail of the PPRS. Those parts of 
the industry that were compliant with the PPRS would not need to worry 
about the legislation and the government did not have to focus on the 
minutiae of the law because they did not intend, ordinarily, to use it.
Indeed in the end the Bill itself had the character of an agreement between 
government and industry. Ironically, to a degree it was itself an additional 
aspect of their informal relationship. One member of the Lords commented, 
“What one would have to recognise is that government wouldn’t be too keen 
on putting something forward that they thought there was widespread 
opposition to. They wouldn’t bring it forward until they had basically got the 
industry broadly in agreement with what they wanted to do.”605 Another 
concurred that in the end, “the effect of the Act is not to end the voluntary 
nature of the PPRS.”606 The Act became one feature of the landscape of their 
co-operative relationship -  a legal dimension to an otherwise voluntary 
arrangement.
603 Interview, Parliamentarian 16
604 Interview, Parliamentarian 18
605 Interview, Parliamentarian 21
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5.5.4 Bargaining chip
As the process of debating and amending the Health Bill coincided with the 
PPRS negotiations, the Bill became a de facto issue in the progress of those 
negotiations. Although officially a quite separate process, the politicians 
debating the Health Bill were aware of the concurrent negotiations and there 
was a widespread feeling among them that the DOH were using the Bill in its 
original form to show that it ‘meant business’ and would be prepared to go 
down the statutory route if necessary, if it did not achieve its aims in the 
negotiations. “It brought this through at this time because of the PPRS 
negotiations that were taking place. The government wanted the statutory 
scheme there purely to increase its bargaining power in the negotiations,” 
said one MP active in proposing amendments in Committee.607
In his view, the government’s foray into the statutory field was not one they 
wanted to go very far. Rather, a principal purpose of it was to assist in the 
negotiations over the new scheme. “There’s always an element of bluff. If 
they could get what they wanted anyway without a statutory approach then 
they wouldn’t go down that road,” he said.608
All Parliamentarians interviewed expressed the same view about the 
concurrence of the Bill and the negotiations:
“The government were quite clearly using the Bill as part of their broader 
negotiations with industry.”609
“It was really all part of a negotiating ploy on the part of government because 
they wanted to have some kind of stick to hit the industry with. They 
undoubtedly were negotiating on both fronts simultaneously and success on 
one front would be reflected in the attitudes on the other.”610
606 Interview, Parliamentarian 18
607 Interview, Parliamentarian 16
608 Interview, Parliamentarian 16
609 Interview, Parliamentarian 20
610 Interview, Parliamentarian 21
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“It was perfectly clear that while these issues were being debated under the 
Health Bill, the negotiations were also going on. We certainly got the 
impression that the government felt the Bill was helpful to them in relation to 
the negotiations, although they didn’t say so explicitly.”611
Although a specific link was not made, the government did allude to the 
political purpose of the Bill, according to one member of the Lords: “Although 
there was no direct mention of trade-offs between what was done on the Bill 
and what happened in the negotiations, the minister did refer to the PPRS 
constantly.”612 The ‘proof of its specific purpose during 1999 was, for one 
Parliamentarian, that “we have not heard a squeak about any sort of statutory 
power since the PPRS was signed. It was a useful sword to hang over their 
head.”613
Furthermore, while many within the industry may have appreciated the 
purpose of the government’s aims and the background to them, legislation 
was by no means seen in a positive light in itself, and very definitely seen as 
a means of forcing issues in the negotiations. One industry spokesperson 
called it “blackmail; we were being asked to negotiate the new PPRS with our 
hands tied behind our backs.”614 Another said that the Bill was used by the 
government quite openly in the PPRS negotiations: “They had the big stick -  
the threat of the Health Bill -  and the civil servants kept mentioning the stick 
throughout the negotiations.”615
If the first rendering of the Bill was indeed, as many people suggested, a 
weapon in the PPRS negotiations, then again it cannot be seen as a serious 
attempt by the government to change the status quo and build a new type of 
regulatory regime in which a more legalistic and formalised (not to say 
adversarial) relationship between government and industry would operate. 
Rather it can be seen in part as a timely bluff. The government fashioned a
611 Interview, Parliamentarian 22
612 Interview, Parliamentarian 21
613 Interview, Parliamentarian 18
614 Interview, industry executive 9
615 Interview, industry executive 13
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Bill that was far more stringent than they intended the final Act to be and 
amendments would be (informally) conditional on progress in the PPRS 
negotiations. A senior DOH civil servant confirmed the effectiveness of the 
Bill in focusing industry minds in the negotiations: “The industry were trying 
not to listen to us and it was only when the Health Bill was published in 
October that they realised we were serious. Then they went berserk and they 
went AWOL.”616
5.5.5 Clarification of existing law
Equally significant for an analysis of the purpose of the Bill was its 
clarification of existing law. The provisions to control prices directly were an 
update of clauses from the 1977 Health Act.617 This Act had incorporated 
some provisions more or less directly from the Defence of the Realm Act 
(‘DORA’)618 of 1914, which had allowed sweeping price setting powers for 
Secretaries of State, and they were considered too crude to be of any use 
(see 2.3.1). The relationship between the PPRS (i.e. companies that agreed 
to it) and these laws was not explicit. So the 1999 Act clarified that 
relationship and made the 1977 laws applicable and useable. “There was a 
lot of tidying up done in the 1999 Act; the powers in it were not all new,” said 
a DOH civil servant.619
The 1977 schedules, which enabled the Secretary of State to control the 
prices of any medicinal product directly by order, were repealed as part of the 
1999 Act. In this sense, the 1999 Act in fact limited the basis of statutory 
price control powers to specific circumstances, defined in the context of the 
PPRS. The government considered the 1977 powers “too crude” to be of any 
use. Industry now had these powers defined clearly in a way that took into 
account both its and government’s rights and obligations. Industry accepted 
this particular function of the Bill, as those previous powers had always hung
616 Interview, DOH civil servant 10.
617 National Health Service Act 1977, Section 57.
618 The Act o f 1914 gave the war time government wide ranging powers over, among other things, the 
media, the legal system and the economy. Many aspects o f the Act survived in various forms until 
long after the second world war.
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ambiguously in the background. One commented about it: “The Act sets into 
law the concept of a voluntary agreement. Other powers in the Act are in fact 
reformulations of existing powers.”620
5.5.6 Conclusions
The clauses of the Health Bill had a specific purpose directly related to the 
existing regime -  it aimed to solve a particular problem of compliance -  i.e. a 
failure in the co-operative regime that was acknowledged industry 
representatives. Hence, the legal provisions it did propose were delimited by 
the PPRS or directly modelled on it: it only proposed a new legal framework 
where the voluntary one had broken down. It was used, too, as a bargaining 
resource for the government in the PPRS negotiations. Furthermore, there 
were aspects of the Bill that in fact already existed in legislative form, but in 
an inappropriate way.
The clauses of the Health Act did not create statutory provisions that would 
be the norm but rather an enforcement mechanism. It would serve to ensure 
that companies negotiated the scheme in good faith and kept their side of an 
otherwise legally unenforceable agreement. It was, therefore, linked into the 
existing regime -  the PPRS -  and sought to provide a framework for it. The 
Act, with its important amendments, did not undermine the essentially co­
operative relationship, although it can be characterised as ‘negotiated 
compliance’ given the mixture of statutory and voluntary means that were 
employed to achieve an agreement on the PPRS.
The ABPI expressed its contentment with the final clauses and emphasised 
that the final Act reinforced the voluntary nature of the PPRS.621 The passage 
of the Bill tested the extent to which both sides valued the co-operative form 
of regulation and proved that this was valued highly by both sides.
619 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
620 Interview, industry executive 6
621 Scrip No 2453, 9 July 1999, p.3
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5.6 The role of Parliament
Assumption 4: Parliament has a peripheral role in this policy field and does 
not constitute a veto point or external influence on the policy community.
Hypothesis 4: Parliament will not be an influential actor in determining policy 
outcomes, which in turn will be reflected in the limited direct attention to it by 
both government and industry.
The basic nature of the British Parliament and of the relationship between the 
legislative and executive branches is important in the debate about its role in 
regulating the industry. As one MP made clear, objective debate about 
individual points can be secondary to the normal dynamics of the British 
Parliament. Even where points are strongly and convincingly argued, the 
government majority can usually be relied upon. “Basically, the government 
hate conceding to opposition members and this is the only reason that our 
major points failed to be taken on board. We had him [John Denham, the 
Minister of State] on the back foot but the government can never accept it’s 
wrong or accept our views,” he said.622 Another Parliamentarian noted the 
general lack of legislative accountability in the British system:
“In this country the power of the executive has increased and ought to be 
diminished. We need to see Parliament being much more effective in holding 
the executive to account, which requires moving in the direction of the 
separation of powers. The problem is, we effectively have a presidential 
system combined with a government with a large majority in the Commons, 
and this means an elective dictatorship.”623
622 Interview, Parliamentarian 16
623 Interview, Parliamentarian 21
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5.6.1 Parliament and the PPRS
These are general points about the limitation of Parliament’s role in the 
legislative process. The PPRS is peculiarly embedded in the executive and 
Parliament would appear to have even less of a role than in many other 
policy areas. But the Health Bill appeared to challenge that marginalisation. 
First, it gave an overt role to Parliament in regulating the industry; and 
second, amendments to the Bill would appear to suggest that there were 
good contacts between industry and Parliamentarians that could ensure its 
voice was heard. Industry seemed to regard it as an important Veto point’.
5.6.2 Parliament and the legislative agenda
Parliament had been an important player in determining the agenda for the 
Health Bill. The relevant clauses of the Bill had been influenced by the 
scrutiny that Parliament had undertaken of the PPRS over preceding years. 
The highlighting of the compliance issue; the work of the Select Committee 
and its emphasis on transparency; and the subsequent Reports to Parliament 
that showed the inefficiency of the PPRS Branch’s work. All of these factors 
were central to defining the ‘1999 agenda’, which underpinned both the 
PPRS negotiations and the contents of the Health Bill (see 4.10.2).
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5.6.3 Parliament and the process of negotiations
The discontent shown by many Parliamentarians with their limited role in 
general was illustrated by the passage of the Health Bill in so far as there 
were a large number of amendments tabled, which were largely well argued 
by their proposers and supporters, but which failed to be accepted into the 
final form of the Bill. But as well as the large number of failed amendments, 
those that did succeed represented radical changes in the Bill: its final form 
was vastly different from its initial rendering, in ways that were important for 
the industry.
The key changes were the specification that a company signed up to the 
PPRS could not have a statutory scheme imposed on it; and that where a 
company was removed from the PPRS, there would be some right of appeal. 
These were government amendments. They were introduced through the 
Lords by Baroness Hayman and they were the result of discussion between 
the Department of Health and representatives of industry (see Chapter 4).
But the limited role of Parliament in the amendment process can be qualified: 
because other amendments were made, introduced by the opposition, that 
were not without significance. Earl Howe, an opposition member of the Lords, 
initially introduced the amendment that exempted PPRS signatories from 
price setting powers, although it was taken up by the government (and 
became clause 34(2) in the Act); and amendments were made in the 
Commons that required the Secretary of State to give notice and reasons for 
removing a company from the PPRS, and requirements for consultation 
where information is sought from companies.
The changes made to the Bill were in part the result of industry lobbying of 
Parliament, as well as ‘behind the scenes’ discussion between industry and 
the Department. Furthermore, so far as the Bill was a bargaining chip for the 
DOH in the PPRS negotiations, amendments have to be seen in the context 
of the government’s true intentions and the possibility that amendments to
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the Bill were intended once they had achieved agreement on the new 
scheme.
Table 5.1: Amendments carried, Health Act 1999
Nature of amendment Location in 
Act
Introduced
in
The Secretary of State must give written notice 
to a manufacturer that the PPRS no longer 
applies.
33(4) Lords
Secretary of state must give reasons for 
removing a company from the PPRS.
33(5) Commons
A company must be given the opportunity to 
make representations when it is removed from 
the PPRS (a right of appeal).
33(5) Lords
There must be consultation with the industry 
body before the Secretary of State can require 
the submission of information from companies.
33(7) Commons
The price limiting regulation cannot apply to a 
company signed up to the PPRS.
34(2) Lords
A statutory scheme may not apply to any 
manufacturer to whom a voluntary scheme 
applies.
35(7) Lords
Companies will have a right of appeal against 
enforcement decisions.
37(5) Lords
Any regulations made under this section must 
be consulted on with the industry body.
37(9) Lords
In exercising the various powers contained in 
the Bill, the Secretary of State must bear in 
mind the importance of the need for medical 
products to be available for the NHS and the 
costs of R&D.
38(4) Lords
5.6.4 Parliament and industry lobbying
Several industry representatives noted the importance of their parliamentary 
contacts in getting significant amendments incorporated into the Health Bill. 
They were in no doubt that their parliamentary contacts played an important 
role in their success in getting discussion of the Bill and changes made to it.
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“We did have a lot of support over the changes we felt we had to sponsor in 
the Health Bill. We got a lot of co-operation from various figures in both 
Houses.”624
“Parliament was absolutely crucial. There was no question that industry 
lobbying of Parliament was a significant factor in enabling us to achieve 
some considerable successes in getting changes in the Health Bill. If you 
compare the original Bill with that which was eventually passed into law, 
there were very significant differences. Making sure that key, relevant MPs 
were on-side was a very important part of the strategy.”625
A traditional perception on the part of industry that its support was mainly on 
the Conservative benches626 could be qualified to some degree by support 
for the value of the industry voiced from all parties during the second reading 
in the Commons.627 Indeed, this was an opportunity to influence the now 
important Labour benches and the perception of the industry is less defined 
by party divisions than in the past.628
Limited industry influence
However, the extent to which MPs and Lords felt they were influenced -  or in 
contact with -  the industry gives a more varied picture. Indeed a few 
Parliamentarians with health portfolios and significant parts to play in 
discussion on the Bill noted an absence of industry lobbying. One MP active 
on the health policy field commented, “I didn’t get lots of people coming to 
see me. I would have had no qualms about being lobbied much more.”629 He 
added that the content of the amendments he proposed were not the result of 
any liaison with or even information from industry: “I drafted the clauses of 
my amendments myself, with no help from industry.” An active participant in
624 Interview, industry executive 13
625 Interview, industry executive 03
626 See for example the ABPI (1995)
627 Scrip No 2432,28 April 1999, p.4.
628 Interview, industry executive 6
629 Interview, Parliamentarian 16
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the debate in the Lords concurred: “I received very few representations from 
industry through the whole passage of the Bill.”630 Becoming somewhat of a 
running theme, another MP and former health minister commented: “Industry 
made no representation to me on any of these issues. When issues of 
prescribing were being legislated on, with great implications for the 
pharmaceutical industry, I received no representations either.”631
Records for both Houses show that very few MPs and Peers participated in 
the debates. In the Commons Standing Committee, government MPs served 
only a ‘vote fodder’ role, without a single contribution from anyone other than 
the minister. They voted down well-argued amendments that the Minister of 
State had had difficulty arguing against and seemingly without understanding 
the implications of what they were voting on. In an area as technical and 
complex as the PPRS, it would appear that many did not have a sufficient 
grip of the issues at stake. One MP and member of the standing committee 
referred to this specifically: “Because this hasn’t really come before 
Parliament in any detailed way before, there were very few MPs who knew 
what the PPRS actually was. I had to have it explained to me and I never 
really got into the detail. I would have liked to have seen a working example.” 
The missed opportunities for industry lobbying were, it seems, extensive. 
“The pharmaceutical industry do not lobby as hard as they could -  they have 
a bit of a ‘chip on their shoulder’ type attitude about it, I think.”632
Information
However, not all agreed that industry had not briefed Parliamentarians 
sufficiently: “There was certainly a great deal of information sent by industry 
to MPs and Peers during the debates on the Bill,” noted one peer. 
Furthermore, the views of some that industry was not as active as it might 
have been may be explained by the focus of their lobbying: “The main links 
industry had were with the Conservatives. They were being briefed directly
630 Interview, Parliamentarian 20
631 Interview, Parliamentarian 12
632 Interview, Parliamentarian 16
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by the ABPI. They were feeding directly into the Conservative position,” 
noted one Parliamentarian.633
The Conservative opposition explained that they had had industry backing in 
arriving at their position: “The amendments that I tabled in the Bill were 
drafted by the ABPI and I was also sent supporting notes for each 
amendment. I remained in close touch with the ABPI throughout the passage 
of the Bill.”634
The direct contact between industry and the executive meant that there was 
a two pronged approach by industry to its lobbying. The process of 
examining the Bill by industry representatives and feeding back their 
concerns to government was the route of much of the reviewing process from 
the original draft to the final form of the Bill. “There would have been 
enormous input from industry at the time of the Green and White consultation 
papers. They would have made it clear to government what they didn’t like.” 
This was borne out by a leading participant:
“I raised the detailed concerns that they [the ABPI] had in committee. To my 
surprise Baroness Hayman capitulated and it made me think there’d been an 
awful lot of work going on behind the scenes between the industry and the 
Department. ... I didn’t know when I got to my feet that I was pushing against 
an open door but that became very clear to me afterwards.”635
Nevertheless, the parliamentary angle was still important: “Although it was in 
direct contact with government, industry knew that it would be more effective 
there if it got amendments down in Parliament for the government to respond 
to and that’s what they did, working through the Conservative benches. Most 
of their input at that stage was through getting amendments laid.”636
633 Interview, Parliamentarian 21
633 Interview, Parliamentarian 18 
635 Interview, Parliamentarian 18
634 Interview, Parliamentarian 21
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Importantly, the industry could claim to have limited the applicability of the 
scheme -  one of the central amendments -  through it’s contacts with 
Parliamentarians, as some of the important amendments taken up by the 
government were laid by opposition members that they had lobbied, including 
the limitation of price limiting regulation to companies not part of the PPRS.
5.6.5 Conclusions
The passage of the Health Bill demonstrates an ambiguous role for 
Parliament over the PPRS. As legislation, it inevitably included Parliament in 
the PPRS policy community in a way that it had not been before. But the 
legislation did not give Parliament any ‘governance’ role in the PPRS. Rather, 
it set out further powers for the Secretary of State, even entrenching further 
the role of the executive in this area.
The process of the Bill’s passage did not show an entirely successful 
relationship between industry and Parliament. It cannot be said that industry 
directed no attention to Parliamentarians or that it did not have some 
productive contacts. The non-government amendments could not have 
happened if there had not been such contacts. The principal mover of 
amendments said so explicitly. But it remains that the most important 
amendments were concessions from government, agreed between them and 
industry outside of the parliamentary arena. It would appear that there was 
some potential gain to be had from further communications with and lobbying 
of Parliamentarians, not least on the government side, which industry failed 
to act on.
Industry valued greatly the amendments to the Bill but their lobbying of 
Parliament can be seen as supplementary to their lobbying of government. 
The intention of the government to make concessions on the Bill in so far as 
they were using it as a bargaining chip in the PPRS negotiations also 
qualified the extent to which Parliament could play any meaningful role.
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The extent of any ‘success’ of the lobbying of Parliament must be measured 
against the extent of the government’s flexibility over the Bill, which has been 
shown to have been ample. The link between the Bill and the PPRS 
negotiations remained an important one. The evidence is that both routes 
were used.
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5.7 Role of the Department of Health
Assumption 5: The siting of an industrial policy function within the 
Department of Health gives DOH authority and competence to act and 
highlights the government’s industrial policy aims, enabling a co-operative 
regime.
Hypothesis 5: The dual role of the DOH will prove decisive in defining policy 
and maintaining the co-operative regime by counteracting the procurement 
focus of the Treasury.
The Health Bill was a blow to the policy community and no more so than 
because the proposals to legislate and create provisions for a statutory 
regulation scheme were designed by the Department that possessed the 
formal sponsorship responsibility for the industry. The clauses suggested to 
the industry that the sponsorship function was not a guarantee of a balanced 
PPRS. The Bill also gave an opportunity for a wider group of people to 
analyse and discuss the compatibility of the two roles of purchaser and 
sponsor residing in the same department.
5.7.1 The parliamentary process
Although the sponsorship role was not central to the discussion of the Health 
Bill in Parliament, opposition MPs did discuss it in the Commons Committee 
stage. While the general principle that the purchasing department should not 
be the sponsoring department was discussed, particular emphasis was given 
to the anomaly of a customer having formal regulatory powers. “It is deeply 
unsatisfactory for the Department of Health, as a customer, to enter into 
contractual relations with a supplier, which it seeks to underpin with statutory 
arrangements.”637
637 House o f Commons Standing Committee A (pt 9) 18 May 1999, Mr Hammond.
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The Liberal Democrats had been central to introducing the idea of shifting the 
sponsorship function on the basis of a fundamental conflict of interest (i.e. 
regardless of the particulars of the Health Bill), and potentially against the 
interests of the tax payer, as well possibly of industry. Amendments were 
tabled to this effect, with the Liberal Democrats proposing in both the Lords 
and in Committee in the Commons that the DOH sponsorship function be 
moved to Trade and Industry, in the event of a statutory scheme being 
applied.638 Conservative Party representatives such a Philip Hammond 
seemed to see this role, in light of the Bill, as one that may be against the 
interests of industry. The pharmaceutical industry, he noted, shared with the 
defence industries the “dubious privilege of falling under a sponsoring 
Department that is also its biggest customer.”639
But politicians were equivocal in their views about the role of the DOH. One 
commented that “there are civil servants in the Department of Health who 
think the pharmaceutical industry are just robber barons out to fleece the 
NHS.” Nevertheless, he continued, “I think there is a basic virtue in 
separating the purchaser from the regulator in this context.”640 Some 
Parliamentarians therefore continued to judge the role in terms of a conflict of 
interest rather than a need to fuse divergent policy aims.
The passage of the Bill and the way in which amendments were adopted or 
pre-empted by the government suggests that the sponsorship role was a 
factor in the DOH’s toning down of its original proposals, once progress was 
being achieved in the PPRS negotiations. As the department responsible for 
the Bill, the DOH’s role counted in favour of industry. Its concern to reach a 
‘balanced’ PPRS settlement meant that it was open to major changes of 
emphasis and of provisions in the Bill in order to maintain the co-operative 
policy community necessary for that purpose.
638 House o f Commons Standing Committee A (pt 9) 18 May 1999, Government Amendment 216.
639 House o f Commons Standing Committee A (pt 9) 18 May 1999, Mr Hammond.
640 Interview, Parliamentarian 18
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5.7.2 The view of industry
From the perspective of the industry, the Bill, published at the time of the 
beginning of the PPRS negotiations, came as a shock to executives and 
made them question the position the Department had taken. Regarding the 
PPRS negotiations in light of the Health Bill, one commented:
“When we heard about the legislation, we didn’t know what they were going 
to do and this obviously makes you question the role of the Department as 
one that’s meant also to have the industry’s interests in mind.”641
Any questions over the DOH’s sponsorship role from industry’s point of view 
were settled by the amendments which required that the new statutory 
powers could only be used in relation to a non-signatory to the PPRS. The 
longer-term support for the DOH as sponsoring department was re­
established (see Chapter 4). The amendment to change the role fell. Some of 
those speaking in favour of the amendment felt it was one that would help 
industry, though possibly in the absence of detailed knowledge of how the 
function works in relation to all the industry’s concerns and the role the DTI 
remains able to play. One MP commented: “There would be conflict between 
two cabinet ministers, whereas at the moment the DTI doesn’t have a role. It 
would in my view be helpful to industry but industry say they don’t want it.”642
Indeed there was no specific pressure from industry to move the sponsorship 
function. There was a proposal to shift sponsorship to the DTI where any 
statutory scheme was instituted by the Secretary of State (which became 
irrelevant when this competence was limited by amendment) but these 
proposals did not originate from Parliamentarians who had been lobbied on 
the issue by industry.
The Bill had been an important event for industry spokespersons. 
Traditionally industry had supported the function remaining within the DOH
641 Interview, industry executive 9
642 Interview, Parliamentarian 16
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because they viewed it as improving the breadth of understanding of the 
industry within the very Department that made the important procurement 
decisions. The introduction of the Bill led some to query that role because it 
gave rise to the question of how the sponsoring department could devise 
draft legislation that the industry saw as counter to its long-term interests -  by 
creating legal provisions that would be at the disposal of all future Secretaries 
of State for Health, when the pressures of budgets and so forth could not be 
known. But even the DTI itself saw any protestations from industry about the 
function remaining in the DOH as tactical rather than strategic: the transfer of 
the function to the DTI is something that “chief executives raise from time to 
time, when there’s something they’re very hot under the collar about,” said a 
DTI official.643
5.7.3 Conclusions
Although the industry were confounded by the Department’s initial legislative 
proposals, they took them in large part to be a bargaining chip in the PPRS 
negotiations and once amendments were made in the Bill to take account of 
their concerns, they no longer saw the Department as overtly hostile. The re­
establishment of the co-operative relationship and the positive aspects (for 
industry) of the PPRS were evidence enough of a department that took its 
sponsorship role seriously.
Parliamentarians had mixed views of the role but this was not a direct issue 
in the Bill and discussion of it was confined to one Liberal Democrat 
amendment that was not carried.
The dual role of the Department was a central feature of the direct linkage 
between amendments to the Bill and the progress of the PPRS negotiations 
and so although the initial Bill gave rise to questions over its exercise of this 
role, its successful amendment to re-establish the largely amicable
643 Interview, DTI civil servant 1
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relationship between government and industry in a co-operative policy 
community was also a result of its broad competence over all areas of policy.
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The historic balance of aims in pharmaceutical price regulation was set out 
clearly by the Secretary of State for Health, Virginia Bottomley, in an article in 
The Times more than a year ahead of the expected date of a new PPRS 
agreement, in January 1992. She extolled the success of the industry and the 
need to support it while noting that government must consider the market 
from the point of view of the taxpayer. The means of achieving this balance 
was also made clear: “We want to move forward in partnership with industry,” 
she said.644
6.1 Political background to the negotiations
Despite the Secretary of State’s conciliatory declaration, the government 
seemingly press-released an intention to reduce the spend on the 
pharmaceutical budget early in 1993645 -  something that would be achieved 
through both the new PPRS and the extension of the Selected List of 
medicines on Schedule 10, prohibited from NHS prescription.
A debate about the merits of the industry, the PPRS and the positions that 
ought to be taken in the negotiations was carried out through the press. The 
government was encouraged to drive a ‘hard bargain’ following significant 
price increases in the drugs budget in recent years.646 On the government 
side, there were leaks to the press about the operation of the scheme, which 
was said by a former department of health official to enable company lawyers 
and accountants to “run rings” round his team of officials.647
The long duration of the 1986 scheme is explained in part by the timing of the 
general election. Ordinarily the scheme would have been negotiated in 1991, 
after five years, but the election was looming. Following the general election
644 The Times 27 January 1992
645 The Guardian 27 January 1993
646 The Financial Times 23 December 1992
647 The Guardian 13 April 1993
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of 1992, the scheme quickly appeared on the Department’s agenda. “My 
understanding was that a renegotiation had already been agreed. I inherited 
a situation with an expectation of an imminent renegotiation,” a senior DOH 
politician commented.648 Neither side forced a renegotiation overtly. From the 
government’s perspective, a senior civil servant commented, “There was no 
overwhelming drive from the government side for renegotiating the 
scheme.”649 The negotiations were expected by both sides and agreed 
mutually.
Despite the public airing of positions, the negotiations took place in a 
reasonably amicable atmosphere. One pharmaceutical executive said at the 
time, “There is quite a lot of goodwill. W e hope to conclude the negotiations 
over the next few weeks, although there is still quite a gap between what we 
want and the Department’s proposals.”650 Industry had made clear that it was 
not opposing the PPRS and was happy to renegotiate the scheme, which 
could achieve positive things for both sides.651 However, the negotiations ran 
in parallel with other significant issues for the industry and there were specific 
areas of concern for the negotiating parties. There were concerns about both 
procurement and industrial policy aims for the government and about 
proliferating regulation from industry.
The issue of the Selected (or ‘Limited’) List focused attention on issues of 
drug costs; concurrently, the Medicines Information Bill was introduced into 
Parliament as a Private Members Bill, sponsored by Giles Radice MP, a 
Labour (opposition) backbencher. There was an intertwining of these various 
discussions with the PPRS in government, industry and Parliament.
64:8 Irterview, Government minister 17
649 Irterview, DOH civil servant 27.
65(0 Tie Financial Times, 10 May 1993
651 Strip No 1778, 11 December 1992, p.4.
256
Chapter 6: 1993 PPRS
6.2 Changes in the scheme in 1993
The major clause of the 1993 scheme -  a success for government and an 
unwelcome reality for industry -  was a 2.5% price cut, across-the-board, on 
NHS sales. There was a tightening of some aspects of the scheme that 
industry also disliked. Other areas were altered in line with industry wishes, 
as well as the Department’s own analysis of the scheme, which showed 
areas of anomaly and perverse incentives. The principal features of the new 
scheme were:652
■ A price cut of 2.5% for three years across all products sold by a company 
to the NHS.
■ The ‘grey area’ in the ROC allowance was replaced by a ‘Margin of 
Tolerance’ (MOT) of 25% in either direction. This meant that a company 
could not apply for a price increase until its profits on NHS business fell to 
25% under their permitted ROC, or that no refund was available to the 
Department until a company’s profits rose to 25% above its ROC.
■ The threshold for companies to submit full AFRs was raised from £4 
million to £20 million, meaning less paper work for many more smaller 
companies. They would now only have to submit audited accounts, 
stating turnover and the proportion of NHS to non-NHS business.
■ Recognition of some fixed costs of UK manufacture. The purpose of this 
was to increase the amount of costs allocated to UK production to 
alleviate the ‘export disincentive’ (this refers to the disincentive to 
companies to increase exports as the apparent input costs of domestic 
sales will decrease and profits from NHS sales be reduced -  see 2.3.7).
■ A new provision for taking some drugs out of the PPRS where genuine 
price competition can be demonstrated.
■ The ROC was held at the range 17-21%.
■ No change was made in the promotional allowance.
652 Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin (December 1993), pp. 103-4; Scrip No 1847, 17 August 1993, 
pp.2-3; Department o f Health (1993).
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The agreement was endorsed by both parties on 26 August 1993 and the 
scheme came into effect on 1 October 1993, to run for five years.653
Table 6.1: Principal changes in the 1993 PPRS
Item 1986 1993
ROC range Negotiation within a “published 
range”
17-21%
MOT / grey area 50% of target profit, either way; 
except in year of price increase
25% of target profit, either way; 
except in year of price increase
Promotional
allowance
To be set as a % total industry 
sales to NHS then divided among 
companies in agreement with 
ABPI. In addition, £500K p.a. per 
NCE, for 2 years after 
introduction.
6% of sales plus £400K fixed 
amount per company, plus 
varying product servicing 
allowances of £100K, £50K, £40K 
and £30K per product.
R&D allowance Negotiated with each company, 
according to average industry 
spend, company’s UK 
investments, the company’s 
global R&D spend as % sales.
Negotiated with each company, 
according to average industry 
spend, company’s UK 
investments, the company’s 
global R&D spend as % sales.
AFR submission 
thresholds
<£500K sales to NHS, no 
financial info required
$500K-£4m audited accounts but 
no AFR required
>£4m full AFR required
<£1m sales to NHS, no financial 
info required
$1m-£20m audited accounts but 
no AFR required
>£20m full AFR required
Apportionment of 
capital costs
Recognition by DHSS of 
imperfection of dividing capital 
employed between home and 
export sales; agreement to 
discuss with industry.
Provision for additional info to be 
provided by companies with AFR 
to consider modifications to 
division of capital employed.
Contribution to 
economy
Specific reference (para 4.6) as 
basis of negotiations on target 
ROR; also one factor in 
agreement on promotional 
allowance.
Specific reference (para 4.6) as 
basis of negotiations on target 
ROR; also one factor in 
agreement on promotional 
allowance.
New products Free pricing; profits can be kept to 
top limit of grey area
Free pricing; profits can be kept to 
top limit of MOT
General ‘grey areas’ Several ‘grey areas’ for 
negotiations between company 
and DHSS, including over target 
ROR and promotional allowance.
Several ‘grey areas’ for 
negotiations between company 
and DHSS, including over target 
ROR and promotional allowance.
653 House of Commons, Written Answers, 27 Oct 1993, Columns 694-5; Mr. Sackville.
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6.3  Negotiating aims
The principal aim of the government, overwhelming any more strategic aims, 
was to reduce the growth in the pharmaceuticals bill: “For us, the issues 
centred very much on the growth in the drugs bill,” commented a senior DOH 
civil servant.”654 This aim was driven by the growth in the drugs bill that had 
taken place over the preceding few years. Now that inflation was low, this 
appeared out of place and drew the attention of the Treasury (see 4.4.3).
While the government intended that the 1993 scheme should succeed in 
reducing the growth in the overall pharmaceuticals bill to the NHS, what they 
required most of the PPRS agreement was a short-term cost saving. Any 
other changes to the way the NHS purchased pharmaceuticals, which may 
be needed to make large long-term savings, would require the overhaul of 
the regulatory system. What the PPRS could achieve for government was a 
cost saving in a politically relevant time frame -  i.e. the coming two or three 
years.
Criticism had been levelled at the PPRS in the context of new demand side 
measures of cost containment, on the basis that the PPRS was a way in 
which savings on the demand side could be lost on the supply side, in so far 
as demand side measures affected the profits of the industry, rather than 
volumes.655
For industry’s part, one aim of the negotiations in general terms was to 
persuade the government that the growth in the overall drugs bill was a 
positive development, signalling the growth of primary care in preference to 
the far more expensive hospital treatment that some newer drugs (such as 
anti-ulcer treatments) were now supplanting. Limiting the cost to the taxpayer 
could be achieved by other mechanisms, such as greater patient co-payment 
for drugs. This had been suggested by ABPI Director, Dr. John Griffin.656
654 Interview, DOH civil servant 27.
655 Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin (May 1993), pp.41-44.
656 The Lancet (1 May 1993), pp. 1156-57.
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They pointed out in advance of the negotiations not only the low rise in prices 
in the sector but also that return on capital of 17-21% was below that for the 
top 100 UK companies on average.657 Industry’s primary aim was to prevent 
any significant cut in overall prices and to defend the allowable rate of return 
on capital but they, like government, did not seek any overhaul of the PPRS.
Industry also had concerns about the introduction of other measures, both on 
the demand side and the extension of the Selected List of medicines 
(Schedule 10). How these would impact on them as individual companies 
was unclear. For some companies this was a minor issue, but for others, 
including some small companies who relied heavily on a few affected drugs, 
it was potentially very significant indeed. Without a clear idea of how the 
Selected List might be extended, for those few firms it was difficult to assess 
the effects of any changes in the PPRS. Companies were unsure how the 
new scheme would affect them until they knew the effect of any extension to 
the Selected List. The experience of the original list in 1985 suggested that 
some companies might be affected quite severely and others barely at all.
Nevertheless, industry representatives felt that they had to recognise the 
political realities of the time: cost containment was a major political issue 
across Europe. Regulation in other markets was not favourable to them. Most 
important was the situation in the US, where the new Clinton administration 
was seeking to limit medicine prices because of rapidly rising public health 
care costs. The US was (and remains) by far the most important market for 
the industry, responsible for the lion’s share of its profits. There were also 
developments in Europe that were somewhat alarming for the industry. 
Germany (one of the two largest markets, along with France, yet unlike 
France a less regulated market by European standards) was also planning 
more stringent purchasing rules.658 This boosted the position of the British 
government and provided a check on the position of industry.
657 Scrip'No 1776, 4 December 1992, p.3.
658 Scrip'No 1849, 24 August 1993, p.3.
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6.4 The pharmaceuticals market
Assumption 1: The market for pharmaceuticals in the UK underpins the 
PPRS by enabling sufficient rewards for both government and industry within 
the scheme, and enabling policy aims to be balanced.
Hypothesis 1: Actors on both sides will seek to maintain the current structure 
of the pharmaceuticals market, and hence the regulatory goods it yields, and 
will not pursue strategies that would undermine it.
There had been developments in the shape of the market during the eight 
years since the 1986 scheme was agreed, and these had implications for the 
position and aims of the two sides in the 1993 negotiations.
6.4.1 Developments in the marketplace
The period of the 1986 scheme had seen growing inflation and a deep 
recession but by 1993 the economy was on an upward trend and inflation 
firmly down from levels seen at the turn of the decade. The annual inflation 
rate was 4%.659 However, the growth in the pharmaceuticals bill was far 
higher. It had been growing far faster than both inflation and NHS spending, 
pushing the pharmaceuticals portion of total NHS funding higher year on 
year. The medicines bill was not cash limited and had been growing, 
according to the Department of Health, by between 12% and 14% a year for 
the previous few years, and in the longer run by about 8% per year.660 This 
marked an acceleration in what was already a fast-growing cost to the NHS, 
and one no longer driven by high inflation. Over the whole decade 1982- 
1991, the drugs bill rose by 39% in real terms.661 Some reports even
659 Scrip No 1769, lONovember 1992, p.3.
660 Interview, DOH civil servant 27.
661 Scrip No 1809, 6 April 1993, p.4.
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suggested that the speed of growth was accelerating beyond 14% during 
1992662 and the rising drugs bill therefore stood out as exceptionally high.
There had already been some political focus on the rising pharmaceuticals 
bill, and attempts were under way to find some means of limiting it. As the 
negotiations approached, the NHS advisory committee on drugs was sitting 
to decide how the Selected List of medicines excluded from NHS 
reimbursement (Schedule 10) might be extended. Government’s emphasis in 
the early 80s had been to cut the drugs bill by as much as possible, in a more 
general atmosphere of cuts and uncertainty in public services. The 
controversial Selected List had been introduced on this basis.
The large rise in the drugs budget -  in both cash terms and as a proportion of 
the overall NHS budget -  was, however, believed by the Department to be 
attributable to factors not directly affected by the PPRS. The rises were 
caused by two forces at work in the market: volume and ‘product mix’. The 
Head of the Industry Division of the DOH, Melvyn Jeremiah, set out the 
results of the Department’s research into the causes of the rising drugs bill, 
concluding that these were the two chief factors, with product mix the main 
driver of growth over a sustained number of years (see Table 4.2).
Table 6.2: Causes of medicine cost increases 1982-1992
% average growth year-on-year
1982-92 1991-92
Pure demography 0.3 0.3
Scripts per capita (volume) 2.7 4.3
Quantity per script 1.1 2.8
Paasche (price of basket of drugs) 1.4 0.0
Product mix 5.5 5.5
Source: Scrip
662 Scrip No 1764,23 October 1992, p.2; Scrip No 1823, 25 May 1993, p.2.
663 Scrip No 1858,24 September 1993, p.5.
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6.4.2 Implications for the PPRS
There was evidence that price increases played almost no part in the rise in 
the overall bill,664 and that ‘trading up’ to better products was a key factor.665 
This was effectively accepted by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
for Health, Tom Sackville, in Parliament, who stated that the cost of existing 
medicines had risen by only 1% in each of the past five years.666 The ABPI 
later revealed prices in 1992 to have risen by just 2.5%, compared with a 
manufacturing industry average of 3.8% and a consumer goods average of 
3.7%. The average annual rise for pharmaceuticals over the past five years 
had been just 2.6%.667
This analysis of prices and costs raised questions about the suitability of the 
PPRS to contain the drugs bill because one of its principle mechanisms of 
market manipulation is to encourage drugs companies to release new and 
better products onto the market so that they can recover their full profits 
allowance, with the prices of all existing products generally being static in 
nominal terms, and therefore decreasing in real terms.
Changes appeared to be emerging in features of the marketplace that had in 
the past enabled the government to achieve its dual aims and for a co­
operative relationship between government and industry to persist: volumes 
were increasing rapidly and doctors were prescribing higher value (i.e. 
newer) drugs. The statistics showed that the influence of therapeutic 
conservatism on the value of the market was possibly diminishing, and this 
had historically imposed some control on the potential impact of new drugs 
released on the basis of free pricing.
664 Scrip No 1841, 27 July 1993, p.7.
665 Scrip No 1805, 23 March 1993, p.2.
666 Hansard, House of Commons, 24 March 1993, Col. 1213fF.; Scrip No 1809, 6 April 1993, p.4.
667 Scrip No 1882, 17 December 1993, p.5.
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6.4.3 Government and the market
The inflation of the preceding decade was a major factor in the motives of the 
government for the negotiations. However, the senior civil servant 
responsible for them noted that there had not been a great deal of urgency 
about conducting the negotiations or expectations of radical reform. The new 
PPRS was a matter of normal business, with eight years having passed since 
the last scheme was drawn up.668
Government aimed to bring down the growth in the overall drugs bill through 
a one-off, across-the-board price cut. Cash savings could then be made 
instantly and calculated precisely, answering the government’s immediate 
political concern of a saving in the short-term.669 The Treasury in particular 
perceived a need for some significant cost containment in the negotiations,670 
even if the relationship between the PPRS (as a cause) and rising 
pharmaceutical costs as analysed was a tentative one. Furthermore, the 
analysis showed that the PPRS would be a blunt instrument with which to 
achieve savings, as the scheme has no direct controls over volumes and 
encourages a shift ‘upwards’ in product usage from the supply side.
From the government’s perspective volumes were not as big an issue as 
product mix. Statistics in 1993 showed that the number of prescription items 
per person fell from four to three per year over the preceding decade for 
those of working age, although for the over 65s they increased from 13 to 19 
per year. Overall, the rise represented demographic trends to some 
degree.671
6.4.4 The position of industry
Industry could be seen as having gained from the growth in the market in 
preceding years. This served to weaken its negotiating position because it
668 Interview, DOH civil servant 27.
669 Interview, DOH civil servant 27.
670 Interview, Government minister 17.
264
Chapter 6: 1993 PPRS
could not claim that unexpected damage was being caused by the PPRS in 
practice. In addition, its bargaining power was qualified by the situation 
elsewhere and especially the proposals for cost containment in the US -  the 
location of first resort for any investments that may be shifted from the UK. 
Showing a direct link between market conditions and incentives for R&D 
investment had been dealt a serious blow by these developments in America.
6.4.5 Imperatives for consensus
Despite its weaker position, the industry was not pushed into structural 
changes in the PPRS that would fundamentally have affected its regulatory 
goods because the DOH’s agenda was broader and it recognised that the 
PPRS delivered the industry benefits without which it could not be expected 
to maintain the co-operative framework. Hence, there were some things that 
were not up for negotiation: freedom of pricing was regarded as a 
commercial necessity and as some compensation for the other restrictions.672
An important motive in not advancing proposals for structural reform that may 
have facilitated better cost containment initiatives was the government’s 
industrial policy concerns. Despite the inflation in the sector and the 
measures being taken elsewhere, in the US and Germany, one industry 
negotiator noted that politicians were questioning their approach to the 
sector:
“In the mid-80s the industry fell below average industrial profitability in the 
UK and there was evidence that we had been quite seriously damaged by 
the preceding three years, following the introduction of the Selected List and 
this gave both government and the industry pause for thought: were we 
really a fat cat sector making huge profits? By the time of the 1993 PPRS 
negotiations, there was the first real attempt to ask the question of what 
damage a push for really cheap drugs for the NHS might have on the
671 Scrip No 1882, 17 December 1993, p.5.
672 Interview, industry executive 9
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industry; and there was the first attempt to try to benchmark it to other 
industries with high R&D investment.”673
The government was concerned at what looked like a potential drift of the 
industry away from the UK.
“What the companies valued was freedom of pricing over new products and 
we needed to make sure we had a system that would make the 
pharmaceutical industry continue to feel that Britain was the place to be, as 
opposed to Germany, Holland, France, or anywhere else, many of whom 
were hotly contending our position [as the leading EU country for 
pharmaceutical R&D].”674
To this extent the 1993 PPRS marked some sort of watershed in 
government’s recognition of the economic value of the industry, which had in 
fact formally been a part of the scheme since the 70s.
6.4.6 Conclusions
The rise in drug costs was the most important contextual factor of the 1993 
negotiations and the one that formed the basis of the government’s aims for 
the negotiations. Moreover, a key feature of the market -  the therapeutic 
conservatism of GPs -  had seemingly waned in the years preceding 1993, as 
the ‘product mix’ had driven inflation in the drugs budget. Yet the 1993 
agreement did not threaten to undermine any of the key regulatory goods 
from industry’s point of view, although it did limit their freedom of manoeuvre 
through the reduction in the ‘MOT’. Profits would now be curtailed far earlier 
than previously once they rose above the target rate of return.
The agreement that was reached further emphasised the tendencies of the 
scheme. Downward pressure on existing drug prices but freedom of pricing 
for new products and it was welcomed by industry for increasing their
673 Interviev, industry executive 9
674 Interviev, Government minister 17.
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manoeuvrability in their pricing strategies.675 The negotiations showed clearly 
that the benefits and costs of the scheme provided a balance that the ABPI 
accepted.
These changes in the scheme were not a direct attack on the causes of the 
rise in the medicines budget. “The critical question [for total drug costs] is 
consumption of pharmaceuticals in expenditure per head and the PPRS 
exerts no volume control whatsoever. The fact that the UK has quite low 
volumes has nothing to do with the PPRS; it’s due to medical culture and the 
structure of the NHS.”676 Indeed, the upshifting to more expensive products 
had suggested that one feature of the market that enables the PPRS -  the 
conservatism of GP prescribing -  might have been undermined to some 
degree and was a motivating factor behind the government’s desire for 
savings.
The PPRS did not deal with the underlying causes of costs but then it was 
attempting to achieve other aims as well, and in terms of costs the 
government’s horizon was a political and therefore short one. “I think there 
was recognition that the PPRS was not an appropriate tool to achieve a 
reduction in growth, more an opportunity to achieve a one-off reduction, to re­
set the base line so that growth then resumed from a lower point,” noted a 
senior DOH civil servant.677 The DOH recognised that this was the only 
means of achieving savings while leaving key features of the market in place, 
and it had not contemplated any structural overhaul of the regulatory regime.
The PPRS can be seen as a significant tightening of some parts of the 
scheme and it included a price cut that was large in cash terms. But there 
were no changes in its broad structure nor, in particular, any threat of such 
changes. In this respect it remained similar to previous schemes. Neither the 
overall price cut nor the change in the MOT dealt directly with the causes of
675 Scrip No 1866,22 October 1993, p.5.
676 Interview, DOH civil servant 27.
677 Interview, DOH civil servant 27.
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growth in the drugs bill, but they sought to use the PPRS to redress these 
changes in the shape and cost of the medicines bill.
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6.5 The global context
Assumption 2: The global organisation of industry lends it bargaining 
resources it would not otherwise have and makes government more alive to 
the need for an active industrial policy.
Hypothesis 2: Industry will seek to utilise its global structure as a bargaining 
resource to counteract the legal monopoly of government, which in turn will 
pay greater attention to their industrial policy aims.
In 1993 there were specific international dimensions to the context of the 
PPRS negotiations. Progress in the European single market had produced 
plans for the integration of medicines licensing within the EU, and member 
states were competing to host the new institution, which might have positive 
implications for the ‘critical mass’ of pharmaceutical interests in that country 
and was of great significance to the major companies.
At the same time, the issue of cost containment in health care had risen up 
the political agenda in the early 1990s across western countries, where 
demographic trends compounded by technological advance were pushing up 
costs quickly.678 There was widespread concern to check the rise in health 
care costs in all major markets. The shape of the industry was beginning to 
change as well, with a process of consolidation that looked set to reduce the 
number of large British firms.
6.5.1 Global industry and markets
The regulatory framework for medicine purchases is one of the factors 
determining where a pharmaceutical company locates its facilities (along with 
corporate, research, manufacturing and sales issues) and the warning from
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industry that a hostile political environment would impact on pharmaceutical 
investment was taken seriously by the DOH: “The threat that worried me was 
if the climate in the UK became too hostile, or perceived as too hostile, then 
the industry would go offshore, primarily to the United States, but also 
elsewhere in Europe,” noted a senior DOH politician of the PPRS 
negotiations.679
This attitude reflects the view of industry that there had been some re­
thinking in government about the value of reigning in the drugs budget too 
much, at the risk of damaging the research-based industry. Nevertheless, the 
balance of advantage in 1993 lay with the government. The threat of 
relocation was necessarily based on comparative analysis of other markets 
and regulatory regimes and because the major markets of the US (see 6.5.2) 
and Germany were pursuing vigorous cost containment regimes, the potency 
of this key bargaining resource was diminished to a significant degree. This 
encouraged ministers to largely dismiss the credibility of the threat of 
disinvestment.680
The UK market was also growing, so could not be characterised by industry 
as suffering from undue cost containment pressure. Within Europe, the 
German and Italian markets actually fell in value during the first quarter of 
1993, while growth in the UK market was relatively robust. The industry still 
employed this argument to some degree but recognised its limitations in the 
circumstances of 1993: the UK looked remarkably buoyant at a time when 
the situation in Germany, both the actual market and proposed legislation, 
was deteriorating (see Table 6.3).
678 Abel-Smith B. (1984); Mossialos E, Ranos C, Abel-Smith B (eds). (1994); Le Grand J, Mossialos 
E(eds). (1999).
679 Interview, Government minister 17.
680 Scrip No 1849, 24 August 1993, p.3.
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Table 6.3: Growth in major European pharmaceuticals markets, 1993
Total purchases Sm Growth % Jan-Mav 1993
France 5,181 6.5
Germany 5,180 -11.1
Italy 3,704 -1.8
UK 2,045 11.6
Spain 1,996 13.6
Netherlands 666 13.4
Belgium 650 5.8
Source: Scrip
6.5.2 The global corporate structure
The 1993 PPRS negotiations appeared to mark a split between ABPI 
member firms along nationality lines, exacerbated by global corporate 
restructuring. Much had changed since 1986. The six large British firms had 
now become four through mergers and acquisitions. American companies 
were regarded as being less content with regulation and more vociferously in 
favour of commercial freedom than their European counterparts, which had 
grown up alongside public health care systems.682
To begin with, reaching a starting point for negotiations in 1993 was hindered 
by this factor: “The industry had problems having a consistent position. There 
was always a tension between the American companies and the European 
companies. Merck was at one extreme of the American companies, arguing 
that regulation was not just unnecessary but immoral!”683
The various groups of companies met to form their own policy position prior 
to organising their collective position under the ABPI. Government officials 
also met with them separately and knew something of what divided them 
within the ABPI. “We met the Americans as a group twice a year,” noted a 
senior civil servant. They also visited headquarters of US companies in
681 Scrip No 1844, 6 August 1993, p.6
682 Interview, industry executive 3
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America and met with the trade associations of Germany and Switzerland.684 
Clearly, British officials felt that a new scheme could not be designed and 
agreed to without input from overseas head offices and associations, quite 
aside from the British divisions of American-based global companies.
It was clear to officials from these broad ranging discussions that sticking 
points in the negotiations would likely come from particular groups among 
industry’s ranks: “W e were conscious that there were things we had to do to 
meet the objectives of some of their constituent elements.”685 And the ABPI 
itself had to balance the various parts of its membership. “They would have 
found it very difficult not to have a representative from an American 
company, and in fact they had two.”686 As indirect pressure was applied by 
government through comments to the press before the negotiations began, a 
divided industry responded with a suggestion that the American 
multinationals may desert the PPRS, forcing a system of direct price 
controls.687
The role of foreign-based multinationals meant that the government felt the 
need to speak directly to senior executives abroad. DOH officials visited the 
US to explain their proposals for the PPRS and address any concerns.688 
This shows the degree of understanding of the global nature of the industry 
on the part of officials, and although the American industry association, the 
PMA (now called PhARMA), criticised the PPRS as a whole and suggested it 
was counterproductive, there was, in the end, agreement on it.689
Despite the weaker position of industry, in part because of regulatory 
developments elsewhere, the scale of the industry and its international 
character did shape the government’s strategy: the DOH was very keen to 
keep American CEOs on board.
683 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
684 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
685 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
686 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
687 Scrip No 1768, 6 November 1992, p.2.
688 Scrip No 1847, 17 August 1993, p.3.
689 Scrip No 1852/53, 3/7 September 1993, p.2.
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6.5.3 Oversees policy
In 1993, there were particular events in some major markets that set an 
important context for the PPRS negotiations and the respective bargaining 
power of the two sides.
The interlinking of the British and other markets was specifically recognised 
by the Secretary of State. The use of Britain as a springboard for exports by 
the international industry was impressed upon the Department by the 
industry: “Certainly if a product was used within the NHS, that was an 
excellent basis on which they could advance their exports,” noted a senior 
DOH politician. Implicitly recognised in this is the importance of getting to 
market quickly, a key aspect of the PPRS. Ironically, the negative 
developments in other countries was likely to make the large firms (at CEO 
level at least) more keen to get a favourable hearing in the UK.
In 1993 there was an additional dimension to the interplay of regimes. Aside 
from the direct effect of one system on another, multinational companies 
could see their position in one country as a way of offsetting a deteriorating 
position elsewhere. In 1993, the major market for all multinational companies, 
the United States, representing around 30% of the global market, was in the 
process of significant reform.
The Clinton administration in the US was seeking ways to limit medicine 
prices, as the publicly funded Medicaid (for the poor) and Medicare (for the 
elderly) health regimes faced the same sort of cost pressures as the 
universal European systems.690 The situation there was clearly important for 
all the major companies. Multinationals were keen to maintain their pricing 
freedom of new products in light of US downward pressure: the UK would 
become a more important example to other markets if lower prices were 
forced in the US.691
690 For a critique o f the Clinton health care plans see: Danzon, Patricia M. (1994).
691 See Scrip No 1809, 6 April 1993, p.4.
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Nevertheless, the international context gave government a stronger hand. 
Cost problems seemed universal and there had been recent downward 
pressure by public authorities in Europe, notably Germany (one of the less 
heavily regulated and higher-prices European markets), as well as the US.692 
This enabled the government to present the need for cost savings as a 
universal one while also enabling it to present the free-pricing-at-launch 
aspect of the PPRS as a significant ‘cherry’ in a seemingly hostile 
environment for the global industry.693
6.5.4 Conclusions
The global dimension of the industry had important contextual implications for 
the 1993 negotiations, primarily owing to its global corporate structure but 
also the way this interplayed with regulatory reforms in its many separate 
markets.
There were changes taking place in the corporate dynamics of the industry 
towards ever larger firms and a consequent shift in the corporate centre of 
gravity towards the US. The influence and attitude of American companies 
were noted by Department of Health officials, at a time when they were 
beginning to become more dominant than their European counterparts. 
There was a recognised need to take account of the international dimension 
of internal ABPI politics by the Department of Health and a recognition that 
reaching agreement with the big British companies did not necessarily mean 
reaching an agreement to which the ABPI could sign up. The structure of the 
industry clearly underpinned the government’s industrial policy to an 
important degree.
Nevertheless, the international firms also recognised their weaker position 
because of events in their other major markets, especially the US where 
proposed cost reduction measures were being mooted. They did not have
692 Scrip No 1841, 27 July 1993, p.4.
693 Scrip No 1849, 24 August 1993, p.2.
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the bargaining power -  in particular the solidity of reasoning -  to back up the 
disinvestment argument. There was therefore an international policy 
dimension that worked in the government’s favour.
Both these factors showed that even in 1993 (before the consolidations of the 
mid to late 1990s), global corporate factors changed the nature of bargaining 
between government and industry in an apparently insulated policy making 
arena such as the PPRS. Their negotiations were also affected by the 
international policy landscape to which industry participants were subject in 
their different markets. These did not directly affect the UK-based individuals 
involved in the negotiations but they did mean that if they were to call upon 
senior executives with a broader regional or global view, the situation in other 
countries would be an important point of argument not open to them this time 
round.
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6.6 The co-operative state
Assumption 3: The ‘liberal’ nature of the British state means there is the 
desire by government for ‘light-touch’ and co-operative regulation using 
limited administrative, technical and legal resources.
Hypothesis 3: Policy proposals that require significant technical, 
administrative and legal resources on the part of government will not be 
pursued, in particular a legislative approach to regulation. They will seek 
maintenance of the co-operative regime.
The 1993 PPRS represents a reaffirmation of the PPRS system of regulation. 
The operating dynamics of the scheme remained the same: a scheme, or its 
replacement, that did require of the government increased technical, 
administrative or legal resources was not signed. Despite some significant 
changes on particular points, the 1993 scheme reads with very few 
distinctions from its predecessor.
The two parties in the negotiations set out to achieve their respective 
objectives, and greater regulation was certainly not something the industry 
aimed for. The government, on the other hand, had examined alternative 
options for regulating prices. It had done so in the light of its aim for the new 
PPRS to reduce the growth of the drugs bill.
6.6.1 Analysis of the problem
The government’s examination of the market and regulation sought to 
analyse what was driving the growth in the bill. “W e concluded from that that 
demography was a factor and drug prices were a factor but neither was a 
major factor. The main driver of the bill was the switch from older to newer
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drugs.694 This was also something other countries, such as Sweden, had 
concluded from their own research.”695 The industry for its part drew attention 
to data which suggested that actual prices had been rising by less than 
inflation, at1.9% .696
Evidence therefore suggested that tighter regulation, or differently focused 
regulation, was the only way to solve the problem and strike at the growth in 
the medicines bill at its cause. Any bearing down on the growth of the drugs 
bill would be difficult, and at least indirect, through the limit on companies’ 
ROC. New drugs are capital intensive and this would likely be reflected in the 
overall drugs bill.
6.6.2 Assessment of the government’s options
Those in government responsible for the negotiations agreed with this 
anlaysis. “At that time we were looking at other mechanisms of controlling the 
drugs bill such as GP fundholding and other demand side measures; the 
PPRS is largely irrelevant to the growth in the drugs bill and this was not our 
aim in renegotiating it.”697 The traditional one-off price reduction would 
reduce the bill over the short-term, and re-set the trajectory of growth, but 
would not contain its growth. However, stricter supply side regulation was not 
considered in any detail. The government had no intention of going down the 
continental route of directly regulating prices but rather of containing costs by 
emulating a normal market through limits on demand.
The growth in the overall bill, according to the ABPI, was due to the success 
of the Department’s policy of encouraging primary care solutions (GPs) in 
place of secondary care (hospitals),698 and this, again, was identified by Tom
694 This switch to more expensive products is often referred to as the effect o f ‘product mix’ on overall 
costs.
695 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
696 Scrip No 1776,4 December 1992, p.3.
697 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
698 Scrip No 1776,4 December 1992, p.3.
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Sackville, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health, as a major 
contributory factor to increased drugs costs.699
Other options were looked at in the run-up to the negotiations that might 
perhaps have controlled prices in a more structured and longer term way. 
“W e did consider ‘radical options’, including statutory price controls, but all 
these were dismissed quite early on. They were never really given serious, 
detailed consideration.”700 This suggests that greater regulation was not 
considered realistic by the civil servants who prepared the ground for the 
negotiations. “While deregulation was not an option, we were in the 
Thatcher/Major era where regulation was not fashionable, so the idea of 
more explicit regulation wasn’t attractive at all.”701 The status quo therefore 
stood out as the option that would not require deeper regulation but would 
keep some basic mechanism of control in the government’s hands and 
achieve a saving in the short-term. This arbitrariness was appreciated at the 
highest level. “Any price mechanism was only a proxy. It had to be invented 
because there was insufficient price pressure in the system. In this case, the 
PPRS just appeared to be the least worst option.”702
So government saw the PPRS as a means of saving money and bringing 
some pressure into a market where normal price pressures are absent. It did 
not see it as a scientifically proven approach to regulation but as a pragmatic 
response to its circumstances.
6.6.3 The bargaining process
The negotiating ‘resources’ of each side, which have reinforced the nature of 
the policy community through the PPRS, were employed to some degree. 
Industry had suggested, both directly and through the press, that investment 
would suffer if profits were squeezed.703 It repeated this claim after the
699 Hansard, House o f Commons, 24 March 1993, Col. 1212-3; Scrip No 1823,25 May 1993, p.2.
700 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
701 Interview, industry executive 9
702 Interview, Government minister 17
703 Scrip No 1773, 24 November 1992, p.2.
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agreement was signed, protesting at the 2.5% price cut to which it had in any 
case acquiesced.704 The industry had highlighted its economic contribution 
and figures showed that the trade surplus for the industry was up by 15% in 
1992, further above inflation than the rise in the NHS’s pharmaceutical bill.705 
Nevertheless this argument was muted by cost containment measures being 
pursued in precisely the country normally referred to as more favourable to 
the industry, the US, as well as another less regulated EU market, Germany. 
The department had openly dismissed this argument as “empty threats”, 
reflecting their confidence in the relative benefits of the UK system as a 
whole.706
For its part, the government had in fact hinted at the idea of further 
regulation. During the negotiations, at a conference held by the Adam Smith 
Institute in May,707 the Head of the DOH’s Industry Division, Melvyn Jeremiah 
had alluded to the idea of some economic evaluation of medicines prior to 
the Department’s agreement that they would be available on the NHS. This 
followed similar moves in Australia and was a timely suggestion given that 
negotiations were underway on the PPRS. He suggested, however, that this 
sort of framework would not be possible alongside the PPRS, reinforcing the 
value of the scheme for industry. He valued the voluntary nature of the PPRS 
but added that if it did not exist some other control -  likely European style 
direct price control -  would be necessary to keep the drugs bill in check. The 
timing and occasion was a clear attempt to push industry to agree a new 
scheme at a time when negotiations were dragging.708 Such a process of 
assessment for medicines would undermine a central benefit (perhaps the 
key benefit) of the PPRS for industry, namely speed to market following 
authorisation from the MCA or EMEA. Requiring an economic assessment 
would mean a further hurdle would have to be passed before medicines 
could be marketed to the NHS.
704 Scrip No 1851, 31 August 1993, p.2.
705 Scrip No 1777, 8 December 1992, p. 10.
706 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
707 Adam Smith Institute (May 1993).
708 Scrip No 1823, 25 May 1993, pp.2-3.
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Nevertheless, neither side pushed these arguments to a point of overt 
confrontation -  they had more the character of shots across the bows of the 
other party.
The government had already introduced demand side measures which would 
not only target more precisely overall costs but which emulated a more 
‘normal’ market. The PPRS was understood to affect the nature of the market 
in a positive way but also to have quite a limited effect on overall costs. In the 
end, the government declined to pursue radical options more because it did 
not feel the need than because it was restricted in doing so. It dismissed 
tighter control early on and actively sought to continue the co-operative 
framework of regulation.
6.6.4 Desire for co-operation
The limitations of the PPRS were recognised. One industry negotiator noted: 
“What government wanted was some certainty about the drugs bill -  they 
wanted their hand on the tiller. But the UK is a capitalist country and the 
Conservative government had a free market philosophy. They wanted 
maximum freedom for industry.” The PPRS was seen as a bespoke system 
suited to the British bureaucracy, government and industry: “The profit ceiling 
is this light touch on the tiller. It doesn’t really matter if you lose some on the 
swings and gain some on the roundabout. It’s a very pragmatic, flexible and 
commercial approach -  a very British way of doing things.”709
Equally, what the government sought to avoid, the industry source believed, 
was excessive bureaucracy, and they were quite open with industry about 
that: “Successive civil servants from the industry division have said to me that 
they run the PPRS with a handful of people and if you look at the 
bureaucracy that’s required in other countries you’ve got vast hordes of 
people administering the regulation.”710
709 Interview, industry executive 9
710 Interview, industry executive 9
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And the voluntarism of the PPRS created conditions within which the two 
sides could co-operate on areas other than purely supply side controls. ABPI- 
DOH working groups were set up during the negotiations of the PPRS to look 
at the drugs bill as a whole and the use of medicines in health care.711 With 
an adversarial, statutory regulatory regime, such broader co-operation would 
be much more difficult, if not impossible. Both government and industry 
conducted the negotiations on the basis that the voluntary framework was the 
best one for both sides.712
6.6.5 Conclusions
Analysing the complexity of price controls in the sector, given the quite 
fundamental nature of growth in the drugs bill (demography and technology), 
government realised it would have to overhaul the PPRS to have any 
significant effect through its supply side controls, which it was not prepared to 
do. It recognised that the PPRS was a ‘proxy’ for intervening into a flawed 
market. The lead negotiator suggested that the purpose of the PPRS was in 
fact extremely limited: “Essentially it’s a comfort blanket for the government. 
It provides a framework which allows them some possibility of preventing 
serious abuse by companies of what is actually quite a powerful position.”713
The 1993 PPRS did not aim for or deliver any radical change in the PPRS. 
Other aspects of pharmaceutical regulation were being pursued with more 
vigour, and were expected to yield some savings in pharmaceutical 
expenditure.
Radical reform was dismissed early on in favour of voluntarism and co­
operation. From start to finish the government had stated its support for 
continuing voluntary arrangements in the PPRS. Even prior to the 
negotiations, the Secretary of State had expressed support for the current
711 Scrip No 1796, 19 February 1993, p.5.
712 Scrip No 1778, 11 December 1993, p.4; Scrip No 1805, 23 March 1993, p.2.
713 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
281
Chapter 6 :1993  PPRS
arrangement and had extolled the virtues of the industry. 714 She aimed to 
maintain the pragmatic and commercially focused structure of the PPRS.
The government did aim to cut the drugs bill and re-base it but did not intend 
to introduce any changes that would restructure the scheme. During the 
negotiations, the ultimate bargaining resources of each side -  disinvestments 
and legislation -  were hinted at and drawn attention to but not seriously 
pursued by the negotiating parties. The maintenance of the co-operative 
relationship proved to be a primary regulatory good and a core value of the 
relationship between government and industry.
714 Scrip No 1774,27 November 1992, p.2; Scrip No 1778, 11 December 1993, p.4.
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6.7 The role of Parliament
Assumption 4: Parliament has a peripheral role in this policy field and does 
not constitute a veto point or external influence on the policy community.
Hypothesis 4: Parliament will not be an influential actor in determining policy 
outcomes, which in turn will be reflected in the limited direct attention to it by 
both government and industry.
In the first half of 1993, Parliament seemed to have been given an 
uncommonly prominent role in the pharmaceutical sector. A Private Members 
Bill on consumer information about medicines had gained government 
backing and was doing rather well;715 the Selected List extension was being 
discussed through an Early Day Motion; and there was a debate on NHS 
medicine costs, through the Adjournment Debate procedure. The PPRS was 
also being renegotiated and there was the possibility that the interest of MPs 
in NHS medicines might spill over from one of the other areas and precipitate 
a discussion of the scheme.
6.7.1 Parliament and the negotiating agenda
During the latter part of the operation of the 1986 scheme, the PPRS was the 
subject of several questions in the Commons. Most of these requested 
specific financial information about the scheme, including the value of sales 
required by a company for it to become liable to submit a full AFR716 (a key 
issue as this was changed markedly in the 1993 scheme), money repaid to 
the Department under the scheme,717 and the level of price increases on
715 Private Members Bills are notoriously unsuccessful. They rarely succeed without gaining the 
support o f  the government and, with it, a greater allocation o f parliamentary time.
716 House o f Commons, Written Answers, 5 February 1992, Column 208; Mr. Sims to Secretary o f  
State for Health.
717 House o f Commons, Written Answers, 19 December 1991, Column 225; Mr. Speed to Secretary o f  
State for
Health.
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pharmaceutical products over recent years.718 This revealed annual 
increases of 1.9% and 2.5% respectively for the years 1989 and 1990, 
highlighting the difference between price increases and the growth of the 
overall pharmaceutical bill of 12-14% a year.
Another question about the scheme, in July 1991, sought to decipher its 
effects on the total drugs bill. The question and reply illustrate both the 
complexity of the scheme regarding its ability to achieve its goals (or, rather, 
to assess what these are), and the concerns of many MPs about its lack of 
transparency:719
Mr. Michael Morris [MP]: To ask the Secretary of State for Health what is 
the impact on (a) profitability of pharmaceutical companies supplying 
medicines to the national health service and (b) the national health service 
drugs bill of the pharmaceutical price regulation scheme.
Mrs. Virginia Bottomley [Minister of State]: The pharmaceutical price 
regulation scheme seeks to strike a balance between securing the supply of 
drugs to the national health service at an acceptable cost to the taxpayer and 
offering pharmaceutical companies a reasonable level of profitability on their 
NHS sales.
It is not possible to estimate the impact of the PPRS on companies' 
profitability or the NHS drugs bill since that would depend on what the level 
of drug prices might be or what other expenditure controls might exist in the 
absence of the agreement.
Many such questions could be seen as ‘setting the scene’ for the later 
negotiations, from one point of view or another, but none can be regarded as 
having ‘set the agenda’ for the government’s negotiating position. Requests 
for some details, where MPs would likely have known the commercial 
confidentiality of such information under the scheme, were seemingly aimed
18 House o f Commons, Written Answers, 25 July 1991, Column 905; Mr. Michael Morris to 
Secretary o f State for Health.
19 House o f Commons, Written Answers, 15 July 1991, Column 63.
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at drawing attention to its lack of transparency. No major debate on the 
scheme took place in its own right in the time preceding the negotiations.
There was one source of parliamentary pressure on the negotiations -  the 
planned Health Select Committee enquiry into the drugs budget. This was 
intended to look at the efficiency and effect of measures designed to control 
the drugs bill.720 It would examine the causes of the rise in the drugs bill and 
the continued upward pressure on it, comparing it to other countries. It would 
also look at the role of government in controlling drug costs.721
It would not begin sitting until after the new PPRS was signed but it 
represented a clear role for Parliament in judging measures across-the- 
board, including the PPRS, and would entail a thorough examination of the 
scheme, primarily from the taxpayer’s perspective. This forthcoming enquiry 
therefore represented a background factor in the agreement on the new 
scheme, especially for industry, which might be worried by the approach to 
be taken by the committee.
6.7.2 Parliament and the negotiation process
The concurrent pharmaceutical discussions meant that Parliamentarians and 
industry representatives were already in contact during the PPRS 
negotiations. In particular, there was continued discussion of the Selected 
List, which led to a “barrage of parliamentary questions” directed at both the 
DOH and the DTI in this regard.722 There was also a debate specifically on 
overall NHS drugs costs, again inspired from the backbenches.
These three legislative events created opportunities to question the 
government, in addition to departmental questions, about the PPRS, on 
which there was no specific debate:
720 Scrip No 1841,27 July 1993, p.6.
721 Scrip No 1847, 17 August 1993, p.4.
722 Scrip No 1776,4 December 1992, pp.3-4.
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■ The Selected List extension: Early Day Motion, James Couchman MP; 26 
July
■ NHS drugs costs: Adjournment Debate, Andrew Hunter MP; 24 March
■ The Medicines Information Bill: Private Members Bill, Giles Radice MP; 
debated 15 January and 30 April
The Selected List Early Day Motion
The Selected List early day motion provided the most extensive period of 
debate on pricing and cost issues, lasting about 90 minutes. Questions were 
tabled about the details of the government’s position in the negotiations. The 
confidential nature of the negotiations meant that these were not answered 
fully in ministerial replies.723
The accountability and transparency of the scheme were criticised in the 
Commons. “There is more openness in debates on defence contracts than 
on (pharmaceutical) price regulation,” noted one opposition MP in the 
summer of 1993.724 Specific elements of the scheme were criticised during 
the period of the negotiations, such as the promotional allowance and clinical 
surveillance, which was characterised as promotion in disguise:
“The industry has been able to extend the parameters of its research and 
development bill by considering what it provides in post-marketing 
surveillance. The Government have allowed the industry to develop this area 
to the point where it is no more than promotion masquerading as research. 
We must consider the limits on advertising and promotion to see how 
effective they are and whether this method of securing the support of GPs is 
the best for the health service and patients.”725
723 House o f Commons, Written Answers. See 11 January 1993, Column 611-12; 27 October 1993, 
Column 694-5. Mr. Blunkett; reply from Minister o f State, Mr. Mawhinney.
724Hansard, House o f Commons, 26 July 1993, Column 958; Mr. Ian McCartney.
725 Hansard, House o f Commons, 26 July 1993, Column 959. Mr. Ian McCartney.
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NHS Drugs Costs Adjournment Debate
The most significant role for Parliament was through the adjournment debate 
on the NHS drugs bill, as this was introduced to enable a few MPs to present 
the case in favour of a rising drugs bill -  in large part in response to the 
Selected List proposal but also in the context of the PPRS negotiation. 
However, the form of this debate meant that it was extremely restricted.
Aside from MPs pointing out how the PPRS gave the industry ‘too good a 
deal’ from the NHS, many MPs sought to explain rising costs in broader 
medical and health care terms, and avert a harsh PPRS settlement. This had 
been the purpose of Andrew Hunter’s debate and he proposed that the basic 
reason for the rise on the overall drugs bill was the shift from secondary 
(hospital) to primary care.726 This point was also emphasised during the 
Selected List debate on 26 July, by Roger Gale MP.727 It was an important 
point for the government, as their aim of transferring demand from secondary 
to primary care was a key part of their strategy for the NHS in order to 
contain overall health costs.
An incompatibility of the Selected List with the PPRS was raised here. The 
more significant debates on the Selected List provided an opportunity for 
MPs to express opinions about the relationship between the industry and the 
NHS, and the concurrence of the PPRS negotiations meant that there was 
some interlinking of the two in this arena, albeit having little effect on their 
separation in discussions between industry and the Department.728
Medicines information Biil
The Medicines Information Bill, a Private Members Bill sponsored by Labour 
MP Giles Radice,729 was a more curious vehicle for PPRS issues. There was
726 Hansard, House o f Commons, 24 March 1993, Column 1212.
727 For example, Mr. Roger Gale, Hansard, House o f Commons, 26 July 1993, Column 956
728 Hansard, House o f Commons Debates. See 15 January 1993 Col. 1218-1231; 24 March 1993 Col. 
1211-1217; 26th July 1993 Col. 948-968.
729 The Lancet (8 May 1993), p.1219.
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little direct overlap between pricing and cost issues and the proposals in the 
Bill about information on clinical trials. Yet the timing made it an important 
test for the relationship between government and industry. Having been 
thought likely to make the statute book by securing government backing, the 
Bill eventually failed through lack of time. It was suggested at the time by 
Labour MP Ian McCartney that this was part of a direct trade-off with industry 
on the PPRS negotiations.730
6.7.3 Parliament and industry lobbying
During the run up to the negotiations, lobbying by industry was directed to the 
executive. But attention was drawn to the strength of industry’s lobbying of 
Parliament by the sudden exit of the Medicines Information Bill, during the 
PPRS negotiations. Although opposition MPs accused the government and 
the industry of having colluded, the ‘filibuster’ in Parliament required the 
tabling of 70 amendments by a large number of Conservative MPs -  
evidence of a significant lobbying ability on the part of industry, if the Labour 
accusations were true.731
In the debate secured by Mr James Couchman MP on the 26 July (ostensibly 
on the proposal to extend the Selected List), he sought to argue against the 
significant extension of the Selected List, representing industry’s views as a 
declared adviser to Pfizer. He suggested that the PPRS and the Selected List 
were incompatible as cost containment measures (it had been argued by 
industry that companies could return to their profit ceilings in the months 
following a Selected List extension by releasing new drugs. The cost 
containment was therefore only short-term). He also argued that medicines 
expenditure represented a cost saving to the NHS through reduced hospital 
expenditure, in cases such as stroke prevention and diabetes treatment.732
730 Hansard, House o f Commons Debates, 30 April 2003 Col. 1322. Mr. Ian McCartney
731 Scrip No 1818/19, 7/11 May 1993, p.2.
732 Hansard, House o f Commons, 26 July 1993, Columns 952-3.
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The continued pressure in Parliament was a reflection of what was 
happening behind the scenes between the industry and the government, and 
served as an additional pressure point to influence the government’s position. 
In this sense, the disquiet over the Selected List meant that the government 
had to be less severe with the concurrent PPRS than it might otherwise have 
been. And it was in the debates over the Selected List that Parliament gained 
a significant role: this was a serious issue for their constituents who received 
prescriptions of drugs that were about to be delisted from NHS funding. 
Indeed, it came “a close second to the issue of sub-post offices in the 
postbags of hon. Members” in the Commons.733
The PPRS had no direct constituency angle other than the overtly industrial 
one and without the broad base of appeal it was not an issue on which 
Labour MPs were likely to persist in exerting pressure. On the other hand, 
opposition MPs could more or less side with the industry view on the 
Selected List because it was seen to directly affect their constituents in a way 
that the PPRS did not. Questions were tabled enquiring about 
representations made by industry to the government about the PPRS,734 and 
in this sense lobbying itself became a minor issue of discussion. But while 
there was a clear base for co-operation between MPs and the industry on the 
Selected List, the PPRS has implications for pricing and investment and 
support was bound to be narrower. Indeed, it was MPs with investments in 
their constituencies that were most active on these sorts of questions.
6.7.4 Conclusions
Parliament played a role in the 1993 PPRS negotiations but it was certainly 
peripheral. Questions were raised about the PPRS, in part to draw attention 
to its lack of transparency (something the committee would later criticise) and 
accountability, though none of the questioning can be said to have set the 
agenda for the negotiations. Industry was able to highlight its concerns
733 Mr. Ian McCartney MP. Hansard, House o f Commons, 26 July 1993, Columns 959.
734 House o f Commons, Written Answers. See 11 January 1993, Column 611-2; 27 October 1993, 
Column 694-5
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through its supporters in Parliament, who were sufficient to secure a debate 
on issues important to industry but the PPRS was the least important of all 
the issues that presented themselves to industry during 1993 and the one 
where there was least direct constituency interest to command MPs’ attention 
and MPs did not demonstrate a sound knowledge of the scheme.
All of these debates drew attention to the PPRS and some explicitly 
questioned its effectiveness and its compatibility with other areas of 
regulation. However, there is little evidence from the debates surrounding the 
Selected List extension, the Medicines Information Bill and the various 
questions relating to the PPRS that ministers were particularly put on the 
spot by parliamentary questioning and there is little evidence of points being 
raised in the industry’s favour regarding the PPRS by MPs lobbied by their 
representatives. The confidentiality of the scheme and the primacy of the role 
of the executive left little scope for effective parliamentary intervention, in 
either direction.
Indeed, the DOH said so explicitly: “I received very little pressure from 
Parliament for the scheme to be reformed. There was some pressure about 
openness of information and a few other matters but I cannot say this was a 
huge issue on my agenda.”735
Government-industry relations appear to have enabled Parliament to be by­
passed and a deal possibly done over the PPRS and unconnected legislation 
in Parliament. Support for the private members bill may have been withdrawn 
following direct industry-government contacts over the PPRS.
Ironically, given that it would be at least five years before the next PPRS 
negotiations, Parliament was about to acquire an explicit and central role in 
assessing the value of the PPRS through the Health Select Committee 
report.
735 Interview, Government minister 17
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Given the limitations on Parliament’s role, the effectiveness of industry’s 
lobbying of Parliament is not easy to judge, precisely because of the close 
relationship between industry and the executive. But 1993 can be seen as 
having set up a model for industry lobbying, around two principles: linkage 
and supplementary pressure. By chance, the PPRS was linked in with an 
issue that was extremely important for the public and therefore MPs, and 
industry found itself on the same side as the Labour opposition on the 
Selected List issue. It also showed that industry believed exerting additional 
pressure to that which was being placed directly on the government was of 
some use, and the discussion in Parliament of the PPRS showed that this 
obscure subject could be brought before MPs through their contacts in 
Parliament, even if they cannot be said to have constituted a veto point in the 
reformulation of the scheme.
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6.8 Role of the Department of Health
Assumption 5: The siting of an industrial policy function within the 
Department of Health gives DOH authority and competence to act and 
highlights the government’s industrial policy aims, enabling a co-operative 
regime.
Hypothesis 5: The dual role of the DOH will prove decisive in defining policy 
and maintaining the co-operative regime by counteracting the procurement 
focus of the Treasury.
The negotiation of a new scheme in 1993 had important implications for the 
role of the Secretary of State for Health. It was a time of increased cost 
pressures on European health systems generally, yet there was also 
recognition of the need to address the concerns industry had about its 
regulatory environment. The context of the time therefore seemed to suggest 
that the dual role of the Department of Health for procurement and 
sponsorship was particularly apposite.
During the 1993 negotiations the Secretary of State stressed, both privately 
and publicly, the need to value the pharmaceutical industry for its scientific 
and commercial success, not least its success as an export earner for UK 
pic.: “I took seriously the view that the pharmaceutical industry is one of the 
most creative success stories for the UK.”736
That the balance to be struck was recognised at the top of the Department 
was not in doubt: “I wanted to get, as it were, our pound of flesh for the 
government but I was always worried that we would go just a step too far and 
result in a situation where Britain stopped being the place that
736 Interview, Government minister 17
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pharmaceutical companies wanted to be.”737 What is not immediately clear is 
whether a Secretary of State would continue to have that balance of 
approach without it being his or her overt responsibility to do so.
6.8.1 The EMEA campaign
The broad role played by the Secretary of State was demonstrated during 
1993 by the campaign to win the EU’s new joint licensing body, the European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA). The government campaigned 
vigorously for the new agency to be sited in London, which it eventually was. 
The new EU-wide authorisation procedure that would be administered by the 
EMEA would streamline the licensing of new products and was directly 
applicable to all EU member state’s markets. In terms of industrial ‘critical 
mass’, the siting of the EMEA in the UK would undoubtedly strengthen the 
position of the industry here.
The Secretary of State for Health was responsible for promoting Britain’s 
case and through this she gained knowledge of the international dimensions 
of the global pharmaceutical industry. The campaign was one which 
“occupied a lot of my time and to which I devoted a lot of energy”, according 
to a senior DOH politician.
The EMEA campaign broadened the understanding of the Secretary of State 
for Health of the industry and its operations beyond its relationship with the 
NHS. A great deal of communication with industry on the EMEA issue 
resulted in her gaining a broad perspective on its global organisation and 
where the UK stood in it. “Winning the EMEA for London was a great 
opportunity. The large pharmaceutical companies have a base in the States, 
a base in Japan and somewhere in Europe; EMEA went a long way to 
making sure that Britain would be the somewhere in Europe.”738
737 Interview, Government minister 17
738 Interview, Government minister 17
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Given that the PPRS negotiations were almost simultaneous, the EMEA 
campaign served as a timely instruction in the international nature of the 
industry and its complex regulatory interests ahead of her involvement in this 
area of purely domestic policy. Furthermore, as sponsor, the Secretary of 
State was directly involved in export promotion for the industry and travelled 
extensively for this purpose.
6.8.2 The sponsorship role
In addition to the EMEA campaign, the global nature of the industry and its 
location strategies would be impressed on politicians by the close 
involvement in their affairs through the sponsorship function. Aside from the 
discussions surrounding the EMEA, the Secretary of State was involved, as 
sponsor, in commercial promotion abroad. “I made a number of export visits 
overseas, to Russia, Hungary, Thailand, Malaysia, Australia, Hong Kong, the 
United States -  and I thought that was an appropriate role.”739 The 
commercial promotion served to reinforce in the minds of responsible 
ministers and the Secretary of State the broader context of the industry and 
its interests beyond its relationship with the NHS. As industry sponsor, the 
Secretary of State made herself available to discuss the bigger contextual 
issues with senior executives throughout the period of the negotiations, 
gaining an appreciation of their views.740
Had the sponsorship function been the responsibility of the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry, the focus of the top of the DOH would not have been 
subjected to some of these other issues and dimensions of pharmaceutical 
policy, quite aside from the particular aims of the PPRS.
6.8.3 Departmental interests
Sure that the PPRS as a framework sufficiently defended and promoted the 
interests of industry, the principal aims of the government in the 1993
739 Interview, Government minister 17
740 Scrip No 1803, 16 March 1993, p.4.
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negotiations were explained thus by the senior negotiator, head of the PPRS 
Branch:
“There were three objectives: one was the bureaucratic objective, to 
streamline the scheme and to clarify some of the definitions and make it 
work better; the second objective was the Treasury objective -  to find some 
savings; and the third was the DTI objective, which was to maintain good 
relations with the pharmaceutical industry -  and that was a Department of 
Health objective as well. The first of these -  the bureaucratic objective -  was 
the main aim of the Department of Health for its own sake; the second 
objective is obviously something imposed on us from the Treasury and the
741third objective was a direct concern of both ours and DTI’s.”
The various objectives are identified here as belonging to each of the three 
departments with an interest in the outcome of the negotiations -  illustrating 
the effect of the dual role on the DOH as one which gives it an overview of all 
of the government’s aims. There is an implication here as well that the 
sponsorship role’s residing in the DOH does not mean the DTI disappears 
form the picture -  it still has an objective and an interest in the PPRS. 
Furthermore, the “DTI objective” is explicitly referred to by the senior civil 
servant as an objective of the DOH, while the “Treasury objective” is not.
6.8.4 The nature of the DOH
Another important aspect of the sponsorship debate is to what extent it 
changes the nature of the Department of Health itself, quite aside from the 
strength or weakness of the DTI and its likely ability to influence 
DOH/Treasury discussions. In 1993 the pharmaceutical industry was far from 
universally liked within the wider DOH. “It was easy and fashionable for 
health people to take the view that the pharmaceutical industry were fat cats 
creaming off profits from exploiting innocent patients,” noted a senior 
politician.742
741 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
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Through the dual role of the DOH, the procurement and industrial policy aims 
of government are unified far earlier in the policy process, at the sub- 
departmental level, rather than inter-ministerially as would otherwise be the 
case. The head of division within the Department of Health has overt and 
formal responsibility for unifying these two objectives before policy proposals 
are put to ministerial examination. “There is merit in civil servants, even 
behind Chinese walls, being aware of the range of issues that are affected in 
a single area of policy,” noted a senior politician. And the situation seemed to 
improve: “Gradually the status and recognition of that function within the 
Department of Health increased, although it was something of a battle.”743
The makeup of the wider department is crucial to judging the likely effect on 
policy outcomes if the sponsorship function were removed: “Other areas of 
the Department tended to be very suspicious of the pharmaceutical industry 
-  they were far more focussed on value for money in the NHS -  but it was an 
objective that ministers had,” said a senior civil servant.744
6.8.5 The role of the DTI
There is evidence that the role of the DTI was important in the 1993 
negotiations even with its limited role. The DTI bolstered the arguments of 
the DOH in exercising its sponsorship function:
“I persuaded Michael Heseltine [Secretary of State for Trade and Industry] to 
write me a letter accusing me of being too brutal with the industry, because I 
really was worried that if I was asked to take even more out by the Treasury 
that it would actually damage the industry. Michael Heseltine duly wrote this 
letter, which got circulated to all departments in Whitehall, suggesting that 
Mrs. Bottomley was being ruthless to the industry -  ruthless and reckless! 
Then the Treasury backed off and decided that I was just to settle.”745
742 Interview, Government minister 17
743 Interview, Government minister 17
744 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
745 Interview, Government minister 17
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For the most part, it seems that industry spokespersons regard the DOH’s 
role as having been significant in the 1993 negotiations. One industry 
spokesperson noted that “Every time the government is horrible to us some 
argue that the DTI would be a more effective sponsor,” and that the PPRS 
negotiations are bound to be a time of relative tension. There can be a 
tendency then for some within the industry to object to the role being placed 
with DOH. But the alliance between the Department of Health and DTI seen 
in 1993 is one that is based on the DOH having this role. Without it, the same 
industry source maintains, “There would be no bar on the Department of 
Health following normal government procurement rules and driving the lowest 
possible price they could.”746
Industry did use the DTI as a ‘back door’ to the DOH regarding the PPRS. 
The ABPI had expressed concern to the DTI about the ‘export disincentive’ in 
the PPRS and a new interdepartmental group focused on exports was set up 
under the auspices of the DTI to look at export promotion in industries not 
sponsored by the Department, including pharmaceuticals.747 So where direct 
DTI concerns were at issue, foremost exports, the industry could rely on 
some DTI representation within government.
If the DTI played some active role in the 1993 negotiations, under its limited 
remit, then the sponsorship role of the DOH can be seen as an additional 
source of industry support within government rather than an alternative one. 
The real importance of the role of the DOH is in the balance of power that 
exists between these three departments. “The most difficult negotiations 
were within government, not between government and the pharmaceutical 
industry, and the key player in our interdepartmental steering committee was 
the Treasury.”748
746 Interview, industry executive 9
747 Scrip No 1776,4 December 1992, p.4.
748 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
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6.8.6 The role of the Treasury
The key relationship according to commentators on both sides is between the 
DOH as a procuring department and the Treasury. “The real warriors were 
the Treasury, who always, whatever the outcome was, wanted another 5%. 
Whatever happened, the Treasury were always greedy and never satisfied; 
they never congratulated you,” noted a senior DOH politician.749
The recent history of pharmaceutical expenditure would ensure that the 
Treasury had a significant part to play in the negotiations about the PPRS 
within government: “The growth in the drugs bill of 12%+ rang alarm bells in 
the Treasury, where expenditure changes are always incremental,” said a 
senior civil servant.750 He also suggested that the PPRS was an important 
piece of regulation for the Treasury, representing a large chunk of public 
expenditure. They devote significant effort to its renegotiation.751
The Treasury could interfere in the various elements of a department’s 
budget and nowhere more so than in areas such as the pharmaceutical 
services within the NHS. “The Treasury always made other matters within the 
departmental budget conditional on taking an arm and a leg out of the 
pharmaceutical budget, noted a senior politician.752 A senior civil servant 
explained its importance for the Treasury: “Aside from social security, this is 
probably the biggest chunk of government expenditure that was, at the time, 
demand led rather than cash limited and the Treasury were very hands 
on.”753 Indeed the Treasury, in the shape of Treasury Secretary Michael 
Portillo, had fired a shot across the bows of the industry in a public 
pronouncement about the rising drugs bill, prior to the 1993 spending review 
and during the PPRS negotiations.754
749 Interview, Government minister 17
750 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
751 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
752 Interview, Government minister 17
753 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
754 Scrip No 1795, 16 February 1993, p.2.
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The power of the Treasury is the key factor in the judgement of industry 
commentators that the DOH is the most beneficial place to site the 
sponsorship function. “Ultimately the government’s position has to be agreed 
by ministers, which effectively means the Secretary of State for health and 
the Chancellor, but the Chancellor is always more important than the 
Secretary of State for health, and so he effectively had a veto.”755 Despite the 
presence of DTI in policy making groups that discussed the PPRS, the key 
bargaining with government was between Health and Treasury and the 
importance of the sponsorship function arises because without it Treasury 
pressure would meet little resistance.
Both the chief civil servant in the Department of Health and the Secretary of 
State noted that the key sticking points in government’s internal decision 
making process occurred because the Treasury insisted on a higher level of 
savings.
The Treasury’s influence meant that the price cut was one of the more 
important parts of the agreement for government as a whole and this was 
communicated to industry, albeit indirectly: “We didn’t start off negotiations by 
saying we are looking for savings of 200 million or whatever. W e went in 
saying that our objective is to improve the operation of the scheme but 
implicit in that was that we would also be saving a lot of money for the 
Treasury.”756
6.8.7 Conclusions
The progress of the negotiations and the contextual events of 1993 suggest 
that the sponsorship role of the DOH was central to the outcome of the 
scheme. The Treasury in 1993 was particularly vociferous in seeking a 
saving on the pharmaceutical budget, which they saw as rising far too 
quickly. The focus of the Secretary of State for Health on non-procurement 
issues appears to have been decisive in her pursuit of a ‘fair deal’.
755 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
756 Interview, DOH civil servant 27
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Furthermore, the key point that the DTI does not cease to have any role but 
can bolster a sponsorship function of the DOH was demonstrated overtly by 
Michael Heseltine’s ‘recruitment’ to the cause, effectively lining up two 
cabinet ministers against the Treasury’s position. The Treasury was widely 
regarded as having little concern other than cash savings in the 1993 
negotiations and the broad ranging competence of the DOH, specifically its 
sponsorship role, was therefore central to the maintenance of the PPRS 
policy community.
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7.1 The pharmaceuticals market
The negotiations of 1993 and 1999, as well as the passage of the 1999 Health 
Bill left the market for pharmaceuticals largely unchanged. The PPRS does not 
impinge directly on all the features of the market identified here as 
characterising its structure. The NHS is the basic structural feature of the 
market, concentrating purchasing power to the point of monopsony. But while 
this concentration of public purchasing power yields clear bargaining resources 
for the government, the empirical research here also shows that this 
concentration has yielded regulatory goods for industry. It provided clear 
advantages for the process of clinical trials, a fact recognised by the 
government: “We had the success of the NHS which meant an exceedingly 
good basis where drugs could be evaluated, tested and developed.”757 And as 
one industry commentator pointed out, it provides a stable market for the 
industry’s goods: “If you argue for a free market, understand what you mean by 
a free market -  you live in a market now where, before NICE, it’s virtually 
compulsory for the customer to buy your products. If you have a free market, it’s 
not compulsory for the customer to buy your products.”758
The NHS itself can therefore be seen as a basic structural asset for both 
government and industry. It enables a symbiotic relationship and facilitates the 
balancing and saticficing -  even the optimising -  of their respective policy 
aims.759 The ‘network interdependence’ identified by Wright760 was something 
that was maintained despite the potential for crisis in 1999 and was clearly a 
desired outcome of both sides.
757 Interview, Government minister 17
758 Interview, industry executive 13
759 Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987), p.298; Simon (1957), pp.204 ff; March and Simon (1958) pp.48 ff
760 Wright. M. (1988b), p.402.
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All the factors that characterise the British marketplace for drugs can be seen as 
contributing to the ability of both sides to achieve an acceptable level of ‘goods’ 
from the two PPRS agreements. Yet the government throughout the 1990s had 
concerns about the developing nature of the industry and its potential budgetary 
impact. The research exemplifies the importance of these issues: part of the 
motivation for government to examine a range of policy possibilities in 1993 was 
the perceived shift to more expensive products -  a shift that was proved by the 
DOH’s research into the causes of growth in the drugs bill over preceding years. 
In 1999 the Health Bill introduced explicit mechanisms of control to augment the 
PPRS and the issue of ‘blockbuster’ products had been increasing in importance 
through the decade: other mechanisms were used, including Schedule 10 of the 
G M SR  But in the end, the restraining features of the market -  including the 
conservative prescribing habits of GPs and the wide use of generics -  kept this 
threat sufficiently in check and any belief in a serious threat of a ‘shock’ to the 
policy community from this quarter cannot be deduced here.
In the end however, the key regulatory goods that were sought by industry were 
maintained and a facilitator of this was the context of the PPRS in a relatively 
conservative market.
Nevertheless, some liberalisation within the PPRS can be identified across the 
decade -  most importantly through the large extension of the MOT in the 1999 
scheme. Even the 1993 scheme (which can be characterised as more strict in its 
narrowing of the margin of tolerance on the ROR) was inclined to exaggerate 
the tendencies of the scheme and further reinforce the costs and benefits of it to 
both sides.
Furthermore, both sides had to gauge the costs and benefits of the PPRS in the 
absence -  given its five decades of operation -  of certain knowledge about how 
the market would later behave without the scheme, or if significant changes
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were made to it. “You can never know the counter factual,” noted a senior civil 
servant in this regard.761
In judging the benefits of the market for the taxpayer, while keeping one eye on 
industrial policy aims, the PPRS had to be judged within the framework of the 
NHS and the monolithic nature of medicines purchases. In this context the 
breadth of choices seemed to the politicians involved to be limited: “Until there 
was a different system of health care funding, I wasn’t able to identify an 
alternative practical structure,”762 said a senior politician.
The particular shape of the NHS market provided a known and relatively risk 
free context in which to continue the co-operative regulatory regime and is a 
clear example of a policy community as Wright would have it, where actors 
“share a common identity or interest,” and will ‘transact’ with each other, 
exchanging resources in order to balance and ‘optimise’ their mutual 
relationships.763
7.2 The global context
The global nature of the industry and the national structure of its markets create 
special dynamics in the government-industry relationship. Given the industrial 
policy aims of government, the mobility of global firms lends them increased 
bargaining resources in their negotiations with the government over regulation. 
This is likely to be a an increasingly important factor in all types of government- 
industry relations over coming years as trade barriers continue to diminish and 
as firms become more global in their organisation, their markets and their 
outlook.
761 Interview, DOH civil servant 27.
762 Interview, Government minister 17
763 Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987), pp.298-9.
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This is a key point in underpinning the strategic aims of both sides and the 
international competitiveness of the industry is explicitly recognised in the aims 
of the PPRS. It is therefore an institutional factor that defines the policy aims as 
well as the negotiating resources of both sides: government’s industrial policy 
aims are mirrored by the bargaining resource of industry to invest according the 
most conducive regulatory environment.
The consolidation of firms in the sector and their increasingly global focus has 
been accompanied by a definite shift in its investment from Europe to the United 
States. Given the dominance of American based firms in the global marketplace, 
the conditions of the American market stand as an example to American 
executives in Europe and they are the ones most likely to push for liberalisation 
and accept least strict regulation. This was the case in 1993 but became far 
more pronounced in 1999: arriving at an industry position within the ABPI 
necessitated placating considerable pressure from some American firms for 
more liberalisation of the market (in the end underpinning the PICTF process).
All three studies here again indicate that the global structure of industry provided 
a context that both necessitated and enabled the aims of each side -  as 
constituted following their internal discussion -  to be balanced within the PPRS 
to a degree acceptable to each.
The global structure of the industry significantly defined the relationship between 
government and industry, because the government’s industrial policy aims 
enabled industry to gain important concessions in their cost containment aims. 
The value of the industry to government was demonstrated by the willingness of 
the Prime Minister to meet the CEOs of the major British firms in the run up to 
the 1999 PPRS negotiations, to discuss broad issues about the UK as a 
pharmaceutical industry location.
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Furthermore, this important structural feature of the industry was identified by a 
key civil servant as a potential problem for the regime, in operational terms, in 
the future: ‘There’s a difficulty of having a return-on-capital scheme in a global 
business. It’s alright when the assets are all in this country, but when they are 
spread around the world it makes it more difficult and this is something that’s 
happening through mergers ... it is a question for the future.”764 A potential 
‘shock’ to the policy community in the future -  or perhaps at least a rising 
pressure -  might prove to be the globalisation of firms and the increasing 
difficulty of assessing their national operations in relation to their national sales.
7.3 The co-operative state
The approach of the state to the control of pharmaceutical prices has been a key 
factor in the persistence of the PPRS as a mode of regulation. The role of the 
state is defined by its ambition: it has not sought to regulate strictly the activities 
of the sector and has confined its cost control aims to the context of the NHS 
and a good deal for the taxpayer within it. That is to say, broader aims for control 
of the sector have not been pursued and industrial policy aims have been to 
facilitate a globally successful industry (meaning both success for British firms 
on the world stage and success for the UK as a pharmaceutical location). This 
attempt to balance different aims rather than to develop a ‘strategic’ approach 
from a blank piece of paper is one seen by Middlemas as bringing industry into 
decision making as part of the ‘extended state’.765 Industrial policy aims can 
therefore be seen as having underpinned the close working relationship 
between government and industry in the PPRS.
The industrial culture of the UK -  the conception of the role of government in the 
economy -  has predisposed the government to this limited involvement in the
764 Interview, DOH civil servant 5
765 Middlemas, K. (1986), p.348.
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sector.766 The historic role of the state was as an overseer of private business 
activity.767 A comprehensive public health care system has complicated this 
relationship but in the aspects of the NHS that create relationships with industry 
the more liberal tendency has prevailed. Co-operation can be seen as a core 
value of the policy community that was instrumental to re-establishing the 
balance in it in 1999, following the crisis of the early part of the negotiations and 
the Health Bill.768
The three studies show that this is the case. In neither the negotiations of 1993 
or 1999 did the government seek stricter control of the industry. Even the 1999 
Health Bill, which sought greater legal control in several areas, did so within the 
context of the PPRS: that is to say that while a different form of control was 
sought in it, the content was to remain the same. In any case, and accepting that 
the form of regulation was also a crucial factor for industry, many of the original 
aims did not progress to the Act. ‘Negotiated compliance’ was certainly preferred 
to strict enforcement, and regulators wish to avoid taking legal proceedings to 
enforce regulation, which necessitated the balancing of various interests.769 Co­
operation was certainly a regulatory good for the government in both 1993 and 
1999. It was also a means to the regulatory good of investment, as companies 
cannot be regulated into investing easily in a globalising economy.770
The studies show a desire on the part of government to continue with a co­
operative regime rather than an inability to regulate in any other way. Indeed in 
other areas of regulation the government has acted decisively to control costs 
and to regulate the industry: not least through continued increases in demand 
side controls and the introduction of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE).
766 Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987), p.278; Wilks, S. (1983), pp.132-137.
767 Balogh, T. (1959), p. 109.
768 Wright, M. (1991).
769 Middlemas, K. (1986), p.348.
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Indeed, the government did perhaps come close to upsetting the nature of the 
government-industry relationship -  not least because of other events happening 
at the same time. Principally this consisted of the introduction of NICE, which 
could undermine the main benefits of the PPRS from the industry’s point of view.
Yet in the PPRS, the negotiations show the government’s clear preference to 
keep industry ‘on-board’ and to listen to its commercial concerns. In this sense, 
the state, in this sector, cannot easily be defined as ‘weak’ given the 
connotations of that term, although some of the features of the ‘weak state’ 
identified by Atkinson and Coleman may be present -  most obviously here the 
government’s own perceived need to have information provided by industry, 
compromising its ability to act.
Industry showed a similar inclination. Despite their initial consternation at being 
presented with legislation in 1999, industry actors soon came round to defending 
the government-industry relationship. Large parts of industry gave some support 
to attempts by government -  through the Bill or the PPRS -  to ensure better 
compliance with the scheme. The role of industry actors in discussing detailed 
amendments to the Bill was so overt that they effectively became a part of the 
legislative process, albeit informally.
This reticence by both parties to undermine their mutual agreement underlined 
the nature of their relationship as one identified by Grant as an exchange 
relationship, in which government gains the information required to conduct 
policy, and an exchange process to implement it.771 Co-operation between the 
two sides is overtly recognised as a core value, in Wright’s terminology, as well 
as clearly discernable from their strategies and actions. The acceptance of a 
negotiated agreement underpins policy that is, in the terms of Wilks and Wright 
and of Simon, about optimising and balancing.
770 Hancher, Leigh and Moran, Michael. (1989), p.275.
771 Grant, Wyn. (1993), pp.46-65.
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The traditional Treasury view’ of the role of the state is one that does not sit 
easily with the largest remaining part of the Beveridge welfare state: the NHS is 
not a state-minimalist system. Furthermore, the ‘sponsorship’ element of the 
PPRS is one that allows the sort of free pricing of new medicines that costs the 
exchequer money: the scheme is not the most robust of regimes for keeping 
costs to a minimum. Yet the Treasury view’ of the minimalist state has informed 
policy in this area: the acceptance of higher-than-possible prices has at all 
PPRS negotiations been accepted in the end. The Treasury, in both 1993 and 
1999 the driving force behind the government’s bargain hunting, has been 
persuaded of the need to give industry the freedom to succeed in international 
markets. In 1999 Treasury officials were adamant that enabling a successful 
industry was a Treasury aim as well.
The modern welfare role appears to set up another anomaly in analysing 
government-industry relations. The Victorian laissez-faire state was one, 
according to Vogel,772 that had an adversarial relationship with industry: it was 
explicitly not mercantilist. A co-operative state-industry relationship is the 
reverse of laissez-faire in these terms. Yet this dichotomy can be seen to have 
evolved significantly long before the post-war welfare states were inaugurated. 
Government’s ‘enabling’ of successful industry, albeit by keeping out of its way, 
was an established feature of Anglo-American thinking by the late nineteenth 
century. ‘Industrial culture’773 -  the conception of the proper role of the state in 
the economy, and the extent to which intervention by government is acceptable 
-  remained minimalist but the relationship was not necessarily adversarial. The 
co-operative relationship emerges because the choices facing government are 
shaped by the welfare state -  in this case the NHS. The government by 
definition has a close relationship with industry as its primary customer. The
772 Vogel, David. National Styles o f  Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United 
States. Cornell University Press, 1986. Chapter 6. pp.226-263.
773 Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987), p.278; Wilks, S. (1983), pp.132-137.
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choice is therefore between a co-operative relationship that fulfils mutual aims or 
an adversarial one which does not.
7.4 The role of parliament
The three studies present mixed evidence for the extent of Parliament’s role in 
the procurement of medicines for the NHS. On the one hand, Parliament has no 
explicit role in the negotiation of the PPRS or in examination of its execution. It 
has however sought to scrutinise the general implementation of the scheme and 
judge its value for money, asking the National Audit Office to conduct a report 
into it in 1993. This proved to be a significant report and many of its suggestions 
shaped the agenda for reform in 1999.
Furthermore, explicit power over the area was given to Parliament in 1999 
through the process of legislating for the back-up ‘statutory PPRS’ that sought to 
enforce the voluntary agreement on those who signed up to it and to provide an 
alternative means of oontrol for any companies that didn’t.
The studies show that, as in 1984 and the debacle over the Limited List, 
Parliament’s role is enhanced when there has already been some breakdown in 
the relationship between government and industry. Both sides have sought to 
engage Parliament to their own advantage at some times and both have been 
successful to some degree. The Health Bill and the PPRS negotiations each 
show that Parliament can be a crucial player in instances of policy innovation or 
overhaul. Formal and informal parliamentary contacts made a crucial difference 
to the ability of industry to gain back some of the ground it felt it had lost 
because of the government’s thorough preparation for the 1999 negotiations. 
Equally, it was (and, by definition, is) the mechanism -  through proposed 
legislation -  by which the government can exercise its key resource as a 
lawmaker.
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Parliament has become a central actor at such key moments but there is no 
evidence that this position can be sustained by it separately from the desire of 
government and/or industry for it to play that role. The exception to this state of 
affairs, as the 1999 PPRS in particular has demonstrated, is in the influence 
Parliament has had over the negotiating agenda, which has to a significant 
degree been driven by Parliamentary scrutiny and criticism. Even here, 
however, Parliament’s minimal grasp of the PPRS and minimal involvement in it 
has limited its criticism to suggestions for reforms to the existing regulatory 
regime.
There is a general point of accountability, which at key times becomes of central 
importance, as one senior industry commentator noted: “Eventually Parliament 
has got to feel happy that the way in which medicines are handled is acceptable. 
Perceptions in parliament are important.”774
The Department of Health and the ABPI do not seek a wider policy community 
except, as Wright would have predicted, when there are problems present in 
their close co-operative relationship. Parliament has a ‘look-in’ and has 
examined the efficiency of the PPRS but it has not been a central player of its 
own accord. This role is encouraged by the limited ability of industry to lobby 
Parliament on an abstruse issue which MPs do not see as central to their 
constituents concerns. Only MPs with particular industrial interests 
(pharmaceutical investments in their constituencies) have an obvious motive for 
taking a substantial interest in the PPRS. The opaque nature of the scheme to 
outsiders was sited as a problem for their discussion of it in the 1999 Health Bill. 
In 1984-5, when Parliament had been engaged in the Limited List debate, the 
issue here was far simpler for MPs -  access for patients to medicines. The 
debate about NICE has followed this pattern because there is a direct effect on 
constituents of blocking a new drug for general NHS use and this can fill a
774 Interview, industry executive 6
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substantial part of MPs’ post bags. The pricing of pharmaceutical has been a 
proxy for wider concerns but not a central issue of concern in itslef.
7.5 Role of the Department of Health
The role of the Department of Health in ‘sponsoring’ the pharmaceutical industry 
is one factor that sets the British system apart from its continental neighbours: 
“Crucial to the evolution of a community ... was the concentration of legal 
authority and policy jurisdiction (regulation and sponsorship) in one 
department.”775 There has been an increased focus on supporting new 
medicines in some European countries in recent years -  notably France -  in 
recognition of the success of the PPRS in supporting an innovative industry. 
And indeed the sponsorship function of the DOH has facilitated a forum for 
dialogue between government and industry and enabled the latter to impress 
upon government its evolving concerns.
The ‘balanced’ view of the Department of Health as a whole, represented by the 
head of the IID (now MPI) in the PPRS negotiations, is one that has proved 
decisive in shifting the DOH’s approach to the scheme. As a senior civil servant 
in the Department remarked, “There are 5/4 thousand people working in the 
Department of Health. All of them bar one want to screw the pharmaceutical 
industry as hard as they possibly can. One person who’s got to be aware of 
something a bit wider than that is the Head of the Division that’s negotiating the 
PPRS.”776 It is the role of the Head of Division, informed by both the 
procurement and sponsorship motive of the DOH, to face down any one-sided 
procurement concerns that the Treasury and the wider DOH may have. There is 
also evidence that in both 1993 and 1999 the Secretary of State for Health 
shifted towards the sponsorship concerns during the process of the negotiations:
775 Wright M .( 1991), p.513.
776 Interview, DOH civil servant 10
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as the person ultimately responsible for signing off the agreement, this is 
evidence of the influential role of the sponsorship function.
The government’s interests here are, in the words of Allison, “competitive, not 
homogenous.”777 As the Treasury is the dominant force among British 
government departments, it is inconceivable that a DOH that did not have its 
approach influenced significantly by the sponsorship role would not drift towards 
a far more procurement-focused approach. While the DTI’s role has had some 
influence, not least in 1999 as a facilitator of discussion when relationships 
between the DOH and industry had been soured, it cannot be seen as decisive 
vis-a-vis the Treasury and it is unlikely to have either been altered or bolstered 
by possessing a sponsorship function while the DOH was the lead department, 
formally responsible for the scheme. Because there was no diminishment in the 
forcefulness with which the DTI aimed to represent the pharmaceutical industry, 
in comparison with any other industry, the DOH sponsorship function can be 
seen as an addition to, rather than a replacement of, the DTI’s role. Both the 
DOH and the DTI face the Treasury as industry ‘sponsors’ (formal and informal).
The sponsorship role of the DOH has therefore significantly affected the 
outcome of PPRS negotiations: a key aspect in fact of the 1999 scheme was the 
incorporation into it of a unique and wide-ranging review of the commercial and 
scientific interests of the industry in the British marketplace and economy.
7.6 Understanding government-industry relations in the 
pharmaceutical sector
Government-industry relations in the pharmaceutical sector in the UK are 
defined by various factors, outlined throughout this thesis. The particular form of
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their relationship through the PPRS is one that was defined as early as the 
modem pharmaceutical industry itself, during the war years when government’s 
relationship with industries of all kinds was shaped by the need for public 
procurement of essential goods. The organisation of the industry at that time 
enabled an amicable and co-operative relationship between the two to emerge 
and prosper. The trauma of setting up the NHS and subsequent economic 
problems that focused the government’s attention on the balance of trade, 
combined to underpin a relatively ‘light-touch’ form of price regulation of 
pharmaceuticals in considerable contrast to alternative systems that developed 
throughout the rest of Europe.
Despite the transformation of the industry in the intervening years, the basic 
framework devised in 1957, the VPRS, with its development during the 1970s, 
still constitutes the basic framework for regulation today. Nevertheless, the 
hypotheses developed here enable an assessment of the likely determining 
factors of both continuity and change and, crucially, the direction, if not the 
detail, of any such change in the years ahead. Fundamental among those 
factors is the British government’s conception of its own role, in the context of 
the vital importance of the pharmaceutical industry in the UK’s industrial 
performance in a changing ‘knowledge’ economy. That is to say, the conjunction 
of the British government’s broadly liberal approach to industrial regulation 
combined with the industrial importance of the industry, is likely to continue to 
prioritise the industrial policy dimension of pharmaceutical regulation to a 
sufficient degree to offset any perceived increased need for cost containment in 
health care at a time of potentially profound demographic and social change. 
The prioritisation of industrial policy has arguably been leant a helping hand by 
the peripheral role of the legislature in framing regulation, where it might be 
considered to have focused to a greater degree on purely procurement 
concerns, which is to say, value for money in the short term. In addition, the 
changing corporate shape of the industry has raised clear operational questions
777 Allison (1971) p. 146
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over the long term viability of the PPRS because of the increasing complexity of 
corporate organisation across countries.
The PPRS negotiations of 1993 and 1999, and the drama of the Health Bill, can 
be seen to represent the latter chapters in the story of the PPRS. It was quite 
clear that the PPRS was not seen as an ‘ideal’ form of regulation so much as 
one that already existed alongside few obvious alternatives. More importantly, 
what the cases of government-industry negotiation here show is a future 
direction of policy, rather than its precise form or content. The difficulties in 
moving from the PPRS to another form of more direct price regulation firmly 
suggest that any inadequacies of the PPRS will be met in the future by moves 
towards more liberal rather than stricter regulation of the industry. The 
government has thoroughly explored and rejected ‘off-the-shelf options for price 
regulation over a sustained number of years, through administrations of varying 
political colours, and the freeing up of the market for pharmaceuticals in the UK 
is the most likely direction of reform for the coming years. And nor is the 
industrial policy vs. procurement concerns a clear dichotomy; the changing 
shape of health care is likely to mean that medicines come to be yet more 
central to the delivery of health care to an older, wealthier population, in which 
primary care is charged with an ever greater portion of the responsibility for 
delivering world class health care accessible to all.
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Name______________________ Type
Jim Attridge
Michael Bailey
Jack Barnes
Kevin Barron MP
Rt. Hon. Virginia Bottomley MP
Alistair Bridges
Mike Brownlee
Rt. Hon. Kenneth Clarke MP
Lord Tim Clement-Jones
Monica Darnbrough
Derek Davis
Rt. Hon. Frank Dobson MP 
Jim Furniss 
lain Gillespie 
Dr. Evan Harris MP 
David Hill
Earl Frederic Howe 
Trevor Jones 
Chrissie Kimmons 
Till Medinger 
John Middleton 
Louise Rickitt 
Baroness Margaret Sharp 
Sir Richard Sykes 
Mike Wallace 
Lord Walton of Detchant
Industry executive 
Industry executive 
DOH civil servant 
Parliamentarian 
Government Minister 
Treasury civil servant 
DOH civil servant 
Government Minister 
Parliamentarian 
DTI civil servant 
DTI civil servant 
Government Minister 
DOH civil servant 
DOH civil servant 
Parliamentarian 
Industry executive 
Parliamentarian 
Industry executive 
Industry executive 
Industry executive 
DOH civil servant 
Treasury civil servant 
Parliamentarian 
Industry executive 
Industry executive 
Parliamentarian
Date Role/position
May 2001 
23February 2000 
19 April 2000 
19 March 2001 
01 August 2001 
March 2001 
06 February 2000
Corporate Affairs, AstraZeneca; ABPI Advisory Team
Glaxo Wellcome Corp. Affairs; Chairman ABPI; ABPI Negotiating Team 
Head, DOH International and Industry Division (IID)
MP (Labour), Chairman of Pharmaceutical APPG 
Secretary of State for Health 1993 
Head, Treasury Health Team, Public Services Directorate 
Head, DOH PPRS Branch 
Letter: 23 May 2000 Minister of Health 1984 (Secretary of State for Health 1986) 
16 January 2001 Lords (LibDem), Health Spokesman, LibDems 
23 August 2000 Head, DTI Biotechnology Directorate 
26 March 2001 Head, DTI Chemicals Directorate 
19 September 2000 Secretary of State for Health 1999 
April 2001 Head, DOH PPRS Branch 1993
18 October 2000 DOH Sponsorship Branch
MP (LibDem) Standing Committee
Leo Pharmaceuticals Corp. Affairs; ABPI Negotiating Team 1993 & 1999 
Lords (Con), Opposition Leader on Health 
Director General, ABPI
Corp. Affairs SmithKline Beecham; ABPI Advisory Team 
11 September 2000 Corp. Affairs AstraZeneca; ABPI Negotiating Team 
18 October 2000 Head, DOH Sponsorship Branch 
March 2001 Treasury, NHS improvement unit
March 2001 Lords (LibDem), Main LibDem Health spokesman in debates
April 2001 Chairman, GlaxoSmithKline / CEO Glaxo Wellcome
05 April 2000 Corp. Affairs, Schering; ABPI Advisory Team
March 2001 Lords (Crossbencher); significant participant in debate
24 October 2000 
05 February 2000 
September 2002 
13 January 2000 
8 March 2000
